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In his study of the rise of the modern penal system, Dis-
cipline and Punish (1979, 6–7), Michel Foucault juxta-
poses two modes of punishment: a spectacular and grisly 
execution from 1757, and a prison timetable from 1837. 
During this relatively short period, to rehearse his well- 
known argument, the predominating power modes of 
an emerging liberalism shifted away from public torture, 
with its focus on the visibly suffering body, and  toward 
self- regulation. In the latter mode of power, subjects (of 
whom the prisoner was paradigmatic)  were supposed to 
internalize a sense of constantly being supervised, such 
that they managed their own be hav ior. Their bodies took 
meaningful shape and intentionality in relation to, and 
ideally by incorporating as second nature, an externally 
imposed order of minute differentiations, emblematized 
by the timetable.
It is surprising in some ways that Foucault’s figure 
for this external order is a timetable,  because timetables 
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2 Introduction
greatly preceded the shift he describes, originating as they did in early 
monastic communities.1 But as Foucault tells it, the period from the mid-
1700s to the mid-1800s saw the rise of a technique of power—he calls 
it, famously, discipline— whose method and modality temporalized the 
 human body more completely, more thoroughly, and more minutely than 
ever before.2 His focus is thus less on the organ ization of time that the 
timetable seems to represent than on the regulation and instrumentaliza-
tion of  human capacity through time. That is, the aspects of the timetable 
that interest him are not units such as the day or the hour but the fact of 
collective  human punctuality itself: specific actions, such as rising and 
dressing in silence, lining up to a sequence of drum rolls, and submitting 
to inspection,  were to be performed by groups, within allotted and very 
specific times, in an unchanging sequence, at regular intervals. Indeed, 
Foucault speaks of the “three  great methods” of control enabled by the 
timetable: more than simply demarcating the hours, the timetable was 
part of a proj ect that intended to “establish rhythms, impose par tic u lar 
occupations, [and] regulate the cycles of repetition” of  human activities 
(Foucault 1979, 149). Though all three of  these aims take the body as 
their object, the first and last are  matters of timing that body in relation 
to other bodies as well as to the clock, in a choreographed chronometrics. 
In short, the timetable is less another iteration of the calendar than it is 
the repre sen ta tion of a newly systematized body moving deliberately in 
concert with other bodies.
In Foucault’s eye, what distinguished modern institutions of power 
from their medieval counter parts was that precision of time was met by 
precision of bodily movement, such that even gestures came  under the 
control of “collective and obligatory rhythm[s]” (Foucault 1979, 152). 
Discipline’s quin tes sen tial procedure was the exercise, in which the body 
itself was broken down into parts, each of whose forces was rearticulated 
in relation to other parts, objects, and bodies, thereby recomposing the 
body into, itself, a part- object in relation to a larger machine. This was 
accomplished in the military through the drill; in schools through in-
creasingly or ga nized physical activities culminating in gymnastics and 
eurythmics in the late nineteenth  century (see, e.g., Budd 1997); and 
in workplaces through management techniques that peaked with Tay-
lorism, also in the late nineteenth  century (see, e.g., Seltzer 1992).  These 
pro cesses  were  matters, not exclusively but foremostly, of timing: of flesh 
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coming into meaningful embodiment and connectivity through ad-
justing itself to par tic u lar rhythms, that is, par tic u lar muscle memories 
whose accomplishment and automation felt like a form of both selfhood 
and community (see McNeill 1997).
To sum up the temporal aspect of Discipline and Punish: Fou-
cault argues that during the eigh teenth  century “[a] sort of anatomo- 
chronological schema of be hav ior is defined. . . . . Time penetrates the 
body and with it all the meticulous controls of power” (Foucault 1979, 
152).  Here, time is both the dominant instrument of control and a means 
by which other forms of control, such as occupational training, enter the 
body and come to feel organic, as body parts are coordinated and cho-
reographed in their relation to other body parts, to the body as a  whole, 
to other bodies, and to external stimuli. In fact, Foucault goes so far as 
to argue that this pro cess formed a “new object” (155): a body that was 
felt and understood as natu ral, as agential and enduring, and as prior to 
any operations enacted upon it, even as  these operations  were also under-
stood to bring out the body’s true arrangement, capacities, and functions. 
The instrumentalization of time, coextensive with the temporalization 
of the body, (re)produced the “true” body. This newly naturalized body, 
Foucault writes, was “composed of solids and assigned movements”; that 
is, it was stable, mea sur able, and separate from other bodies. In other 
words, discipline’s “docile body,” as Foucault (135) calls it, was profoundly 
individualized, insofar as discipline isolated and specified not only singu-
lar  human beings but also minute gestures. This is the Foucauldian body 
we know and have critiqued for de cades in queer, feminist, and antihu-
manist theory: the singular body proper to the atomized subject of 
liberal rationality.3
But this newly timed body is also, Foucault goes on to say somewhat 
enigmatically, one of “speculative physics . . .  imbued with animal spir-
its. . . . [a body] of rational mechanics” (Foucault 1979, 155).4 His tilt 
 toward speculation, the animal, and the mechanical thus also invokes a 
combinatorial ethics, hinting at the way that the disciplined body was 
newly  imagined as, and trained to be, both porous to and associative with 
other bodies, objects, and machines. That is, the disciplinary techniques 
of the military, schools, factories, and so on worked to collate and to in-
strumentalize the time of individuals in order to amalgamate them into 
new kinds of massified forces: armies, student bodies, and workers whose 
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carefully arranged combinations of  human energy maximized produc-
tion and effect.5 The temporalized body of Discipline and Punish, then, 
was also collectivized in new ways prior to, and eventually alongside of, its 
biopo liti cal management as population: population, we might say, was 
the horizon of engroupment produced by the state, but it was made flesh 
by, and also contested through, smaller forms of association. And as Kyla 
Schuller (2017, 20) notes, in the nineteenth- century United States  these 
smaller forms of association— “private sector sites such as the planta-
tion, slave ship, church, orphanage, domestic home, domestic novel, fac-
tory,  women’s auxiliary socie ties, reform movements, and extranational 
settlements”— were just as vital to the operations of power as  were explic-
itly state- run institutions such as schools, hospitals, prisons, and the 
military. Local forms of sociability and agency  shaped the capacities of 
individual US American bodies into small- scale forces: constellations of 
nonstate, collective actors.
What Foucault describes in Discipline and Punish, then, is something 
like a Deleuzian assemblage, a collectivized body that represents a con-
tingent gathering of connected forces whose component parts shift in 
relation to one another and whose interior and exterior are not stable— 
albeit one that discipline immediately reterritorializes for the state, the 
market, and other entities of control (see Deleuze and Guattari 1988). 
This early Foucault also has in common with Deleuze an understanding of 
how bodies communicate with other bodies to form alliances and modes 
of being together without passing through cognition or through the lin-
guistic forms of identity— and thus intersects with some of the concepts 
foundational to con temporary fields such as the new materialisms and af-
fect studies, both of which turn away from the social constructionist po-
sition that language determines the field of action, being, and collective 
possibility. The new materialisms are most concerned with the agential 
properties of  matter, the pro cesses by which  matter becomes meaningful, 
and the interactions between the  human and the inhuman world. Stacy 
Alaimo’s (2010, 2) new materialist concept of “trans- corporeality,” for ex-
ample, captures some of the porosity of  human bodies that Foucauldian 
discipline makes it pos si ble to apprehend, though Alaimo is concerned 
with the interface between bodies and environments. Affect studies, 
too, focuses on the body as a “sensitive interface” (Gregg and Seigworth 
2010, 12), exploring thresholds of sensation that may or may not be dis-
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cursively codified as emotion, that blur subject- object and mind- body 
distinctions, and that constitute “asubjective forces” for sociopo liti cal 
action (Gibbs 2010, 187). Congruent with the aspect of discipline that 
I am describing  here, and crucial to at least some versions of affect stud-
ies, is Marcel Mauss’s “habitus,” or the learned disposition of the body 
that allows culture to feel like nature and to be “passed on” from body 
to body (Mauss 1973; Bourdieu 1977).6 Similarly, the temporal remaking 
of bodies into forces entails the idea that bodies communicate directly, 
in what affect theorist Davide Panagia calls “somacognition” (Panagia 
2009). Fi nally, the scientific concept of “entrainment,” or the tendency of 
rhythmic patterns to synchronize and, more broadly, of moving bodies to 
align with one another, has been fundamental to affect studies (see, e.g., 
Brennan 2004, 9–11, 68–73). None of  these theories of materialism or of 
affect draws directly from Discipline and Punish, yet the pro cess Foucault 
describes, of timing the body, seems vital to all of them.
To return, then, to Foucault, the invention of the subject, a modern 
body with an interior life understood as separate from that body, was, 
at the same time, the invention of the possibility of local assemblages, 
novel and contingent forms of belonging that neither required nor re-
sulted in a subject. Yet the genealogy of queer theory that has taken up 
the porous, combinatorial body as a wedge against the liberal politics of 
identity has generally followed Deleuze and Guattari’s interest in space, 
or “planar relations” (E. Sedgwick 2003, 8), and thus has not taken up 
the role of timing in making assemblages pos si ble. Leo Bersani (in Dean, 
Foster, Silverman, and Bersani 1997, 14), for example, imagines engroup-
ment formally, in terms of visual and tactile correspondences between 
bodies, as “a kind of solidarity not of identities but of positionings and 
configurations in space.” Eve Sedgwick, in Touching Feeling (2003, 8), 
pivots from a hermeneutics of “beneath” to a politics of “beside,” an-
other spatial relation. In Queer Phenomenology, Sara Ahmed (2006) dis-
solves the boundary between bodies and objects through interrogating 
the normative spatial arrangements that naturalize and reproduce some 
bodies at the expense of  others. Even Jasbir Puar (2007), in Terrorist 
 Assemblages, is predominantly interested in the role of the assemblage in 
deconstructing linear- progressive time through its juxtapositional logic, 
as opposed to the role of timing in making assemblages pos si ble in the 
first place.
6 Introduction
In contrast, I maintain that the temporalized invention of the subject, 
which is si mul ta neously the dissolution of the subject, should be of in-
terest to any scholar of sexuality. Indeed, it seems crucial that the body 
was understood as being fully penetrable by time before it was under-
stood as being fully penetrable by desire: discipline’s temporalization- 
subjectification precedes and then overlaps with the solidification of 
sexuality as such, or what Foucault elsewhere (1990a, 129) calls “the 
regime of sexuality”—by which I understand him to mean, briefly, the 
bundling of anatomy, object- choice, desire, fantasy, gender expression, 
and sex practice (among other  things) into a specific kind of person, nar-
rowing by the  middle of the twentieth  century into the heterosexual/
homosexual binary. Foucault’s account of the disciplined body as some-
thing whose potentialities  were latent and brought out through applied 
techniques— penetrations of power— that retroactively confirmed the 
very innateness of  those possibilities sounds very much like his account 
of how sex came to be installed as the true meaning of personhood, and 
indeed the two intersect and coarticulate.
But in his shift to the study of sexuality, Foucault himself also loses 
time. He describes the invention of sexuality as a series of predominantly 
spatial techniques: implantation, interiority, proliferation, distribution, 
annexation, peripheries, dissemination, penetration, saturation, areas, 
surfaces, networks, and spirals. Only in his suggestions about the ars 
erotica—in cultures he describes in his four- volume History of Sexuality 
as  either non- Western or premodern, in which the practice of plea sure in 
the pursuit of truth includes attention to the frequency, pacing, rhythm, 
and duration of sensual activities— can we see the timing of erotic life as 
a central part of how subjectivity and personhood come into being.7 In 
Foucault’s ([1976] 1997, 240) work on modern Western biopolitics, on 
the other hand, the chronometrics of the body dis appear into a large- 
scale “state control of the biological” focused on sequence and duration. 
In biopolitics, populations— masses of bodies— are created and managed 
through temporal techniques that change the arrival time, order, and 
length of life and life events.  These include birth control or fertility en-
hancement, policies designed to promote or delay marriage, reduction of 
the morbidities associated with chronic illnesses, and so on (243). And, 
of course, as the work of Ann Laura Stoler (1995) has clarified, this is a 
partial treatment of the role of temporality in biopolitics in any case, for 
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Foucault does not account for the role of sequential or durational time in 
the eigh teenth and nineteenth centuries’ racialization of sexuality, which 
is equally the sexualization of race, in which colonized populations 
 were cast as primitive and savage—as both developmentally  behind and 
historically prior to their colonizers. But even in bringing out this his-
tory, Stoler follows Foucault in imagining the work of time on sex and 
sociability only on a very large scale and not in terms of rhythm, syn-
chrony, timing, or metronomics.
To sum up, Foucault offers no description of the role of time between 
the two poles he describes for the organ ization of life: the individualizing 
work of anatomo(chrono)politics that depends on timing specific bod-
ies, and the massifying work of biopolitics whose temporal aspects seem 
 limited to rearranging life events or periodizing populations.  There is no 
explicit account in Foucault of how social formations are temporally cre-
ated and regulated by forces other than the state, as they so clearly  were 
in the United States; as Dana Luciano (2007, 11–12) puts it in her call for 
an affective history of sexuality, “[a] diff er ent analy sis [of power and ‘sex’] 
might have been produced had Foucault incorporated other addresses 
to the body within this chronology [of the movement from anatomo- 
politics to biopolitics].” The temporalizing address to the body clarified 
in Discipline and Punish, then, clearly involves biopower, or the work of 
organ izing the sensorium and the physical habits that give rise to it (see 
Lemke 2011, 36), but may not be apprehensible  under the state- centered 
understandings of biopolitics that have emerged  after Foucault, such as 
 those of Giorgio Agamben (1998) and Achille Mbembe (2003).8 Nor 
does Foucault explore how the timing of bodies in local instances might 
disrupt the rhythms, durations, and sequences imposed by the state and 
other large- scale institutions. Only in Foucault’s early descriptions of 
bodies as accumulating into forces do we see a glimpse of what we might 
call an ars sociabilis, or the attention to frequency, pacing, rhythm, and 
duration that tunes bodies to one another even in the absence of physi-
cal contact. We need a story of how discipline’s temporalized body met 
other bodies in modern social formations reducible neither to institution 
nor population, neither to identities nor genital sex— but in ephemeral 
relationalities organ izing and expressing themselves through time.
This book is that story. It identifies sites of temporal control, of the 
rupture of that control, and of the temporal rupture of other forms of 
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control, which are bigger than the individual body and for the most part 
smaller than populations. It is most interested in small- scale techniques 
that might be conceptualized as coming between anatomopolitics and 
biopolitics; that may be aimed at subjectification but may produce a 
small- scale collective consciousness instead of an individual, interiorized 
subjectivity; that may be produced within, by, and even for a biopo liti cal 
proj ect but that do not necessarily serve it at all times. Foucault’s theory 
of discipline teaches us that the body may be a site of inscription, but also 
makes it pos si ble to see the body as an instrument in and for acts that 
cannot be reduced to identities but are social nonetheless, in a pro cess 
that I  will eventually link to incipiently queer modes of belonging and 
becoming. Similarly, the proliferating inclinations between the bodies 
that discipline fosters do not necessarily solidify into a figure or a form 
of being but may stay entirely in the register of  doing. Fi nally, we can 
see through Discipline and Punish that temporality is a nonreproductive, 
but nevertheless somatic and material, mode of sensory receptivity that 
collates bodies in relations of affinity across space and, I would add to 
Foucault’s analy sis, even across historical period.
Beside You in Time contends, then, that subjugated knowledge is often 
lodged in the flesh itself, and lives as timed bodiliness and as styles of 
temporally inflected sociability, predominant in the nineteenth  century, 
that we have forgotten, or never learned, how to see.9 Broadly, the sites 
of temporal control and response to that control that I discuss in this 
book are religious rituals ( those of the Shakers in chapter 1, and Catho-
lics in chapter 5), racialization (slavery in chapter 2, and racial uplift in 
chapter 4), historiography (chapter 3), health and conservation culture 
(chapter 4), and sexuality (chapter 5), all appearing or intensifying dur-
ing a period that I call the very long nineteenth  century, whose contours I 
 will outline more carefully below. Within  these sites, fictional characters 
and  actual historical actors strug gle both to inhabit the dominant tem-
poralities that or ga nize them, and to tap into other rhythms, other ways 
of feeling like they belong to a history, and/or other modes of arranging 
past, pre sent, and  future, that  will foster new forms of being and belong-
ing. In what follows, I call  these temporal encounters sense- methods, 
foregrounding time itself as a visceral, haptic, proprioceptic mode of 
apprehension— a way of feeling and organ izing the world through and 
with the individual body, often in concert with other bodies.
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On Sentimentality and Sense- Methods
Any theory of the time- sense as a method for creating sociability in the 
nineteenth  century must be squared with the extant work on senti-
mental culture, for as numerous critics have shown, the latter was the 
nineteenth- century United States’ dominant machine of sociability and 
intimacy— its scientia sociabilis, to riff again on Foucault’s (1990a) History 
of Sexuality. By “sentimental culture,” I mean the wide variety of institu-
tions and discourses that turned what  were understood as raw physical 
sensations into meaningful emotional concord with  others, with  those 
meanings or ga nized and recontained around, or reterritorialized in and 
as, race, buttressed by gender, class, nationality, religion, and sexuality 
(and of course this list could go on).10 The promise of sentimental culture 
was, and remains, its capacity to extend face- to- face rituals and practices 
into forms of belonging that affiliated  people beyond immediate commu-
nity, to build cohorts of fellow feeling (Kete 2000; Coviello 2005). But 
its ideological currency was, and remains, a highly racialized language 
of emotion, whereby white  people’s, particularly white  women’s, fragil-
ity, interiority, receptivity, porosity, and expressivity are produced and 
maintained in relation to other subjects and populations cast as overly 
susceptible to their sensations or as impervious to feeling.11
This book’s object of analy sis, in contrast with sentimental studies, is 
neither raw sensation nor the nineteenth  century’s codified language of 
emotion and its attendant identities. Beside You in Time turns from the 
passions back to the body receiving sensations and puts the body at the 
center of analy sis, but focuses on ways of using and tuning the body in 
relation to other bodies pre sent, past, and  future, in an extension of Fou-
cauldian discipline  toward ends that may not serve identity or dominant 
forms of the social. However, the best recent work on nineteenth- century 
American sentimentality has also illuminated something crucial for this 
proj ect: how biopower takes shape through culture’s management of the 
affects, particularly the sense of time, in pro cesses that sometimes his-
torically precede the state’s relatively more brute interventions on the 
physical body and sometimes justify the latter. Dana Luciano’s Arranging 
Grief (2007), for example, clarifies how non- state- centered rituals and 
symbols of mourning conscripted the body for a form of slow, nonlinear 
time that seemed to be a bulwark against both national- progressive and 
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commodity- capitalist time, even as it clearly buttressed them. For Luci-
ano, biopower, or what she calls “chronobiopolitics,” involves the produc-
tion of “life” in the coordinated temporal terms of linear reproduction, 
accumulation, and accomplishment on the one hand, and a replenishing 
cyclical and sacred domesticity on the other (10). Luciano’s work on the 
“temporalities of social belonging” (17) demonstrates that time and its 
regulating functions take shape in and through collective bodily praxes 
that are not coterminous with the state’s inventions of and interventions 
into populations—an insight key to this book.
In a related proj ect, Kyla Schuller’s The Biopolitics of Feeling (2017, 2) 
 asserts that sentimentalism “operates as a fundamental mechanism of 
biopower.” As with Luciano’s work, Schuller argues that this affective 
form of biopower preceded state- centered biopolitics in the United States, 
and provided a means for the latter to operate: “the tasks of the biopo-
liti cal state,” writes Schuller, “evolved out of the private institutions of 
sentiment” (21).  These institutions, in Schuller’s view, focused on the 
capacity of the body to receive and coordinate external stimuli. The sci-
entific discourse of impressibility, or the capacity of the body to receive 
sensations and incorporate them into heritable qualities, Schuller argues, 
was used to differentiate “civilized” subjects, who could pro gress through 
time, from “savage” ones who  were “suspended in the eternal state of flesh 
and linger[ed] on as unwanted remnants of prehistory” (8). Impressibility 
was understood as a literal binding mechanism, connecting bodies to 
their environment and to each other in ways that  were eventually man-
aged by the state as race, gender, and sexuality. Furthermore, impressibility 
or ga nized linear- historical time through the rubric of heritability.
What brings  these two proj ects together, and makes them so impor-
tant to this one, is their understanding of the role of bodily sensation, 
prior to the regime of “sexuality” and expanding our understanding of 
biopower to include affect, in disposing subjects  toward one another so-
cially. As Schuller puts it, “Sex before sexuality manifested as a prolif-
erating dynamic between bodies” (2017, 34). I’ve attempted to capture 
this dynamic with the term “sense- methods.” Sense- methods consist of 
bodywork, of inarticulated or unspoken, carnal forms of knowledge, in-
tervention, and affiliation inhabited and performed  either in groups or 
on behalf of them. They are nonverbal, and often nonideational— not so 
much Foucault’s ([1976] 1997, 7) “non- conceptual knowledges,” which 
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are unsystematic or seemingly unsophisticated ideas that merely rank 
below the knowledge systems of elites, but rather somatic manifestations 
that are not, however codified they might be on their own physical terms, 
typically understood as concepts or methods at all. Neither are sense- 
methods necessarily keyed to the traditional five senses of sight, sound, 
touch, smell, and taste. Instead, they might be synaesthetic, or entirely 
beyond  those five senses, insofar as they often involve the visceral, the 
proprioceptive, or muscle memory— and in this book, I am particularly 
interested in a sixth sense, the sense of timing, or synchronization (tem-
poral coincidence) and alternation (turn taking), which, though some 
scientists have described it as innate (Trevarthen 1999/2000, cited in 
Gibbs 2010, 198; see also Strogatz 2004), seems a site wherein the cultural 
and the biological meet one another.
Sense- methods do not necessarily operate from the top down, as Fou-
cault would have it in Discipline and Punish and beyond. Curiously, Dis-
cipline and Punish has virtually no theory of re sis tance, and even in the 
first volume of The History of Sexuality (1990a), in which Foucault does 
theorize re sis tance, the idea of “reverse discourse” shears the term “dis-
course” of any but its linguistic aspects, insofar as it names the way that 
individuals could reappropriate a form of selfhood by claiming the terms 
and concepts produced by the institutions of law, medicine, and psy-
chiatry, rather than by arrogating techniques of power that  were applied 
directly to the body:  there is, for example, no “reverse implantation” in 
Foucault. But amassed and recombined  human energies— engrouped, 
disciplined bodies— can certainly turn together against the very institu-
tions in which they  were or ga nized, as in the factory strike that turns 
the sociability of wage workers against the  owners of production, or the 
urban flash mob that turns the anonymous consumer crowd into a jug-
gernaut. Judith Butler (2015, 8) calls this “concerted bodily enactment, 
a plural form of performativity,” focusing on “forms of coordinated ac-
tion, whose condition and aim is the reconstitution of plural forms of 
agency and social practices of re sis tance” (9). Butler’s horizon is the 
demonstration aimed at the official national- political sphere, where bod-
ies gather and do  things in concert in order to signify and to perform 
their per sis tence in the face of being relegated to the biopo liti cal status 
of disposability: notably, according to Butler, plural actions intervene in 
a specifically temporal way, showcasing the quality of endurance. Butler’s 
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heuristic is the performative, or the way that popu lar sovereignty can 
be enacted in advance of or as a relay to its achievement as policy. My 
horizons and heuristics are somewhat broader: in my view, coordinated, 
informal sense- methods can effect any number of social possibilities, and 
enactment of a national ideal is only one of them. They can also generate 
social forms that do not respond to or mimic an official, legible version. 
In other words, if Butler’s performative theory of assembly focuses on the 
embodiment of “the  people” through protests and occupations, my own 
theory of sense- methods focuses on the embodiment of a relationality 
that does not always refer to or result in a stable social form but instead 
moves, with and against, dominant timings and times.
On Queer Hypersociability and Method
“Sense- methods” comprise, above all, a queer theory of relationality and 
sociability. If engroupment is a sensory  matter, one particularly inflected 
by the senses of time and timing, this is  because the senses are necessarily 
more promiscuous than the discourses that reterritorialize sensations into 
identities and populations. In their treatise The Undercommons, Stefano 
Harney and Fred Moten (2013, 15) describe the social in some of the terms 
that I am  after, gesturing  toward “the re- routing encoded in the work of 
art: in the anachoreographic reset of a shoulder, in the quiet extremities 
that animate a range of social chromaticisms.” In  these brief, evocative 
phrases I can see several ele ments of what I mean by sense- methods: an 
emphasis on body parts (shoulders, extremities) as meta phors for and 
means of rearticulating the social; a compositional theory of the social 
itself ( here, it is  imagined through choreography, through the jazz tech-
nique of chromaticism, and through color theory, whereas my predomi-
nant rubrics are temporal); an unpredictable sense of direction (the prefix 
ana- meaning upward, backward, again, against). Beside You in Time, in 
keeping with  these ele ments, tracks a series of social reroutings that take 
place through embodied temporal recalibrations.  These reroutings are ex- 
tensive, as centrifugal as they are centripetal: sense- methods, I contend, 
are key to imagining queerness as not antisocial or antirelational, as in 
recent work by Lee Edelman and  others, but hypersocial.
To briefly rehearse the antisocial thesis of queer theory: foundational 
to it is Lacan’s (1999, 126) dictum that “ there is no such  thing as a sexual re-
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lation,” meaning that desire is a series of self- projections onto the Other, 
in which the Other’s subjectivity has no place or real impact. Early gay 
male theorists such as Guy Hocquenghem ([1972] 1993) and Harold 
Beaver (1981), who theorized the antirelational aspect of homo sexuality 
in advance of its con temporary articulations, understood homo sexuality 
as, precisely, a breaking of the social contract through which imaginary 
identities recognize and enter into exchange with one another. Extend-
ing the Lacanian formulation and borrowing from Laplanche ([1970] 
1976) the idea of sexuality as “unbinding” the energy that the ego seeks to 
bind into coherence and functionality, Leo Bersani (1987) has famously 
posited the receptive sex act— the state of being penetrated sexually—
as fundamentally anticommunitarian and antiidentitarian. Sex, in Ber-
sani’s view, is anti- or nonrelational not just  because desire is a hall of 
mirrors but also  because receptive sex shatters the contours of the bodily 
imago and of the ego, which is at first a bodily one and the grounds from 
which we enter into relations with  others. Receptive sex, then, is a figure 
for the promisingly destructive potential of all sex, a theoretical insight 
that spans Bersani’s work from at least The Freudian Body ([1986] 1990) 
through Homos (1995). For Lee Edelman (2004), this destructive poten-
tial, which Edelman links tightly to the figuration of queers as avatars 
of death and to the Freudian death drive, makes queerness into a wedge 
against a particularly US American form of futurity in which reproduc-
tive heterosexuality and the figure of the child are the horizon for poli-
tics, for life, for the politics of life.
For my part, and despite how compelling I find  these formulations, I 
see queerness less in terms of the pulsations of the death drive that insis-
tently undermine the coherence of ego, identity, and politics—or what 
Lynne Huffer (2009, xvii) calls the “ironic” mode— and more in terms of 
a drive  toward connectivity, conjugation, and coalescence that produces 
new forms, however momentary, which Huffer (xvii) calls the “generous” 
mode (see also Freud [1920] 1964), and which cannot be equated with 
the biopo liti cal understanding of life as that which must be optimized at 
the expense of  those deemed unworthy of life. As theorists from Deleuze 
and Guattari (1988) through Elizabeth Grosz (2004), Jasbir Puar (2007), 
and Tim Dean (2000, 2009) have clarified in diff er ent ways, biological 
reproduction need not be the telos of the life drive: its point is to mix 
substances, to coalesce with  others, to self- extend and thus retroactively 
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transform the self, to renew living on diff er ent terms and in ways that 
need not culminate in the schemes of personhood we know  today but 
may pass through styles of affiliation that we can learn from. And of 
course the generous mode can equally discombobulate the status quo as 
long as its prac ti tion ers remain ironic enough not to let the social forms 
they generate petrify and become inevitable.
Returning to Harney and Moten: they insist on a social imaginary 
that focuses on “reroutings” rather than on negation. This idea of re-
routing may have been lost in queer theory’s handing off of the baton 
of queer antirelationality from Bersani to Edelman, for one distinct 
strand of Bersani’s thinking involves the way that art and sex alike, in 
shattering the forms through which we perceive ourselves and the world, 
open up the potential for new connections among psyches, bodies, and 
environments— new relays for connectivity. Bersani actually has a very 
lush social imagination, for he posits new relationships based on aesthet-
ics, even on design—on the visual rhymes of body parts in anonymous 
sex acts, or on what he calls (in Dean et al. 1997, 6) a “correspondence of 
forms” that extends the self  toward  others in relations of partial sameness, 
ringing changes on the couple- centeredness of sociality itself. But this, 
too, is a spatial and effectively visual formulation, however useful I have 
found it. The hypersocial, by contrast, is not just excess sociability but 
sociability felt and manifested along axes and wavelengths beyond the 
discursive and the visual— and even beyond the haptic, for the synchro-
nization of bodies does not require their physical touch, but rather a si-
multaneity of movement in which the several become one. In theorizing 
sense- methods as a means  toward and a way of thinking queer hyperso-
ciability, then, I lean on the prefix “hyper” meaning not only over, above, 
beyond, in excess, but also (in its more present- tense, truncated usage) a 
suggestion of excessive motion, as “hyper” is slang for “hyperactive.”
Furthermore, the forms of sociability afforded by alignments and re-
alignments in and through time are not just synchronous— they also hop 
the timeline in ways that the term “hyperlink” invokes. In this book, then, 
I also want to draw out an aspect of an older, Marxist materialism, which 
sees history not as a congealed past but as the continual making and re-
making of the social field—of the relations among  people, including be-
tween the living and the dead as well as the not- yet- born, as in Walter 
Benjamin’s ([1950] 1968, 260) reminder that the working class, figured 
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as the redeemer of  future generations, forgot a hatred “nourished by the 
image of enslaved ancestors rather than that of liberated grandchildren.” 
But even this is too linear and too aligned with genealogical descent. 
Meanwhile, Deleuzian assemblages are often theorized as taking place 
within a par tic u lar time period (usually the pre sent), rather than verti-
cally, across eras in ways that blur the bound aries between now and then, 
and in  doing so change social possibilities in the pre sent. My concept 
of sense- methods, on the other hand, intersects with an underdiscussed 
ele ment in Foucault (1990a, 143), his idea of biohistory, or the pro cess in 
which the history that  humans make, their organ ization of power, inter-
venes in what seem like immutable laws of biology, changing the physical 
constitution of the  human. Foucault (143) describes biohistory as “the 
pressure through which the movements of life [i.e., what would seem to 
be merely biological] and the pro cesses of history [i.e., collective  human 
activity] interfere with one another.” While Beside You in Time does not 
track the biological per se, it does explore how physiological acts and so-
cial formations intersect with and reconstitute one another across time as 
well as within par tic u lar spaces. I take up, therefore, not only the rhythms 
of discipline but also another mode of subjectification, engroupment, 
and self- dissolution that is connected to the invention of race: the rise 
of historical feeling, or the sensation of being connected to and derived 
from non- kin ancestors or prior to non- kin progeny, which partially con-
tributed to the periodizing of populations that Stoler (1995) describes but 
is not reducible to that function. Among denizens of the late eigh teenth 
and nineteenth centuries and beyond, the feeling of belonging to and 
extending into time from out of a par tic u lar past was inculcated through 
reading secondary histories, historical fiction, and anthropological trea-
tises about the development of humanity’s vari ous cultures. Historical 
feeling also took shape through physical practices that involved the tem-
poral recalibrations of bodies and subjects: rituals of patriotism, grief, 
and other shared emotions; heritage activities such as collecting and 
tourism; and especially the historical reenactments that became popu lar 
beginning with eighteenth- century tableaux vivants— all tuned the body 
to other epochs, just as discipline tuned it to new rhythms.12 In this book, 
I contend that sense- methods can rearrange the relations between past 
and pre sent, linking con temporary bodies to  those from other times in 
reformulations of ancestry and lineage.
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Fi nally, the idea that the sensory register can or ga nize what belongs 
together, what can be brought together, and how that “bringing” hap-
pens, also influences the way I read and think in this book, which I am 
not sure boils down to a method I can formulate for transfer to students 
and colleagues or a gambit in the current method wars. But let us call it, 
too, a sense- method. I begin, always, with finely grained close readings of 
imaginative and documentary texts, whose “reroutings” of bodies, rela-
tionships, and perceptual possibilities take patience to apprehend. Part of 
that apprehension includes a kind of ingathering of a critical and histori-
cal archive whose contours I  don’t have in mind in advance, as the pri-
mary work begins to speak outward, to incline me  toward material that 
further illuminates it or that it suddenly casts in a diff er ent light. I’ve al-
ways described my method to students as slow, blind, groping in the dark, 
but that seems an especially apt meta phor for a book on embodied ways 
of knowing that are at a temporal slant to official knowledge. As disabil-
ity studies has taught us, slowness and blindness are not lesser forms of 
understanding but merely alternative ones. And groping, despite its bad 
reputation as a sex act, is just a mode of sensory improvisation. All of this 
is to align my method with, itself, a promiscuous hypersociability of ap-
proach of the sort that  will be recognizable to anyone trained in cultural 
studies, in which we cannot know in advance with what materials our ob-
jects  will demand proximity. My hypersocial method may also resonate 
with some current discussions of surface reading as a “mutual pedagogy 
of erotics” (Cheng 2009, 102) between text and critic, text and contexts, 
text and other texts, rather than as a hermeneutic aimed  toward the re-
covery of unconscious material or hidden historical  causes— though I 
cannot lay claim to never reading symptomatically.
It might be more modest, and more honest, to claim both the meth-
ods of mutual attunement and resonance that I track between bodies in 
Beside You in Time and the methods I use to reor ga nize literary texts in 
relation to one another and to other materials, as feminine, feminist, or 
even lesbian- femme, with an emphasis on the critic’s, and even the textual 
object’s, receptivity and susceptibility to vari ous “outside” materials.13 In 
fact, queer hypersociability is not tuned to the drama of the antisocial 
thesis, a theory developed in urgent response to the early aids crisis in 
which gay white men  were portrayed as forces of death and to the rise of 
a gay movement insistent upon normativity, but responds instead to the 
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erosions of everyday life that have perennially characterized female, non-
white, lesbian, poor, disabled, and other less privileged existences. My 
touchstone thinker, then, is not the Freud of the death drive but Audre 
Lorde, whose 1978 paper “The Uses of the Erotic” advocated the feel-
ing body, in common pursuit with  others, as a source of knowledge and 
power.14 Lorde writes, “In the way my body stretches to  music and opens 
into response, hearkening to its deepest rhythms, so  every level upon 
which I sense also opens to the erotically satisfying experience,  whether 
it is dancing, building a bookcase, writing a poem, examining an idea” 
(Lorde [1978] 2007, 341). She links the mutual timing of bodies, which 
she calls “self- connection shared” (341) and satisfying “our erotic needs 
in concert with  others” (342) to a po liti cal demand for structures based 
on  human need rather than on profit. The stakes for sense- methods and 
for queer hypersociability, then, are both con temporary insofar as they 
address the twentieth and twenty- first  centuries’ acceleration of ordinary 
modes of debilitation, and specific to the long nineteenth  century insofar 
as they address the historically specific role of time in maximizing the 
force of the  human body, wearing it down, and countering its reterritori-
alization as endlessly useful for state and market interests.
To clarify my argument once more: this book claims that the sense 
of time is instrumental to becoming social in an expansive mode I call 
a queer hypersociability, and that time is itself a mode of engroupment 
for both dominant and subordinated  human energies. I track queer 
 hypersociability through dance in chapter 1. In chapter 2, I explore a form 
of this drive to combine with both the dead and the living in African 
American per for mances of playing dead. In chapter 3, I investigate queer 
hypersociability across time in amateur historiography. In chapter  4, I 
show how the use of chronic time expands queer relationality. And in 
chapter 5, I connect queer hypersociability back to the sacramental and 
incarnational. To see the very long nineteenth  century in terms of sense- 
methods, then, is to see the overlapping and shifting powers of discipline 
and sexuality, the ordering force of time in the production of bodies and 
collectivities, and the racialization of time in places within, alongside, or 
instead of the official po liti cal state. The scenes in which sense- methods 
do their work, as the chapters to come  will show, are variously rhythmic, 
historical, and/or divine, and they expand not only the bound aries of the 
 human body but also  those of the nineteenth  century itself.
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On the Archive and the Period
My archive of very long nineteenth- century texts is perhaps most notable 
for what is not in it: much of the gay white male corpus of the period 
that has been foundational to queer nineteenth- century American liter-
ary studies. For Thoreau, Whitman, most of Melville (though I do nod to 
“Bartleby, the Scrivener”), Charles Warren Stoddard, Henry James, and 
 others, I’ve substituted the celibate Shakers, ex- slave writers who are am-
bivalent about the  family, the ostensibly heterosexual Mark Twain and 
Pauline Elizabeth Hopkins, and the Sapphic modernists Gertrude Stein 
and Djuna Barnes.  These are all artists whose chief aims seem to be an 
expansive vision of sociability rather than a drive  toward identity or even 
queer sex practices. I’m not convinced that the white male archive, espe-
cially that of the nineteenth  century, leads inexorably to homo sexuality 
or to the antisocial thesis, and indeed, Peter Coviello (2013) has made a 
persuasive argument, in Tomorrow’s Parties, that much of that archive— 
Whitman, Thoreau, and Melville in particular— elegiacally preserves 
forms of sociability that would become illegible  under the regime of 
sexuality. I feel greatly indebted to Coviello’s proj ect. But I do think that 
my alternative constellations of texts have brought me to the idea that the 
time- sense produces forms of collectivity and association that “sexuality” 
and even Coviello’s more diffuse erotics may not fully contain.15
Even given this shift in archival materials, though, it may seem incon-
gruous to make an argument about the uses of the timed body through 
analyses of linguistic texts, as this book does. To this I would argue that 
the sense- world of the past is available to us only at one remove, through 
repre sen ta tion. Nonrepre sen ta tional sound recordings can give us back 
the sonic past, but only a very specific slice of it— a single per for mance, 
a par tic u lar ambient soundscape. Old smells, also indexical rather than 
repre sen ta tional, can body forth the remains of the past, as when an 
opened grave smells of rot, but  these smells are not composed of the orig-
inal object’s molecules,  because if they are, then the object that they ema-
nate from still exists in some form in the pre sent. Similarly, we can touch 
or taste objects from the past, but not in their past. We can “feel” the past 
only through a second- order repre sen ta tion of it, in a visual or linguistic 
medium that evokes other senses, or through a physical reenactment that, 
given the new context in which it takes place, can never be a perfect cap-
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ture. But even reenactment cannot re create the way that per for mances 
worked in their own moment to recruit beholders into their scene. We 
can see the horizontal pro cess of recruitment, of belonging, mapped out 
as pro cess only in second- order pre sen ta tions whose participants, wit-
nesses, and commentators—as narrators and characters— appear on the 
same historical plane as the activity itself.
Of the vari ous media through which repre sen ta tion takes place, only 
the durational ones— the ones that unfold over a stretch of time rather 
than being apprehensible all at once, like a painting— can capture the 
pro cess of coordinating, gathering, transmitting, and other wise trans-
ferring energies from one body to another. Thus the works explored in 
this book are almost all prose (some supplemented by images), precisely 
 because prose takes place through linear time, establishing relations of 
cause and effect and highlighting pro cess. The works I take up are also 
predominantly narrative prose,  because seeing the pro cessual nature of 
sensory engroupment depends, in part, on the narratorial commentary 
surrounding it. And they are predominantly but not entirely fictional 
 because characters too can comment on the recruiting pro cess and thus 
offer a glimpse of how sense- methods worked in their own moment. 
Therefore, many of the texts I discuss in this book depict per for mances, 
among them song and dance, stage shows, and liturgical acts; many of 
them include commentary and other reactions by witnesses who are, or 
resist being, pulled into the scene of per for mance. I examine anti- Shaker 
tracts whose polemic is supported by lurid descriptions of the Shakers 
as well as lithographs of their per for mances in chapter  1; narratives of 
former slaves as well as folk tales, stage per for mances, and illustrations 
in chapter 2; newspaper accounts of per for mances in both chapters 1 and 
2; Mark Twain’s short essays and speeches in chapter  3; and short sto-
ries and novels in all five chapters, including fiction by Catharine Maria 
Sedgwick, Sutton  E. Griggs, Pauline Elizabeth Hopkins, Mark Twain, 
Herman Melville, Gertrude Stein, and Djuna Barnes. In all of them, we 
can see historically specific bodies at work in and through time in ways 
that would other wise be difficult to take hold of.
The span of  these works, from the late 1700s to the mid-1930s, is un-
wieldy only according to traditional nation/period demarcations. Beside 
You in Time tells a story about the power of the timed body during the 
very long nineteenth  century, a period that I first understood as a period 
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at all through the history of sexuality. This period is bookended by the 
consolidation of discipline in Eu rope and its colonies on one side in the 
late eigh teenth  century, and on the other, the somewhat belated consoli-
dation of sexual identity in the United States  after Eu ro pean sexologi-
cal texts  were translated and made available  here— a consolidation not 
complete, if it ever was,  until  after the first third of the twentieth  century 
(see Chauncey 1995 and Kahan 2017). Or, to put it more simply, I am 
interested in the period bounded on one end by the Eu ro pean prison/
factory/hospital in Foucault’s Discipline and Punish and refracted in the 
experience of the Shakers that I discuss in chapter  1, and on the other 
end by the American gay bar that glimmers through the first volume of 
The History of Sexuality (Foucault 1990a) and Foucault’s essay “Friend-
ship as a Way of Life” ([1981] 1984) and that shows up in Djuna Barnes’s 
Nightwood ([1936] 2006), the subject of my final chapter. But I am less 
interested in  these as spaces than as temporal  orders.
Another way to look at the very long nineteenth  century, then, might 
be in terms of shifts in the lived experience of temporality. On the one 
hand, by the late eigh teenth  century, Eu rope and the United States had 
seen an intense solidification of the power of clock time (Sherman 1997; 
O’Malley 1990) and work discipline (Thompson 1967), the temporal 
motors of Foucault’s prison/factory/hospital complex. By the mid- 
nineteenth  century,  these interrelated phenomena had dispersed over 
new domains such as slavery (see M. M. Smith 1997) and, as Catharine 
Beecher’s A Treatise on Domestic Economy (1841) makes clear,  house work. 
At the apex of discipline’s regime, we can presume, time began to seem 
immutable and unmalleable both  because it was orchestrated by insti-
tutions large and small, and  because it was seen to emanate from the 
individual body’s very gestures— though, as I  will go on to argue,  these 
orchestrations could be turned into forces that countered institutional 
modes of temporality. But during the latter half of the nineteenth 
 century through the period before World War II, new technologies such 
as the railroad, photography, the cinema, and air travel made time seem 
suddenly pliable, such that the ordinary rhythms of  things sped up or 
slowed down, events could be made to run backward, or a juxtaposition 
of disparate moments could invoke change over time (see Schivelbusch 
[1977] 1986 and Doane 2002). A multiplicity of pos si ble times, and in-
terventions in the systematized time of capitalism, opened up during the 
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latter part of the long nineteenth  century, emblematized by the wander-
ings and flaneurship that comprised life for the denizens of urbanized 
spaces such as Wall Street in “Bartleby, the Scrivener,” which I explore 
in chapter 4, and Djuna Barnes’s Paris in Nightwood, which I explore in 
chapter 5. Rather than tracking a teleological history of time as it moved 
from discipline to flaneurship, though, this book names and locates some 
of the prevailing temporal regimes of the period I describe in the United 
States, and places some alternate sense- methods in relation to them. To 
put it yet another way, I track the timed body across several proximate 
and entangled regimes— religion and secularity, race, historiography, 
health, and sexuality— a body that acts in vari ous and varying relation to 
the most legible imperatives of  those regimes.
Chapter Breakdown
The modes of bodily control I explore in this book are also specific, 
though not always unique, to the United States and its empire. The first 
of  these I explore, in chapter 1, is the order of secularity, other wise known 
as mainline Protestantism, which demoted cultures that  were seemingly 
too dependent on bodily means of worship to the status of savages racial-
ized as Native American or, less often, automatons or machines racialized 
as black. The United Society of Believers, or Shakers, is a case study for 
the way that rhythmic alterity, when seen as countervailing the norms of 
gender and sex, could racialize  people who in other ways seemed thor-
oughly white, for the Shakers  were New  England Protestants hailing 
from the  mother country itself. But the dominant forms of Protestantism 
emerging in the late eigh teenth  century, in keeping with Puritan ideals 
and as a way of distinguishing themselves from ecstatic worship, subordi-
nated the liturgical body to the word—to scriptural exegesis, verbal con-
fession, and homiletics. Protestantism became less and less apprehensible 
as a system that, itself, temporally ordered bodies and life trajectories as it 
took shape in negative reaction to communities such as the Shakers, who 
used explic itly somatic, rhythmic modes of belonging to  counter het-
eromarital hegemony and to express their ideal of celibacy. The Shakers’ 
method of worship, I argue, was simply too corporeal, even when Shaker 
elders reordered it into highly disciplined, patterned dances. In fact, as I 
demonstrate, the Shakers’ reformed dance style doubly racialized them 
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as so overly regulated that they hyperbolized whiteness into a form of 
deathliness associated with blackness and enslavement.
Following up on this association of blackness and death, the second 
order of timing that I explore, in chapter  2, is the one that regulated 
chattel slavery in the United States. This was not primarily the proto- 
Taylorization of plantation work, as the latter was influenced by the fac-
tory system, even if the reordering of plantation time was a second- order 
way of making slave bodies docile (M. M. Smith 1997). More fundamen-
tal to the system of slavery was the fact that slave  owners had absolute 
power to wrest enslaved  people from genealogical time, and to shorten 
or terminate slaves’ lives—to effect what Orlando Patterson (1982) calls 
the “social death” of enslaved  people as a prelude to and rehearsal of an 
 actual death imposed from without as a  matter of murder or enforced 
deterioration. The sense- method that emerged in response to this con-
dition was a per for mance of death that I call chronothanatopolitics, or 
playing dead, reenacting social death so as to both refuse the consola-
tions of a liberal, white humanism that depends on antiblackness for its 
meaning, and gesture at other forms of sociality. As my archive for this 
chapter— several African American folk tales; the ex- slave narratives of 
Harriet Jacobs ([1861] 1987), Henry Bibb ([1850] 2001), and Henry Box 
Brown ([1851] 2008); and Sutton E. Griggs’s novel Imperium in Imperio 
([1899] 2003)— clarifies, playing dead is a per for mance, but not a mode 
of performativity dependent on resignification in the idiom of queer 
theory. Rather, what it has in common with queer theory is an asocial, 
though not entirely antisocial, mode of relationality  counter to marriage, 
kinship, and reproduction— saturated as  these latter forms are with the 
temporalities denied to  people of African descent.
The concept of social death is also precisely what allows the tem-
porality of slavery to be understood as enduring beyond the period in 
which white Americans legally owned black ones. It ruptures any easy 
periodization of before and  after 1865— the dominant periodization for 
scholars of American lit er a ture and culture. Related to slavery, then, is 
a third form of temporal control that congealed in the long nineteenth 
 century, that of academic history. The dominant historiography of the 
nineteenth  century was made up of firm bound aries between then and 
now, between bodies categorized as modern and  those cast as savage or 
primitive, and between bodies of diff er ent eras: in other words, historical 
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writing was a way of ordering time in and for a nineteenth- century pre s-
ent tense deeply invested in hierarchical differentiations between bodies. 
In chapter 3, I explore how two fin de siècle authors, Mark Twain and 
Pauline Hopkins, burst  these temporal bound aries to write histories that, 
as fictional versions of historical reenactment, thrust then- contemporary 
bodies into much  earlier times in ways that contested and still contest 
both the periodization of US history and the rigid categories of gender, 
race, and sexuality. In Twain’s A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur’s 
Court ([1889] 1982), a white traveler to medieval Camelot fails to see, 
though Twain’s readers are set up to recognize, how medieval forms of 
power and vio lence persist in the wake of US chattel slavery, particularly 
in post- Reconstruction Amer i ca. In Hopkins’s Of One Blood ([1903] 
1988), a traveler to the ancient seat of Ethiopia finds it preserved under-
ground as if time has  stopped, and discovers that Western culture derives 
from African  people’s inventions and ideas: the novel effectively rewrites 
global history. Importantly,  these ruptures of historical periodization are 
also ways of reconstituting erotic life, as if writing or experiencing history 
other wise might be a form of sex. Twain’s main character “abuses” history 
as a mode of “self- abuse,” masturbating his way out of linear- historical 
time and clarifying how a sexual disorder is understood as a temporal 
one, and how “bad,” amateur historiography is linked to aberrant sexu-
ality. Hopkins’s main character literally marries his way back into a dy-
nastic Afrocentric history on a somewhat more conservative note, but 
the trope of reincarnation that animates Of One Blood moves beyond the 
genitality of masturbation in Twain to suggest a form of reproduction 
and cross- temporal contact that supersedes marriage and dynasty.
As Twain and Hopkins show, nineteenth- century American history 
proper— both the writing and the making of dominant history— was 
linked, in turn, to the production of normative bodies,  those understood 
to lead the proj ect of nation building and hence modernity. Early in the 
very long nineteenth  century, disciplinary techniques such as  those Fou-
cault describes  were used to hone the militaries that fought in the name 
of American in de pen dence (see von Steuben 1779), and  these remained 
fairly stable through the War of 1812, a  battle that defined US nation-
hood. As weapons technology developed, infantry tactics followed in a 
variety of manuals pertinent to each US war (see Military Field Manu-
als, 1782–1899, 2007). And reenactments of wars and  battles  were a 
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mode of masculine self- fashioning (see Schneider 2011). But drills and 
exercises with a nationalist horizon  were not just the purview of the mili-
tary and its civilian imitators. The rise of the Boy Scouts, the physical 
culture movement, and or ga nized sports involved ordinary  people in 
proj ects understood to contribute to the destiny of the United States. By 
the late 1800s and into the first quarter of the twentieth  century, impe-
rial might was idealized in the figure of the white, able- bodied, sporting 
man (Bederman 1995; R. Dyer 1997; Green 1986). Concomitantly,  after 
the failure of Reconstruction, proponents of racial uplift envisioned the 
 future of black  people in terms of middle- class norms of sexual propri-
ety, domesticity, and heteronormative gender roles (Carby 1987), terms 
that framed par tic u lar routines and rhythms of work, leisure, and home 
life as vital to the  future of that par tic u lar population and to human-
ity as a  whole. Both imperial white masculinity and black racial uplift 
 were framed in eugenic terms. By the early twentieth  century, the idea 
of “ human resources” was born to address the prob lem of national vital-
ity and, in par tic u lar, the role of chronic maladies in sapping it: chronic 
time, we might say, had become a national prob lem precisely insofar as 
the state and the market fostered an almost machinic productivity. This 
is  the context I use in chapter  4 to explore Gertrude Stein’s novella 
“Melanctha” ([1909] 2000), which pits the time of the chronic, embod-
ied in the eponymous female protagonist, against racial uplift’s disci-
pline of “regularity,” embodied in her lover, Dr. Jeff Campbell. Reading 
“Melanctha” alongside of Melville’s short story “Bartleby, the Scrivener” 
([1853] 1979), which in many ways anticipates it, allows us to see chronic 
illness, recalcitrance, and lack of  will as forms of re sis tance to the tempo-
rally disciplined bodies that supposedly make history national, and make 
national history.
In chapter  4, I describe how chronic time, grammatically inflect-
ing “Bartleby” and elaborated both as plot and as style in “Melanctha,” 
also opens bodies to new forms of connection with the world and with 
 others by slowing them down, dilating, and intensifying them. Chronic 
time  decalcifies and disaggregates “sexuality” thought in terms of object- 
choice, bringing us back, conceptually, to the way that discipline reas-
sembles individual and social bodies, opening them to one another in 
new ways. But as experienced by  those left out of the times of empire and 
uplift, chronic time does not always produce a mass that can be managed 
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as a population, nor does it necessarily work in ser vice of proj ects that 
serve the state or capitalism. As “Melanctha” clarifies, the connections 
that chronic time forges are micrological, temporary, and uninevitable. 
Surprisingly, Stein characterizes  these moments of connectivity and 
assemblage as religious, which hearkens back to my analy sis of Shaker 
worship practices. While sacred ritual can directly serve dominant in-
stitutions of power, the religious feelings Stein conjures up are rooted in 
bodily experience in ways that recall an American history of dissident, 
enthusiastic, emphatically minor sects. My final chapter, then, turns 
back to a stigmatized and especially visceral religion in the United 
States, Catholicism, and its incarnational doctrine of the sacraments. 
The sacraments, I argue, are in many ways a consummate sense- method, 
for they involve contact between the body and material understood to 
bring  participants closer to God and to one another through the body 
of Christ. Baptism, for example, uses  water—by sprinkling, pouring, or 
even complete  immersion—to transform the baptismal candidate into a 
Christian and bring him or her into the spiritual kinship of Chris tian ity, 
as well as to renew the baptismal vows of observers who have pledged to 
support the candidate’s life as a Christian. Even as the sacraments bring 
 people together horizontally with one another and with the divine in 
earthly form, they also enfold Catholics and their Anglican counter-
parts into a vertical form of history and descent, as with the laying on 
of hands that accompanies ordination and folds the ordinant into a his-
tory of apostles, or as with the chrism (anointing oil) that is part of the 
sacrament of extreme unction, which signifies that the dead person is 
now part of a genealogical line of saints. I locate a sacramental men-
tality, which I call a sacra/mentality, in a counterintuitive place: Djuna 
Barnes’s high modernist novel Nightwood ([1936] 2006). In the teeth of a 
homosexual identity that has by the time of Nightwood ’s first publication 
begun to consolidate, the novel offers up the sacraments as an alternative 
route to  human connectivity and lineage. It does so with deep irony, of 
course, for in Nightwood baptism, the laying on of hands, and especially 
the Eucharist are modes of linking together  those who are—by Chris-
tian and state standards— damned, including the lesbian Nora Flood, the 
cross- dresser Matthew Dante O’Connor, and the androgyne Robin Vote. 
Detached from the institutional Church, the sacramental becomes this 
book’s final vision of queer hypersociability.
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I finish with a coda that brings Beside You in Time into the twentieth 
 century, via Amiri Baraka’s short- short story “Rhythm Travel” ([1995] 
2009), which turns rhythmic entrainment  toward both reparations for 
slavery and an Afrofuturist horizon.  Here, the time- sense connects the 
narrator to  others in a way that no timetable could contain, queering af-
filiation and succession far beyond the work of Foucauldian discipline. 
“Rhythm Travel” reminds us that, as slaves and their African forbears 
 understood, timing allows bodies to find one another in ways that have 
the capacity to reformulate social life as we know it.
A New Yorker cartoon from 1999 shows a  little boy in 
con temporary clothes staring up at a tall man wearing 
a broad- brimmed hat and an apron. The man stands 
before a large  table, building a smaller  table with old- 
fashioned tools, including a mallet, an awl, a hand- held 
planer, and a small handsaw.  Behind him on pegs are two 
ladder- backed chairs. The man says to the boy, “No, lad, 
we  aren’t movers.  We’re just Shakers” (figure 1.1).
Playing on the phrase “movers and shakers,” the joke 
is  simple enough: Shakers, caught hopelessly  behind in 
their artisanal ways, are not at the forefront of modern 
business or culture.  There’s also a gentle pun on “movers” 
as in “carriers”; Shakers may make furniture, but some-
one  else transports it out into the world. And fi nally, the 
cartoon clinches the image of Shakers as apo liti cal. Not 
being “movers,” they can hardly be thought of in terms of 
movement politics, and their “shaking” is merely quaint, 
with no critical thrust whatsoever. This cartoon is a good 
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take on how the Shakers are remembered by con temporary Americans, 
if at all: as a gentle  people uninterested in social change though vaguely 
pacifist; notable only for their old- fashioned clothes and lovely hand-
made objects; fossilized in a style of furniture that remains popu lar; but 
other wise, immobile— not least  because most of the Shakers are now 
dead (Blakemore 2017).
Yet the Shakers  were originally a radical sect, akin to the American 
Mormons and upstate New York’s Oneida Community in their experi-
mental kinship system, and descended from the British Methodists in 
the way that they put the feeling body at the center of their religious cere-
monies. Indeed, the Shakers had a kind of moving, kinesthetic politics—
or politics of movement—in which their liturgical dance performed 
and embodied a radically gender- egalitarian, asexually generative, and 
eventually communitarian society. For the Shakers, dance was a method 
through which to arrive not only at spiritual enlightenment but also at 
a way of living that contested the hegemony of domestic- marital couple-
hood  under industrial capitalism. I begin this book with them  because 
their history, particularly as it is reflected in the anti- Shaker and apos-
tate lit er a ture that emerged almost immediately on their arrival in the 
1.1  “No, lad, we  aren’t movers.  We’re just Shakers.” Mick Stevens, 
The New Yorker Collection/The Cartoon Bank, 1999.
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United States, offers an archive of coordinated physical activity, however 
mediated, of reactions to that activity, and of changes to it over time. In 
the early Shaker and especially the anti- Shaker archive, we can see a late 
eighteenth- and early nineteenth- century embodied sense- method in the 
flesh, through descriptions of their dances and their eventual adjustment 
of  these dances to what they understood as Anglo- European norms.
Breaking away from the Quakers in  England in the late eigh teenth 
 century as the Quakers subdued their ecstatic forms of worship, the 
“Shaking Quakers,” or the United Society of Believers in Christ’s Second 
Appearing, as they called themselves, arrived in the United States from 
Liverpool,  England, in early August 1774 with their  future leader, Ann 
Lee (S. J. Stein 1992, 7). Theologically, the Shakers parted ways with other 
En glish Protestants by— among other  things— insisting on the equality 
of the female princi ple in the godhead (they understood Ann Lee as a 
female Christ), requiring that their members be celibate as a means of 
controlling worldly temptations and the flesh, and, paradoxically, claiming 
that worship  ought to include the body  because God would not disallow, 
as a means of professing faith, any fa cil i ty given to man (“W.” 1873).
While their theology was radical, it is the Shakers’ literal, bodily ac-
tions that I wish to focus on in this chapter— locomotions that  were neither 
reproductive nor forward- moving. The celibate Shakers used song and 
dance as a way of “shaking off ” carnal temptations and as an expression 
of being filled with the Holy Spirit. In a sense, they danced their way out 
of genital sex and into embodied, holy communion with one another and 
with God. Originally, this involved erratic and spontaneous movements 
and dissonant singing: the earliest Shakers danced, sang, and chanted in 
groups, but each dancer moved according to individual whim, creating 
what looked to outsiders like chaos. Within roughly a de cade of their ar-
rival in the American colonies and  after much approbation, the Shakers 
formalized their songs and dances, about which more below— but this 
did not garner approval from the rest of the Anglo- American population 
 either.
The history of the early American Shakers, then, is a story of how be-
tween their arrival to the North American colonies in 1774 and their re-
forms in 1787, a small group of  people used agitated, discontinuous bodily 
tempos to mark out their difference from the rest of the world, with the 
predictable result of being stigmatized. Yet it also eventually becomes a 
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story of how, even though in 1787 and beyond the Shakers imposed on 
themselves a more orderly rhythm, the terms rather than the degree of 
their stigmatization changed. My central claims for this chapter are as fol-
lows: first, the Shakers make vivid how a par tic u lar sense- method, rhyth-
mic dance, “timed” bodies into structures of belonging that both reflected 
and contested the dominant ones of the era, casting light on the role of 
timing in the po liti cal management of both extant eighteenth- century 
groups (religions and “civilizations”) and emerging nineteenth- century 
populations (nations, races, genders, and sexualities). Second, when the 
Shakers responded to racializing and sexualizing stigmas against them by 
tightly regulating their liturgical movements, they  were not accorded the 
status of whiteness  after all; the meta phors by which they  were stigma-
tized and the racial group with which they  were affiliated simply shifted. 
All this ultimately suggests that long- nineteenth- century whiteness itself 
was a sense- method, one intimately bound up with time.
The Racial and Sexual Politics of Tempo: The “Back” Style
The history of sensibility and sentiment offers the clearest account of how 
denizens of the late eigh teenth and nineteenth centuries  were accorded 
differential abilities to sense, or physically apprehend, their environment 
and the objects and  people in it according to the princi ple of empiricism, 
and then to take the time to order  those senses into proper emotions, 
modes of understanding, and forms of affiliation (Schuller 2017). This 
pro cess was, profoundly, a  matter of proper timing. Seventeenth- century 
debates among Protestant theologians, for example, sought to distin-
guish the subjects of true Christian feeling and experience from “for-
malists” who mimicked the outward trappings of religion, and— more 
importantly for our purposes  here— from “enthusiasts” who  were dupes 
of their own response systems, variously troped as imagination, animal 
spirits, or nerves (Taves 1999, 16). The prob lem with religious enthusiasm, 
in a nutshell, was that it failed to subordinate the passions to reason, a 
pro cess that took time. As Jordy Rosenberg points out, John Locke’s 
critique of religious enthusiasm centered on its claims to immediate 
knowledge based on sensory input: in Locke’s view, according to Rosen-
berg, enthusiasm “lacks the necessary reflexivity and commitment to 
duration that is integral to the empirical pro cess” (Rosenberg 2011, 37). 
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 Here, the prob lem with enthusiasm is less the lack of authorized religious 
interlocutors— mediators—in the transaction between God and believ-
ers, and more the alacrity— immediacy— with which input makes claims 
on the understanding. Rosenberg goes on to claim that Hegel too dis-
missed enthusiasm as incompatible with the slower tempo of true sci-
entific knowledge, and cites enthusiasm as the eighteenth- century sense 
that foregrounded “the intersection of knowledge with time” (38). Shakers, 
along with other ecstatic worshippers,  were dismissed by many of their 
detractors as “enthusiasts” insofar as they represented the danger not only 
of overly embodied responses to stimuli but also of overly quick ones, of 
pure reaction-formation and impulse. The stigmatization of enthusiasts 
clarifies the way that secularism emerged, in part, as a par tic u lar temporal 
regime that demanded pause and deliberation.
The capacity to respond in an ordered and timely way to sensory input 
distinguished not only proper religious experience and scientific knowl-
edge from enthusiasm but also, by the mid- nineteenth  century, “civilized” 
from “uncivilized” populations. Kyla Schuller’s The Biopolitics of Feeling 
(2017) makes a compelling case that the nineteenth  century’s ideas about 
inheritance, evolution, and civilization centered on the body’s capacity to 
receive impressions and to respond to them methodically. First, properly 
“civilized” subjects would coordinate impressions into considered and 
meaningful patterns of adhesion with other bodies  under the sign of a 
sympathy coterminous with white subjectivity. Second, according to the 
Lamarckian theory prevalent at the time, impressions would accumulate 
over timescales that exceeded the  human lifespan  under the sign of a de-
velopment coterminous with white racial health. The proper response to 
impression, the one that produced sympathy and  human evolution, was, 
like Locke’s and Hegel’s scientific knowledge, a  matter of timing: lesser 
races  were cast as, on the one hand, impulsive, grasping, and overly reac-
tive to impression, and on the other, torpid, sluggish, and impervious to 
it. Schuller’s (2017, 58) trenchant formulation that “biopolitics entails the 
racialization of temporality” reflects not only the familiar notion that 
some races are cast as the past of humankind and  others the  future but 
also the idea that some bodies emerge as improperly calibrated, tempo-
rally speaking, to what touches them, responding too soon or not soon 
enough. Biopolitics, then, is not only a  matter of binding individual 
bodies into populations with a state- sanctioned past and destiny— the 
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famous Foucauldian formulation that biopolitics involves the state let-
ting some populations flourish at the expense of  others, and that “race” is 
the mechanism for  doing so. It is also a  matter of binding bodies to their 
immediate milieux, to one another, and to the  future in ways neither too 
immediate nor too delayed, and of anathemizing  those who are out of 
step. The early Shakers made this binding pro cess literal in their dances 
but, try as they might, remained at odds with the normative biopo liti cal 
timing of individual and collective bodies.
In fact, the earliest Shakers in the United States  were immediately 
identified as metrically awry. The first anti- Shaker pamphlet published in 
the United States, the Shaker apostate Valentine Rathbun’s An Account of 
the  Matter, Form, and Manner of a Strange New Religion (1781), empha-
sizes the rhythmic aspect of Shaker worship in ways that became typical 
in the lit er a ture denouncing Shakers, much of which drew directly from 
Rathbun’s account:
They begin by sitting down, and shaking their heads, in a violent man-
ner, turning their heads half round, so that their face looks over each 
shoulder, their eyes being shut; while they are thus shaking, one  will 
begin to sing some odd tune, without words or rule;  after a while an-
other  will strike in; then another; and  after a while they all fall in, 
and make a strange charm:— some singing without words, and some 
with an unknown tongue or mutter; some in a mixture of En glish: the 
 mother, so called, minds to strike such notes as make a concord, and 
so form the charm. When they leave off singing, they drop off, one by 
one, as oddly as they come on; in the best part of their worship, every-
one acts for himself, and almost every one diff er ent from the other. 
(V. Rathbun 1781, 7)
What seems to have disturbed Rathbun so thoroughly was the lack of 
harmonic or rhythmic convergence, of “rule,” in much of the ritual. He 
recoiled from the Shakers’ reliance on an improvised but incomplete 
“concord” with “every one act[ing] for himself.”  Here we see a pro cess of 
(mis)timing that fails to produce proper adhesion between  people, mul-
tiplying difference rather than consolidating sameness as proper sympa-
thy would.
Rathbun’s grand son Caleb, who remained a Shaker for some time, 
along with his  father, Valentine Rathbun, Jr., would expand on the se nior 
Shake It Off 33
Rathbun’s account in 1796, describing the Shakers abusing their young 
male charges: “They  were jirked [sic] each by one leg and one arm, from 
side to side, across the floor, and violently jammed against the wal [sic], 
they  were next stripped quite naked, and tied with their hands above their 
heads, and  there slapped with a stick, like a pudding stick, for near half 
an hour; and fi nally they  were loosened in this naked situation, and set to 
jumping about, the Elders in the mean time  running round among them 
and pushing them over” (C. Rathbun [1796] 2013, 4).  Here, the punish-
ment echoes Rathbun  Sr.’s descriptions of Shaker dance as a  matter of 
jumping, stripping, and nudity. This correlation between Shaker worship 
and physical cruelty is especially ironic given that a major point of con-
tention between Shakers and the world’s  people was their pacifism, espe-
cially their refusal to fight in the American Revolution (S. J. Stein 1992, 
13–14). But it separates them definitively from the civilized, for whom 
the sympathetic mutual attunement of bodies was understood to miti-
gate against vio lence, marking Shakers’ physical responses to one another 
as destructive to rather than constructive of sociability. And rather than 
an inheritance consisting of impressions passed from body to body across 
generations, this remark depicts a scene of intergenerational jerking, jam-
ming, slapping, jumping,  running around, and pushing that fails to bind 
the elders to the  future of the young, and, by extension, to the destiny 
of even their own  people. It is a literalization of the damage that Shaker 
celibacy was understood to inflict on the nation.
The Shakers’ vio lence, then, is also an aspect of their lack of a specifi-
cally national belonging. Rathbun Sr. writes, “It is impossible to point out 
any exact form, for they vary and differ and seldom act the same form ex-
actly over again. They chuse to do so, to be singular, lest, as they say, they 
should be connected with Babylon” (V. Rathbun 1781, 8). At first glance, 
this “singularity” reiterates Rathbun Sr.’s claim that  every Shaker dancer 
acted for himself, and references the Shaker prohibition of marriage. But 
it also indexes the early Shaker distrust of rhythmic and harmonic simul-
taneity. The negative invocation of “Babylon,” where  humans originally 
spoke one language, suggests that the early Shakers linked synchrony to 
evil. A combination of mimesis and repetition, synchrony depends on 
sameness of sound and regularity of the gaps between sounds, a resolu-
tion of acoustic dissonance and temporal disorder into unisonance— a 
euphony of voices speaking si mul ta neously. Unisonance, in turn, underlies 
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the fantasy of the nation itself as a bounded and bound population of 
fellow readers, prayers, and chanters. Indeed, for Benedict Anderson 
(1982), the nation- form is distinguished precisely by synchrony, by the 
“meanwhile” time of print culture, specifically newspapers and novels, 
which are not only read in tandem by citizens but also exhibit multiple 
storylines taking place si mul ta neously.
Early Shaker distrust of synchrony is also connected to their refusal 
of the print culture that, Anderson argues, bound national subjects to 
one another by fostering a sense of mutual activity across distant spaces. 
Shakers declined to reproduce their theology and ser vices into materi-
als that could be apprehended by readers who could keep a safe distance 
from Shaker meetings, which  were originally open to the public and 
 understood as recruiting events. Indeed, Shakers mistrusted literacy in 
general, preferring a pedagogy of musical and rhythmic entrainment. As 
Etta Madden (1998, 33) has argued, since Ann Lee was not convention-
ally literate, her predominant mode of “reading” was her interpretation 
of visions, “ people’s minds, hearts, and bodies,” and the Scripture deliv-
ered orally. An apostate writing in 1795 described how Ann Lee “would 
walk around [worshippers], smile upon them, lay her hand upon their 
heart, then take their hand and press it upon her own bosom. She would 
stroke their arms, lay her hand on their heads, and many other  things . . . 
all the while she would be singing and chanting forth a strange bewitch-
ing kind of incantation,  until the person was wrought into a perfect maze” 
(Anonymous 1795, quoted in Wergland 2011, 18).
 Here, liturgical dance and seduction are one and the same: the “perfect 
maze” expresses the way that Ann Lee’s singing, dancing, and gestures 
ensnare the worshippers both physically and affectively. As in many en-
thusiastic religions, Lee’s sense of what it meant to embody and to reach a 
constituency was in dramatic opposition to Enlightenment modes of ab-
stract citizenship, wherein the citizen checked his bodily particularities 
at the door of the public sphere, and spoke, ideally in print, as a generic 
national subject (see Warner 1990b). In response to Lee’s oral, pictorial, 
and physical recruitment techniques as well as to Shaker celibacy, anti- 
Shaker writing was adamant about the unfitness of Shakers for national 
belonging: as anti- Shaker writer James Smith ([1810] 2013, 14) saw it, 
“Let Shakerism predominate, and it  will extirpate Chris tian ity, destroy 
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marriage and also our pre sent  free government, and fi nally depopulate 
Amer i ca.”
The most surprising stigma against the Shakers, however, was not 
their status as suspect Christians, nor their lack of “civilization,” nor 
even their anti- Babylonian refusal of nation- making synchrony. It ap-
pears in Rathbun’s passing description of Shakers singing “in an Indian 
tone”; in Peter Youmans’s (C. Rathbun [1826] 2013, 311) claim that Shak-
ers “scream, shout, and holloo like Indians”; in Absolem H. Blackburn’s 
([1812] 2013, 238) claims about Shaker “[g]esticulations, of which the sav-
ages themselves, never would have dreamed of at a war dance”; in Hora-
tio Stone’s ([1846] 2013, 153–54) description of the Shakers’ “wild savage 
revelries”; and in an anonymous writer’s ([1847] 2013, 167) denounce-
ment of Shaker rituals as “similar . . .  to the blind and superstitious orgies 
of untutored savages.” All of  these repre sen ta tions of Shaker dance sug-
gest that the Shakers’ lack of adherence to Eu ro pean forms of song and 
dance made them available to racial stigma.
The Shakers did not bar  people of color from their communities or 
worship, and several Shaker songs dated 1830 and thereafter are self- 
consciously “Indian” and “Negro” (their words) in ways that embarrass 
modern readers but did leave Shakers open to being conflated with Native 
and African Americans.1 More broadly, though, early Shakers  were racial-
ized in and through the idiom of time, first as Native Americans. First, 
their mode of worship was embodied and immediately responsive to the 
perception of a holy spirit. In fact, a Shaker missionary wrote in 1807 of 
a visit to the “Shawnee prophet Tecumsah” that the prophet “sensibly 
spake by the power of God” (Andrews 1972, 120), and John Mac Kilgore 
(2016, 105) suggests that that visit enabled the Shakers and indigenous 
Americans to recognize that they had in common “immediate inspira-
tion, ecstatic dancing, a message of reform and renunciation, and a kind 
of folk communism.” Second, like Native Americans, the celibate Shak-
ers’ kinship patterns did not follow the middle- class Anglo- American 
norm of the monogamous nuclear  house hold but relied on adoption and 
cohabitation. Putting  these two  things together, we might say that the 
timing of Shaker songs and dances, like  those of Native Americans to 
which apostates analogized them, refused the heteroreproductive tempo-
ral order of late eighteenth- and nineteenth- century Amer i ca.2 Thus, the 
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anti- Shaker tracts that I quoted from above that figure Shaker worship as 
“Indian” or “savage” link the harmonic and rhythmic irregularities of two 
cultures  imagined as temporally sexually aberrant, as if the sexual aber-
rance caused the musical/metrical irregularity or vice versa. If the Shakers 
did not become a race, precisely, they  were figured in terms that barred 
them from the temporal and sensory qualities of whiteness, for white-
ness entailed physical responses and bodily synchronies that indexed and 
fostered sympathy, and a conception of the  future understood in terms of 
reproductive inheritance and racial development.
The Shakers’ distance from whiteness, in their conflation with Native 
Americans, had to do not only with the nonmarital, “promiscuous” modes 
of affiliation expressed in their dance but also with their method of re-
producing themselves via recruitment. Tellingly, in his initial description 
of a Shaker dance, Rathbun Sr. genders female the power to coordinate or 
decoordinate musical notes and movements: he notes that the “ mother,” 
or eldress at the head of the ceremony, provides some harmonic conflu-
ence with the notes she “strikes” ( whether this means singing or playing 
a percussive melodic instrument such as the triangle is unclear in this ac-
count), and  these moments of harmony are what draw viewers and par-
ticipants further into the ritual. By equating  these fleeting euphonies with 
a “charm,” Rathbone suggests that the Shakers conform to ordinary Eu ro-
pean expectations about harmonics only briefly, in order to draw unsus-
pecting witnesses in. Also pointing to the power of female recruitment, 
an anonymous writer protesting Ann Lee declares that “her religious per-
for mances  were so very clamorous, her rites so gymnastic and subversive 
of the peace of families . . .  the sect was deemed a public nuisance by the 
 people, and was suppressed by the civil authority” (1795, 82). The writer’s 
statement that Shaker rites threaten “the peace of families” suggests that 
more was at stake than quiet enjoyment of the neighborhoods in which 
Shakers resided. Rather, Shaker dancing itself seems to have been under-
stood as something that could break up families by seducing  people into 
leaving their natal homes to join Ann Lee’s sect.
 These worries about a  woman “charming” unrelated  people into a new 
form of sociability clarify just what was so threatening about the Shakers 
and why both their dances and their celibacy  were so often described in 
terms of promiscuity: in a sense, Shaker celibates had sex without having 
sex, engendering new kinds of subjects, bodies, and families. They put 
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into stark relief the way that rhythmic dance, like rhythm in general, is 
asexually generative. Writing about how  humans achieve consciousness 
of and through rhythm, the psychoanalyst Nicholas Abraham (1995, 
70) argues that rhythm manifests as “bodily movement that feels like 
it triggers the next manifestation”; in other words, perceiving rhythm 
is generally a  matter of moving in response to it, however subtly. That 
movement then literally incorporates rhythm, making the body seem 
like its motor, like the origin of the rhythm itself— which in a sense it is, 
insofar as rhythm does not preexist its perception or, more specifically, 
its proprioception. Within rhythmic activity, the perceiver, in Abraham’s 
(75) words, “becomes a rhythmic object.” The bound aries between per-
ceiver and perceived dissolve, and bodies reassemble into larger units of 
action that seem to share a subjectivity: an assemblage that does not re-
flect the marital- reproductive  family. Moreover, rhythm itself gives rise to 
futurity in the form of an asexual bodily feeling that another “manifesta-
tion” is coming.
Shaker rhythms  were also asexually generative in ways that directly 
flouted the timing of sex itself during the period. According to Henry 
Abelove’s (2003, 23) speculations, by the late eigh teenth  century, when 
the Shakers moved across the Atlantic, sex had been, at least in  England, 
reor ga nized according to the rhythms of cap i tal ist production, with 
every thing that was not “cross- sex genital intercourse” recategorized as 
what we would now call foreplay— a prelude to the main event.3 Abe-
love reads the increase in En glish population during the long eigh teenth 
 century as evidence for an increase in heterosexual intercourse that corre-
sponds, in turn, with a rise in productivity in general. And, concomitant 
with the ideology of production, he suggests, came a new understand-
ing that sex could be divided into unproductive and productive aspects, 
and that the former should be, at best, a lead-in to the latter. The sexual 
body was, it seems, newly paced and ordered; heterosexual intercourse 
became a sense- method for intuiting and performing the demands of in-
dustrial capitalism, a method that no doubt crossed the Atlantic  toward 
a new republic that needed, above all, productivity and reproduction. 
While the story of how heteronormativity was “timed” into being is an in-
complete one, Abelove’s analy sis provides a lens through which to look 
at Shaker dance. As ordinary eighteenth- century sex practice consoli-
dated around cross- sex genital intercourse, with other bodily activities 
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becoming foreplay, sex assumed a kind of linearity and couple- centricity 
that Shaker dance and Shaker celibacy eschewed. The linking of this 
refusal to Native Americans, again, suggests that the sense- methods of 
whiteness include not only sympathy and reprofuturity but also a proper 
sequencing of courtship, foreplay, and intercourse.
Shaker bodily practices, by contrast with  those of dominant Anglo- 
America, departed from the centralization of sex around intercourse: 
their dancing was a diffuse physical exertion that, in keeping with their 
celibacy, led to no climax, sexual or other wise. The Shakers drew their 
authority to dance in worship from Old Testament descriptions of 
 Israelites dancing to the Lord in gratitude (2 Samuel 6:14–21). In that 
story, David dances before God in a skimpy garment, and Michal, the 
 daughter of Saul, chides him for it; David defends his actions, saying 
that the Lord has chosen him as prince of Israel over Saul, and he is al-
lowed to make merry, play, or celebrate before the Lord. In a Shaker ser-
vice reconstructed by a group of religious studies scholars (Davies, Van 
Zyl, and Young 1984), the exegesis compares the Shakers to  these Isra-
elites, and one early nineteenth- century defender of the Shakers wrote, 
“Sacred  dancing would not appear in so debased a light, had it not been 
perverted by the wicked generally for the purpose of nocturnal recre-
ation” (T. Brown 1812, 85). In other words, Shaker dance protested the 
secularization of dancing into a mode of romantic courtship or sexual 
foreplay. But it also spiritualized dancing into a mode of religious and 
social reor ga ni za tion.
Shaker dances, then, repudiated couple- centered eroticism. But they 
also performed new arrangements of gender and sexuality. For example, 
the reconstructed Shaker ser vice includes a brief list of theological con-
cepts and justifications taken from Shaker writings, including the statement 
“Such dancing allows for the recognition and consecration of natu ral ap-
titudes and skills” (Davies, Van Zyl, and Young 1984, 2). In other words, 
rather than fostering couplehood, Shaker dance manifested individual 
and collective talents that could contribute to the community. The early 
style in which each person moved in de pen dently of  others engaged in 
simultaneous but diff er ent movements can also be fruitfully understood 
in terms of Roland Barthes’s (2013, 6) concept of ideorrhythmy, a mode of 
rhythmic togetherness in daily life that does not preclude individual re-
treats and improvisations, and thus balances community and singularity. 
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In addition, the Shakers’ movements expressed and enacted their antago-
nism to the world’s  people, whose gender and sexual hierarchies as well as 
liturgical practices Shakers opposed: the second half of the sentence from 
the reconstructed Shaker ser vice quoted above is “and it [Shaker dance] 
affirms the equality of the sexes” (Davies, Van Zyl, and Young 1984, 2). 
Avoiding the rules that governed secular dance, which usually focused on 
partnering men and  women, Shaker dance could serve to critique gender 
in equality and what might be called not just compulsory heterosexuality 
but compulsory sexuality. Shaker dance was not a lead-in to romantic 
love or sexual intercourse but, in its conglomeration of singularities, a 
mode of collective expression and, itself, an expression of collectivity. 
We can read Shaker dance, then, as a foil for what would eventually be 
the Foucauldian “regime of sexuality,” whereby the meaning of irregular 
bodily movements, alone or in groups, could only be concupiscence (see 
Foucault 1990a). Shakers’ bodily agitations simply did not add up to the 
secret of sexuality.
Changing It Up: The Laboring Dances
Relatively swiftly, the Shakers responded to the accusations that they 
 were oversexed, disorderly savages who threatened the nation by intro-
ducing the rhythmic regularity for which they are now best known.  After 
the death of Ann Lee and her  brother William Lee in 1784, and that of 
their successor, James Whittaker, in 1787, Joseph Meacham emerged as the 
leading elder. Meacham introduced and codified a system of communal 
living and mutual owner ship of land and goods, or ga nized the celibates 
into sex- segregated families according to age and spiritual ability, fixed 
a daily schedule and standards for the products Shakers made, and im-
posed schedules and activities for worship. Post-1787 Shakers lived in 
large communal “families” separated by sex, whose members  were not 
biologically related:  children  were separated from parents and raised in 
separate collective  houses by elders;  those who had married before join-
ing the Shakers  were not allowed to interact with their spouses. This 
novel kinship arrangement, again, expressed as well as fostered the cel-
ibacy that was at the center of Shaker theology and reform. But most 
importantly for our purposes, Meacham made dancing orderly and col-
lective so as to reflect this new order, introducing what the Shakers called 
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“laboring” dances in which men and  women, still separated, moved in 
tandem rather than individually (S. J. Stein 1992, 32–46).
The first order of business was to straighten out the body; laboring 
was supposed to be performed with, according to one song, “body right 
erect with ev’ry joint unbound” (Andrews [1963] 2011, 103), as opposed 
to the whirling, jerking motions described by early apostates. The two 
main dance steps, solidified between 1787 and 1790,  were a shuffle, with 
knees bent and feet strongly hitting the ground in a step- close- step mo-
tion, and a skip used for movement forward and backward. Men and 
 women stood in separate groups, facing a singer, and alternated skipping 
advances and retreats  toward one another and/or the singer, punctu-
ated by shuffles and turns in place (D.  W. Patterson 1979, 102). At no 
point did the groupings intermingle the sexes, nor did individual dancers 
ever pair off into male/female  couples. The stamping shuffles kept the 
beat like a drum, and dancers held their forearms outstretched, palms 
downward, with their hands  gently flapping in time to the  music, imi-
tating a motion of shaking off  water from the skin. While Shaker dance 
is difficult to picture (the shuffle especially), the Wooster Group dance 
com pany has reconstructed, reinterpreted, and performed some of the 
dances, setting them to the tunes of an lp made in 1976 by the  Sisters of 
the United Society of Shakers at Sabbathday Lake, Maine. The rehearsal 
videos (see Wooster Group 2015) show just how unusual  these dances 
must have looked to Americans who  were used to rural American and 
cosmopolitan Eu ro pean dance forms.
In the 1820s, additions to the dances included circle- within- circle for-
mations, with men and  woman moving in opposite directions; new hand 
motions, such as waving the hands over the head and pantomiming to 
the lyr ics; and sprightly marching steps, a new kind of shuffle adapted for 
an aging population (Davies, Van Zyl, and Young 1984, 6; D. W. Patter-
son 1979, 247). The marching steps evolved into a separate dance form re-
sembling military drills, called “marches.” In 1837, a period of spiritualist 
activity in Shaker communities began, understood by  those who claimed 
to be possessed by spirits as a revival of  Mother Ann’s work. Many of 
 these visionaries saw new dances and brought them forth to their com-
munities;  these innovations included some meeting of  couples within the 
dance (bowing and changing places, though still not touching), as in tra-
ditional American folk dances.  Those who claimed to be visited by Native 
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Americans sometimes danced solo, in the manner of the early Shakers, 
but alone with an audience instead of all together (D. W. Patterson 1979, 
378). The spiritualist era passed, but its legacy was yet another alignment 
of dance patterns with doctrinal concepts, as in, for example, breaking 
out into four circles symbolizing the four  great “dispensations” of Shaker 
theology (Adam to Abraham, Abraham to Jesus, Jesus to  Mother Ann, 
and  Mother Ann to the community) (Robinson 1893, 116, cited in D. W. 
Patterson 1979, 387). Dances also slowed to a dignified pace, again to ac-
commodate the el derly.
 Earlier, I suggested that Shaker dance was stigmatized even  after it 
became more orderly, but that the terms changed. As I’ll demonstrate 
below, from the 1830s onward, some impor tant anti- Shaker lit er a ture 
stigmatized Shaker worship by focusing on the tedious uniformity of 
their culture. The trope of oversimilarity that governed responses to the 
new dances had very diff er ent racializing implications than the vio lence 
and promiscuity associated with Native Americans: it made the Shak-
ers figuratively black. This racialization did not replace the association of 
Shakers and Native Americans but overlapped with it and then took on 
a life of its own, focused less on their “wild” gyrations and more on their 
threatening oversynchronization.
I have argued thus far, following several critics, that late eighteenth- 
and early nineteenth- century whiteness, as a sense- method, involved 
the following: finely calibrated delays between receiving a sensation 
and responding to it (Rosenberg 2011 and Schuller 2017); understand-
ing stimuli as cumulative and heritable over time (Schuller 2017); and 
sequencing intercourse properly (Abelove 2003). I have also suggested 
that the failure to achieve whiteness involved a certain sluggishness and/
or impulsivity, or being too slow or too fast in relation to one’s surround-
ings, as well as dissonance and too much rhythmic differentiation and 
too much or too  little sex. But blackness, in par tic u lar, is often figured 
as a  simple excess of repetition, leading to an inability to achieve rhyth-
mic intention and thus to enter the flow of time. For instance, Abraham 
(1995, 72) describes rhythm as “the expectation of what has just been 
constituted”— a stretching  toward a  future that  will yield up a repre sen-
ta tion of the past in the form of a repetition. But he denies such temporal 
complexity to  people of African descent. He writes that “most African 
tribes” use a monotonous rhythm in their drumming, a “succession that 
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does not advance” (84; emphasis in source). He continues, “[In drum-
ming,] the same cycle is constantly repeated, and duration— the very 
environment of conscious acts— marches in place” (84). Abraham goes 
on to attribute to Africans “a fascinated consciousness, subjected to an 
inevitable, horizonless  future” (84). In other words, “African” rhythm, 
 because it does not necessarily resolve into Eu ro pean mea sures, cannot be 
productive of retrospective- anticipatory time, the time of humanity and 
of history alike. Rather than being made into rhythmic “objects” in a way 
that promisingly liquidates subjectivity, as Abraham’s unmarked white 
subjects are in the first material I discussed from his book, his “Africans” 
are “fascinated” and “subjected,” figuratively enslaved by their percussive 
patterns, their minds bound to a  future over which they have no control 
and cannot see. Abraham goes on to posit that “the absence of a revalo-
rization of the past as a constitutive pro cess clearly reflects the total axi-
ological passivity of the individual before the imperatives of the group. 
Entirely in the pre sent, extended  toward the  future that is imposed on 
us, we no longer have to face the past” (84).
In other words, in the case of Africa, rhythm becomes evidence not 
of the ordering capacities of the  human mind but of the incapacity for 
temporal order.  There are echoes  here of the discourse of enthusiasm as 
lacking the capacity to receive a stimulus and narrate how it came into 
being, that is, as lacking a historical sense. Abraham’s “we” is spuriously 
inclusive, too, as it implicitly links African polyrhythms, misrecognized 
as monorhythm, with modern totalitarianism (“the passivity of the in-
dividual before the imperatives of the group”). He is, of course, tapping 
into a long history of understanding nonwhite cultures as without proper 
differentiation, rhythmically and other wise: perhaps the paradigmatic 
example is the fictional Marabar Caves in E.  M. Forster’s A Passage to 
India whose echo is a “monotonous noise,” an “ou- boum” that is “entirely 
devoid of distinction” (Forster [1924] 2005, 137). This racialized echo of 
India is also sexually aberrant, for it predicts and contributes to the as-
sault that Adela Quested claims to have under gone in the cave. And it 
stops time even outside the cave, the ringing in her head a figure for an 
India she cannot escape.
To see the Shakers moving  toward racialization as black, we must 
begin with the nineteenth- century material that figures them as repeti-
tive. Writing in 1842 about a visit to the Shaker village of New Lebanon, 
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for example, Charles Dickens focuses on precisely this deadly quality of 
rhythmic repetition. He calls the Shakers “wooden men,” and describes “a 
grim room, where several grim hats  were hanging on grim pegs, and the 
time was grimly told by a grim clock which uttered  every tick with a kind 
of strug gle, as if it broke the grim silence reluctantly, and  under protest” 
(Dickens [1842] 2001, 236). Dickens’s term “grim” tolls like a funeral bell 
over and over again, as if to mimic the movement of the ticking clock, but 
also overtakes it. The repetition of “grim” and the image of worldly time 
in the figure of the clock, struggling against the “grim silence” of Shaker 
eternal time, suggest that observers saw the Shakers as overly regulated, 
their insistence on mea sured time as productive of a deathly sameness, a 
time stoppage.
This is nowhere more floridly described than in Catharine Maria 
Sedgwick’s novel Redwood ([1824] 1969). Centered on a power strug-
gle between Caroline Redwood, a Southern belle, and Ellen Bruce, who 
epitomizes New  England womanhood, Redwood also contains a subplot 
about a young girl, Emily Allen, who is held captive by a Shaker com-
munity. The novel’s marriage plot— which culminates in the  union be-
tween Ellen and a young man whom Caroline has previously claimed as 
her own— unfolds in contradistinction to Shaker celibacy. In Redwood, 
the sexual promiscuity that marks the earliest criticisms of the Shakers 
is gendered entirely male. Early in the Emily Allen subplot, a villainous 
Shaker elder, Reuben Harrington, sings “a shaker tune, at all times suf-
ficiently dissonant, [which] . . .  sounded like the howl of an infernal,” and 
“to this  music he shuffle[s] and whirl[s] in the manner which the sect call 
dancing and  labour worship” (1:96). Sedgwick seems to have blended 
the early and the reformed styles in her depiction of Shaker dance, but 
Harrington’s sounds and rhythms accord with his predatory nature as 
he sets out to seduce Emily. We glimpse, again, the correlation of Shak-
ers with Native Americans as Emily’s aunt Debby shouts to this dancing 
Shaker, “Stop your dumb pow- wow!” (1: 96). True to his “infernal” howl, 
erratic body movements, and “Indian” dancing, Harrington turns out to 
be a libertine, a kidnapper, and a rapist— and indeed, his accomplice in 
this abduction is none other than one of the era’s ste reo typically drunken 
Indians. Thus we can still see, in this post-1787 text, what I have been call-
ing the racialization of the early Shakers via their harmonic and rhythmic 
styles, which align them with Native Americans.
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But the major shortcoming of Shaker society is, in Redwood’s terms, 
“monotony,” and this turns the critique in a much diff er ent direction. 
The narrator of Redwood speaks of “the uniform habits and monoto-
nous occupations” of the Shakers, which “have a strong tendency to check 
 every irregular feeling, and to intercept  every vagrant desire” (Sedgwick 
[1824] 1969, 2:18). Harrington’s desire is out of control  because he sings 
and dances in the early style. But in the narrator’s description of 
 Emily’s captivity among the Shakers, the post- Meacham style dominates, 
and uniformity and monotony pre sent a very diff er ent kind of threat. In 
fact Redwood, like Dickens’s Notes, signals the undifferentiated rhythms 
of Shaker society with the image of a clock: “Emily had paused at the 
staircase from extreme weakness; the loud ticking of the clock had ar-
rested her attention; this sound, always the same, seems like the natu-
ral voice of this monotonous solitude. ‘Oh,’ said Emily, unconsciously 
uttering audibly her thoughts, ‘to what purpose is time mea sured  here? 
 There is no plea sure to come— there is none past that I dare to remember’ ” 
(2:23–24).
 Here we see an echo of Abraham’s contention that African rhythms 
do not produce a past or an intentional  future. As a non- Shaker, too, 
Sedgwick apparently cannot imagine Shakerism as a form of sociability 
but only as solitude. The clock that “voices” this solitude with a “tick,” 
notably like the clock in Dickens, has no “tock,” no redeeming differ-
ence that encompasses plea sure past or  future. Cast as Emily’s unbearable 
loneliness, “monotony” comes to signify a lack of differentiation both 
sexual and rhythmic. It is as if the difference that resolves sameness into 
complementarity, and isolation into sociability, like the “tock” that would 
turn two “ticks” into a pair, is the “plea sure” of proper heterosexual de-
sire itself: in other words, heterosexuality is redeemed as the difference that 
makes time pos si ble. Without the differentiation emblematized by hetero-
sexual desire,  there is no “purpose” to mea sur ing time; thus Shakers are 
outside of time by virtue of their celibacy. They are not simply outside of 
the rhythms and pacings of heterosexual courtship and sexuality; they 
are absolutely atemporal.
Redwood depicts Shaker dance in much the same terms. The narrator 
describes Emily’s  sisters and brethren moving “with a uniform shuffling 
step, as if it was composed of so many automatons, their arms rising and 
falling mechanically; and their monotonous movements, solemn melan-
Shake It Off 45
choly or stupid aspects, contrasting ludicrously with the festive throngs 
which are usually seen stepping on ‘light fantastic toe’ through the mazy 
dance” (Sedgwick [1824] 1969, 2:43). The terms “uniform,” “automa-
tons,” “mechanically,” “monotonous,” and “stupid” work together to por-
tray Shaker dancing as so undifferentiated as to be inhuman.  Whether 
together like the dancers or alone like Emily, Shakers are so overregulated 
by time that they are no longer in it, and so uniform that what they do is 
no longer legibly social.
This takes on racial characteristics in the equation of Shakerism with 
enslavement, and Shaker dance as a means of expressing and promulgat-
ing slavery. For instance, in 1810 James Smith wrote, “It is said, if  those 
 under the Shakers are in bondage, they are voluntary slaves. They are just 
such voluntary slaves as the ten kings and their subjects  were  under the 
Pope, they  were artfully led into it . . .  they are objects of pity, seduced, 
bewildered and lost;  under strong delusion, kept in bondage, by the fear 
of hell or the terror of the whip” (Smith [1810] 2013, 185).  Here, anti- 
Catholicism merges with anti- Shakerism and racism in the suggestion 
that Shakers lack the psychological capacity for in de pen dence. In an 
example that more directly correlates Shaker enslavement with their 
dance, Christopher Clark’s long anti- Shaker treatise, A Shock to Shaker-
ism ([1812] 2013, 10), equates Shaker rhythms of work and worship with a 
 mental slavery akin to the bondage of African Americans, declaring that 
“it is easier to gain white Negroes in Amer i ca, to work, and dance all 
their days, than to obtain money to purchase black ones.” Clark goes on 
to racialize and equate Catholics and Shakers for giving confessions to in-
termediaries rather than directly to God: “God would just as soon damn 
for their sins, a Pope or Shaker confessor; as he would a Hottentot, or a 
Guinea Negro” (18). Fi nally, beginning in the 1840s, Shakers performed 
their songs and dances in costume in traveling shows such as the one 
advertised as a “ Great Moral Curiosity! Shaker Concert!” in the Maine 
Cultivator and Hallowell Gazette on March  27, 1847.  These shows no 
doubt competed with and complemented the minstrel shows also popu-
lar during the 1830s and 1840s, putting the Shakers, as historian Christian 
Goodwillie (2013, 1:xxxii) writes, “on equal footing with the most vulgar 
public entertainment,” and further racializing them.
The most widely circulated image of the Shakers as “white Negroes,” a 
lithograph published in 1831 by Anthony Imbert, “Shakers near Lebanon 
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State of New York,” (figure 1.2), follows the tradition of equating unifor-
mity with  people of color, and Africans and  people of African descent 
with a lack of rhythmic differentiation.
In this print, a group of men dance  toward a group of  women, with a 
fash ion able “Gentile”  woman watching. All the dancers have their arms 
out, palms down, in the traditional manner; the  women appear to be 
stepping backward while the men step forward (though in real ity, the 
dancers would be more likely to be facing a singer). The  women are al-
most completely uniform in appearance, their  faces lit to the same degree 
of bright whiteness, with only variations in age and facial expression dis-
tinguishing them from one another. But the men are much more individ-
uated and grotesque, for they appear to be prancing with their buttocks 
pushed outward, and wear a variety of unhappy, somewhat leering  faces. 
Five figures stand out from the crowd of men: in the front and third row 
foreground are two men with large- nosed, sharp profiles, who are in 
some versions of the lithograph clearly dark- skinned; in the second row 
an incongruously short, fat, bald man dances next to a tall, gaunt man in 
a white wig. In the very back row is an African American man whose pro-
file echoes that of the short bald man, but this time drawn with the low 
1.2  “Shakers near Lebanon, State of New York,” 1831. Library of Congress, Prints and 
Photo graphs Division, lc- usz62-13659.
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forehead, flat nose, round buttocks, and protruding lips typical of racist 
ste reo types of the era, which refract back onto the bald man and racial-
ize him as black, or at least off- white. Next to the first African American 
man, in silhouette, is another apparently African American man. While 
the Imbert lithograph might be signaling “amalgamation,” or  simple race 
mixing, the gender segregation, and the ways that the bodies of the white 
men echo  those of the black men within an image of synchrony and 
uniformity, suggest a certain asexual “contagion” of blackness, such that 
blackness can be spread through the overly uniform dancing.
This lithograph bears instructive comparison to a much more Shaker- 
sympathetic watercolor done by Benson John Lossing in 1856 (perhaps 
Lossing even had the  earlier lithograph in mind). In this piece, men and 
 women dance in the same direction in the front three rows, men  behind 
 women, with the back rows dancing in the opposite direction (figure 1.3). 
Both men and  women have their elbows bent, forearms extended, and 
palms up. The  women are uniformly dressed in white with sheer, dark- 
trimmed bonnets, heads bowed.
The men all have on blue vests, and  either white or blue- grey pants. 
All have dark hair cut short in front, longer in back, or light hair in a 
modified “bowl” cut. The men all wear a neutral or slightly pleasant ex-
pression, and all are fair- skinned. Again, the men are more differentiated 
than the  women by color, but this time blue rather than black, and not 
differentiated through racial caricature, as all the dancers are white.
While  there  were, indeed, African American Shakers, most famously 
Rebecca Cox Jackson, in the Imbert lithograph the most clearly black 
men bring up the rear of the dance, and iconographically, the way they 
hold their bodies adds to the lithograph’s pre sen ta tion of Shaker men as 
grotesque, insofar as all the men take up the postures of ste reo typically 
racist images of African Americans. As a  whole, too, Imbert’s men are 
literally blacker than Lossing’s— their backs are cast in shadow, they wear 
dark vests, and only two heads of light or white hair appear among the 
dozen male figures. The lithograph precedes the post- Emancipation pe-
riod in which black men  were sexualized; rather than being cast as lech-
ers, Imbert’s Shaker men appear to be feminized in their imitation of the 
 women’s dancing, and fools in their taking on the poses of black carica-
tures. But read alongside the Lossing watercolor, Dickens’s Notes, Sedg-
wick’s Redwood, and the Smith and Clark anti- Shaker tracts especially, 
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the Imbert lithograph suggests that the overordering of Shaker worship, 
including its tandem movements and physical separation of the sexes, 
is not just deathly to dancers in terms of its connection with a gender- 
nonnormative and sexually aberrant refusal to reproduce. The Shaker 
rage for order, as caricatured  here, is also related to— though importantly 
not coterminous with— the status of social death accorded to slaves 
(O. Patterson 1982), and by extension to Native and African American 
 people on the Eastern seaboard of the United States. Like slaves, Shakers 
 were socially dead insofar as their kinship forms  were legally meaningless, 
though Shakers as a  whole did not suffer the destruction of  these forms 
in the way that slaves did. Like Native and African American  people, 
Shakers  were seen as inhuman precisely insofar as their physical move-
ments  were read as  either excessive or overly mechanical (see Ngai 2005, 
89–125).
1.3  Benson John Lossing, “The Dance,” 1825. Watercolor, 4 1/2 in. × 6 1/2 in. Dated 
“Saturday, 16 August 1856.” MssLS 1-289. The Huntington Library, San Marino, 
California.
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Taken together, the Imbert lithograph and the literary texts I have 
explored  here suggest that the prob lem with Shakers was a surrender of 
 Eu ro pean norms— sexual, gendered, and racialized— that added up to 
their being literally out of step with Amer i ca. This “Amer i ca,” a white 
one, demanded proper reaction times, a heterosexuality marked by a re-
productive stance  toward the  future, a correct sequencing of sex, and a 
right balance of synchrony and rhythmic differentiation. As the Imbert 
lithograph especially clarifies, to seek out alternate tempos and move-
ments in concert was to risk, paradoxically, both the hyperwhite deathli-
ness of the  women pictured, and (relatedly) the suspect blackening of the 
men. Neither was a proper form of whiteness.
From the Shaker point of view, though, their bodies  were metronomes 
keeping time with something more divine than capitalism, the nation, 
heteronormativity, or whiteness. Redwood clarifies this with an unex-
pectedly Shaker- sympathetic passage. Back in the stairway scene, Emily’s 
Shaker aunt, Susan, who is primarily responsible for preventing Emily 
from leaving the Shaker settlement, offers a Shaker calibration of time: 
“ ‘Do you ask to what purpose [time is mea sured]?’ said Susan . . .  ‘— Oh, 
have you already forgotten when  every stroke of that clock was as a holy 
monitor to you, arousing you to redeem the time . . .  when the stroke 
of  every hour carried with it the rec ord of your innocence?” (Sedgwick 
[1824] 1969, 2:24). Susan does not see clock time as undifferentiated 
without the saving aspect of heterosexual love: for her, rhythm inheres 
in the relation between the “tick” of the earthly clock and an unspoken 
“tock” of religious arousal, a fullness of time differentiated not from it-
self but from the world, and not through heterosexuality but through 
the redeeming aspect of sexual “innocence,” or celibacy tuned to a “holy 
monitor.”  Here, the plenitude of time, and the celibacy it indexes, is a 
new form of sociability, a  union with God.4
And while Redwood does not, in the end, endorse Susan’s philosophy 
of rhythm as a form of asexual religious ecstasy, a counterpoint to the 
novel’s general dismissal of Shaker time as undifferentiated emerges in 
the epigraph to the chapter that follows the exchange between Emily 
and Susan. The epigraph is from the French educational phi los o pher 
Madame de Genlis: “Le bonheur se compose d’une suite d’actions 
et de sensations continuellement répétées et renouvellées; simplicité et 
monotonie voilà en général ce qui le form et le constitue.” (Happiness 
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consists of a combination of actions and sensations continually repeated 
and renewed; simplicity and monotony are generally the form it takes 
and what constitute it) (Sedgwick [1824] 1969, 2:35; translation mine).
 Here, repetition is renewal, and not death, which is somewhat in 
keeping with the value put on pausing in eighteenth- century discourses 
of enthusiasm, and with Abraham’s conception of Eu ro pean rhythm as 
anticipatory and history making. But surprisingly, monotony itself is a 
form of regeneration— again, not reproduction. This sounds remark-
ably like Foucauldian discipline and like a tempered version of the ec-
static togetherness that William H. McNeill (1997) attributes to keeping 
together in time. Tellingly, Sedgwick leaves untranslated this seemingly 
pro- Shaker vision of “monotony” as renewal by repetition. Though Su-
san’s figure of “redeeming the time” is a form of asexual “happiness” that 
strongly  counters Emily’s vision of heterosexualized “plea sure,” the novel 
does not pick up on the radical implication that rhythm does not kill, 
but queers—by which I mean  here, offers a vision of a life outside of 
white temporality and not centered in marriage and  family. In this sense, 
Shaker rhythms  were, precisely, both queer and sacred, for they lifted the 
Shakers out of vari ous earthly tempos and united them with one another 
in a spiritual form of belonging that might be thought of as not only akin 
to queer world making but also truly, radically Christian, if we remember 
that Jesus instructed his followers to abandon their biological families: 
“If any man come to me, and hate not his  father, and  mother, and wife, 
and  children, and brethren, and  sisters, yea, and his own life also, he cannot 
be my disciple” (Luke 14:26; see also Shell 1995).
Still with Us
The Shakers, it might be said, eventually stilled themselves. With a popu-
lation in continual decline  after about 1850 due to their inability to re-
cruit and retain members, the remaining Shakers simply aged and died. 
By the 1900s, the el derly Shakers had ceased their dancing, and by the 
1940s even marching had died out. What remained was what we might 
quaintly call their “moveables,” their furniture and other artifacts. No 
longer shaking, Shakers moved into the mainstream through an aesthetic 
of symmetry, simplicity, and craftsmanship. As the definitive history of 
Shaker life in Amer i ca (S. J. Stein 1992, 423) puts it, “Once feared, hated, 
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and persecuted, now the Shakers are the darlings of American popu lar 
culture.” Major museums, including the Whitney and the Corcoran, 
have mounted exhibits of Shaker objects;  there are Shaker “living muse-
ums” staffed by actors at Hancock, Lebanon, and other formerly occu-
pied Shaker villages; “Shakerana” is mass- produced; and Americans seem 
to prefer the Shakers as designers rather than as agitators for celibacy, 
communitarianism, and asceticism. Their rhythms may have ground to a 
halt, but it is impor tant to remember that the Shakers  were, in their day, 
both literal and po liti cal movers indeed.
The scene of social death that anti- Shaker lit er a ture only hinted at is 
the topic of my next chapter, which focuses not on the so- called monoto-
nies of African- derived culture but on repetitions, testing, and even play 
in the face of overwhelming social death. Its archive is a set of nineteenth- 
century texts in which ex- slaves or freedmen repeatedly return to the 
scene of their own status as slaves by feigning death. Their repetitions and 
returns to the scene of social and  actual death are anything but dancelike, 
though they are certainly per for mances of a sort. And the “players” face 
not rhetorical stigmatization but, variously, reenslavement, live burial, 
and lynching. Yet their activities are ways of negotiating another over-
arching temporal regime of the very long nineteenth  century: the status 
of slaves and eventually  free black  people as avatars of chronopo liti cal 
nonbeing.
If antebellum anti- Shaker lit er a ture linked monotony 
and repetition to death and, by implication, to black-
ness, nineteenth- century African American lit er a ture 
tells a somewhat diff er ent story. Postbellum narrative 
fiction such as Pauline Hopkins’s Of One Blood ([1903] 
1988) and Charles Chesnutt’s late nineteenth- century 
tales, collected as The Conjure Stories (2011), often mo-
bilizes the trope of the living dead. Hopkins’s novel, dis-
cussed in the next chapter, contains African American 
ghosts and an ancient Ethiopian civilization buried 
in a crypt. The short stories collected as The Conjure 
 Stories include “The Goophered Grapevine” (1887), a 
tale about enchanted grapes that cause their enslaved 
eaters to age prematurely and then return to youth, foil-
ing the life span and the binary between  dying and living. 
A tale published the following year, “Po Sandy,” tells of 
a slave who turns into an immobile but living tree await-
ing the return of his sold- off wife. Sandy gets cut down 
THE GIFT OF CONSTANT ESCAPE
Playing Dead in African American Lit er a ture, 
1849–1900
Black studies’ concern with what it is to own one’s dispossession, 
to mine what is held in having been possessed, makes it more 
pos si ble to embrace the underprivilege of being sentenced to the 
gift of constant escape.
fred moten, “Black Op”
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and made into lumber, and then haunts the narrator and other characters 
through the walls of buildings made from the lumber. As several critics 
have argued, the most immediate sense- methods of African American 
lit er a ture of the late nineteenth  century might be melancholia, haunt-
ing, and encryption— sensations that at once capture the horror of the 
 Middle Passage, slavery, and the failure of Reconstruction, and that allow 
black writers to preserve and remobilize the histories erased by white 
 supremacist revisionism.1  These sensations are neither monotonous, as in 
the racist depictions of African (and Shaker) rhythms,  because they elicit 
fear and won der, nor are they strictly repetitive,  because they are  matters 
of return and surrogation with a difference.2
Instead of signaling a thralldom to monorhythm,  these African Amer-
ican figurations of blackness as living death register the legacy of what 
Orlando Patterson has famously described as the complete, unremitting 
social death imposed by slavery. According to Patterson (1982, 13), slav-
ery is “the permanent, violent domination of natally alienated and gener-
ally dishonored persons” (emphasis in source). As a substitution for death, 
the “natal alienation” of slavery imposes living death, or what Achille 
Mbembe (2003, 21) calls “death- in- life.” This is effected by complete iso-
lation from the legally recognized social ties that comprise kinship and 
 human belonging, a position on which Hortense Spillers (1987) and 
Saidiya Hartman (2008) have elaborated extensively. Furthermore, to be 
outside of recognized structures of belonging that include ancestry and 
descent as part of their meanings is to be not only outside of the hori-
zontal relations of gender and kinship, as Spillers in par tic u lar argues, 
but also outside of generational time and “lifetime,” birth- to- death time. 
Frank B. Wilderson III (2010, 279–80), then, has extended Hartman’s 
and Spillers’s work to reconceptualize social death as the foreclosure of 
temporal capacity, of the enslaved person and his/her descendants’ abil-
ity to meaningfully shape the past, pre sent, and  future. This foreclosure 
of slaves’ generationality and temporality is only hinted at in Patterson 
(1982, 38), but made explicit when he cites Claude Meillassoux’s (1975, 
20–21) statement “[The slave] can never be brought to life again as such 
since, in spite of some specious examples (themselves most instructive) of 
fictive rebirth, the slave  will remain forever an unborn being.”
This chapter complicates Meillassoux’s characterization of slaves as 
“unborn” and/or unremittingly dead- in- life by focusing on how  actual 
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slaves and their descendants, some fictional and some historical, exor-
bitantly and often repeatedly mimed death. While I do not mean to dis-
miss or overwrite the power ful theorizations of African American time 
in terms of melancholia, haunting, and encryption, I also want to claim 
that the experience of slavery and its aftermath, and modes of protesting 
and recalibrating that experience, involved an investment in rhythmic 
movements— not just song and dance, but a kind of shuttling  toward and 
away from (social) death without reanimation, resurrection, or reincarna-
tion. Playing dead is a sense- method insofar as it involves the body touch-
ing death and/or becoming temporarily dead. It is a kind of fort- da for 
confronting the (a)temporalities of slavery and its aftermath, particularly 
the static time of social death— for accepting neither the permanence 
of social death nor the consolations of white humanism and the latter’s 
commitment to what it designates as a life. In part, this means consider-
ing the queer potential of slaves’ and their descendants’ voided kinship 
ties and resultant temporal suspension, focusing on the possibilities and 
limitations for critical race theory of queer theory’s “antisocial thesis,” 
or the claim that queers  ought to exploit and mobilize our position as 
avatars of death and reproductive sterility (see Bersani 1987; Edelman 
2004; and Caserio et al. 2006). In part, it means seeing the movement 
 toward and away from death in vari ous narratives and per for mances as 
rhythmic, and rhythm as a mode of dealing with durational time, the 
unremitting time of antiblackness. Fi nally, it means understanding Af-
rican American writers’ and performers’ elaborate movements  toward 
and away from death as occupations, in the po liti cal sense of that term, 
of social death. I call both the regime of slave timelessness and African 
American stylizations of it a chronothanatopolitics— about which more 
below. I counterpose state- sponsored chronothanatopolitics as bio/
necro- politics, to African Americans’ individual and collective recapture 
of chronothanatopolitics. In what follows, I trace this recapture, via the 
sense- method of playing dead, through three ex- slave narratives (the fic-
tionalized autobiography of Harriet Jacobs and the life stories of Henry 
Bibb and Henry Box Brown), one set of per for mances (Brown’s lectures 
and pa norama), and one work of post- Reconstruction narrative fiction 
(Sutton E. Griggs’s novel Imperium in Imperio), framing them with two 
Br’er Rabbit trickster tales, and linking the motif of playing dead in  these 
works to the current- day protest per for mances of Black Lives  Matter.
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Chronothanatopolitics: Br’er Rabbit
The equation of enslavement with unremitting death is belied by some of 
the most foundational African American stories, the trickster tales deriv-
ing from African folklore and recalibrated to address slavery— examples 
one could hardly call “specious,” pace Meillassoux, and that differ from 
postbellum fiction’s backward- looking figures of melancholia and haunt-
ing. In  these folktales, “fictive rebirths” foreground the movement of 
slaves and their descendants in and out,  toward and away from, death. 
The slave may be unborn in  these stories, but he or she is not, for that, 
dead. Instead, the slave plays dead, using feigned death to engage in what 
Jared Sexton (2011) has called “the social life of social death,” or the forms 
of relationality, available within a state of natal alienation and dishonor, 
that do not simply replicate the modalities of white supremacy: nation, 
 family, citizenship, love.
In African- derived folktales about playing dead twice in the road, 
then, death is a game. A trickster— Anansi the Spider in West African 
versions of the tale, Boukee in a Bahamas version, Br’er Rabbit in Joel 
Chandler Harris’s (1881a) famous reworkings of slave tales— lies down 
in the road, playing dead.3 Let us call him Br’er Rabbit, for familiarity’s 
sake. His straight man— Br’er Fox in Joel Chandler Harris’s retelling— 
has been hunting, and is bringing home a heavy load of game. Br’er Fox 
sees Br’er Rabbit “dead” in the road and says to himself that he  will leave 
this delicious- looking dead rabbit and go on to see if  there is another 
one in the road further on, and if so, he  will turn back to get the first 
one. This enables Br’er Rabbit to hop up, outrun Br’er Fox, and play 
dead in the road a second time. Seeing this, Br’er Fox determines to put 
his load of food down and go back for the first dead rabbit, planning to 
come back and pick up his food and the “second” dead rabbit on his way 
home. However, Br’er Rabbit makes off with his food, and Br’er Fox ar-
rives home empty- handed, with neither his original load nor a rabbit for 
dinner.
While he may, indeed, never have been “born” except in his famous 
briar patch, Br’er Rabbit plays dead as opposed to hiding and stealing the 
food, scaring Br’er Fox into dropping it, or some other pos si ble ruse. He 
does so twice. And he gets enormous plea sure out of being reborn, or, if 
slaves are never properly born into recognized kinship forms, secondarily 
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born without an origin and without any resulting kinship ties. His per-
for mance of death makes pos si ble a birth that undermines the position of 
birth as a primary event that automatically connects the born person to a 
web of legibly  human relations. At the heart of the tale are the theatrical-
ized pleasures of repetition without reproduction, incarnation without 
resurrection, death without prior life.  There’s a certain glorious excess 
in this story, along the lines of Georges Bataille’s (1986) formulation of 
death as a form of proliferation and hence of life: feigned death begets, 
over and over again, new Br’er Rabbits— reborn outside of marriage and 
reproduction, not as freemen but as slaves who have temporarily and mo-
mentarily escaped.
What I wish to focus on  here, though, is less the coming- back- to- life 
aspect of the Br’er Rabbit tale and the texts that I  will argue are its succes-
sors, but the complexity of playing dead, especially multiple times. Play-
ing dead certainly evokes Mbembe’s (2003) concept of necropolitics, or 
the way that the state and its auxiliary powers create “death- worlds” filled 
with the “living dead” (Mbembe 2003, 40). For Mbembe, necropolitics 
is countermanded by  those who turn their bodies into weapons in ser-
vice of both eternal life and an unrealized  future. But Mbembe focuses 
on the relation between the necropolitics employed by the United States 
in the  Middle East, and its strategic recalibration as Muslim martyrdom, 
dodging the fact that slaves, by definition,  were denied the subjectivity 
that martyrdom assumes. Even Jasbir Puar’s (2007) power ful reworking 
of Mbembe’s work on suicide bombers claims the latter as queer  because 
they dissolve bodily and temporal bound aries of the sort fundamentally 
denied to slaves. By contrast, playing dead twice requires no subject: it is 
like squaring death, or cubing it. Playing dead does not allegorize physical 
death as a redemptive release from social death, nor does it portray physi-
cal death as a redundant confirmation of social death, nor does it claim 
a bodily coherence or stable subject that it then goes on to deconstruct. 
Instead, it trades on an exorbitance of death beyond death, death beside 
death, death within death. Fi nally, playing dead also does not turn back 
upon death, or the system that produces social death, to destroy them in 
the name of life or even of continuation in a radically new mode.
More useful for my purposes than necropolitics is Dana Luciano’s 
(2007) idea of a chronobiopolitics, which foregrounds time. Drawing 
from Foucault’s ([1978–79] 2008, 1990a) conception of biopolitics, Lu-
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ciano adds the prefix chronos to describe cultural and po liti cal arrange-
ments of time that not only designate some lives as long, coherent, and 
meaningful while cutting  others short and/or relegating them to atem-
poral meaninglessness but also focus on the feeling body as the key to 
nonlinear temporalities: most importantly, her term emphasizes tempo-
rality as an affective technique of necro/biopower. In place of necros/bios, 
though, my term “chronothanatopolitics” references Thanatos, Greek 
my thol ogy’s personification of death, of whom an Orphic hymn (circa 
3rd  century bc–2nd  century ad; Orpheus 1792, 224) declared, “On thee, 
the portion of our time depends, whose absence lengthens life, whose 
presence ends.” This description of Thanatos imagines the god flicker-
ing between absence and presence: unlike bio/necropolitics, it does not 
oppose life and death to one another but coils the line separating them. 
 Here, life is dependent on and constituted by death.
Thus the hymn foregrounds the way that life, rather than being the 
opposite of death, is the opposite of the presence of death— merely a tem-
porary “disappearing” of death and a counterper for mance of it that does 
not negate it. The hymn allows us to conceptualize tricks such as Br’er 
Rabbit’s as a staging and involution of the life/death binary rather than 
just a commitment to life or an unchanging black deathliness. Thanatos, 
of course, also references Freud ([1920] 1964), who, in “Beyond the Plea-
sure Princi ple,” transformed its meaning in his conception of the death 
drive to emphasize the organism’s psychic impulse to return to an origi-
nary, quiescent, atemporal state. Again, the death drive confounds any 
easy opposition between life and death, as the very pulsation of the drive 
 toward death is entailed in living. But chronothanatopolitics is neither 
a purely psychic drive nor a universal phenomenon; instead, it is a pro-
duction of deathliness and nonbeing by historical forces external to the 
subjectivity it creates for nonblack  people, and forecloses for  people of 
African descent: one might call it a sociopo liti cal death drive enacted by 
white supremacy.4 And as the example of Br’er Rabbit shows, chrono-
thanatopolitics can also be counterperformed as a kind of dancing on the 
edge of death or a shuttling movement between life and death, and in 
this it is diff er ent from both bio- /necropolitics and chronobiopolitics.5
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The Politics of Nonresurrection: Harriet Jacobs
Why not simply claim that miming death is fundamentally Christian, 
derived from a theology of (re)incarnation and life  after death? For in lit-
er a ture about slaves and even sometimes by ex- slaves, symbolic re sis tance 
to social death and a commitment to (re)birth often include a rhetorical 
commitment to the Christian trope of resurrection— a life- in- death in 
which they are not chattel (Genovese [1974] 1976, 164). Harriet Beecher 
Stowe’s  Uncle Tom’s Cabin (1852, 273) offers a vivid fictional example of 
this when Tom says to Legree, “I can die” and then suggests that his trou bles 
 will be over when Legree kills him, whereas Legree  will end up in hell. 
The prob lem  here, as so many critics have noted, is that the Christian 
model of resurrection offers no succor in the  here and now: it was, in 
fact, a tool that slaveholders used to encourage enslaved  people to seek 
their reward only in the afterlife.6 In contrast to  Uncle Tom’s Cabin, many 
narratives written by former slaves use the trope of resurrection to fig-
ure freedom in this life: for example, Frederick Douglass ([1845] 1982, 
113) famously writes,  after the incident in which he fights back against 
his owner Covey, “I felt as I had never felt before. It was a glorious res-
urrection from the tomb of slavery, to the heaven of freedom.” Indeed, 
resurrectional and insurrectional rhe toric  were often intertwined in the 
versions of Black Chris tian ity that centered on Jesus. Crucified by power 
but returning to life to redeem his  people, Jesus offered a power ful vision 
of re sis tance and symbolized a master with greater authority than that of 
slave  owners (Genovese [1974] 1976, 165). But of course Douglass is not 
legally emancipated  after this incident, and this points to a prob lem with 
even black Christian reworkings of resurrection: the permanent freedom 
granted in the afterlife has yet to be won by living black  people on any 
lasting basis. Hence the trope of approaching and escaping death,  dying 
and being reborn and then  dying again, and, especially, willfully playing 
dead, figures the precarity of black existence both before and  after slavery.
This is clarified in Harriet Jacobs’s autobiography, Incidents in the 
Life of a Slave Girl ([1861] 1987). Jacobs’s protagonist, Linda Brent, inters 
herself in an attic for seven years to ensure that her  children are freed, 
and thus the narrative is often read as a tale of heroic motherhood—or, 
to use Lee Edelman’s (2004) term, of reprofuturity, a coinage naming 
the conflation of the  future with the production and care of  children. 
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For example, Georgia Kreiger (2008) has read Brent as someone who 
“plays dead,” but argues that the death is a linear journey into the un-
derworld symbolized by Brent’s confinement in the attic, which meta-
phor ically cleanses her from the sexualized sin of choosing to be a white 
man’s mistress to avoid her rapacious male owner, and makes her legible 
through the matrifocal lens of white female sentimental discourse. But 
Brent’s escape from confinement is no resurrection: as Jacobs makes 
clear, Brent’s victory is equivocal both insofar as a patron eventually buys 
her freedom, confirming her status as property, and insofar as she must 
tell her tale  under the dominant terms of domesticity even as she is de-
nied full access to it.7 The fact that this (deferred) domesticity itself was 
troped by Jacobs’s white contemporaries as “the Angel in the House,” as 
Barbara Welter (1976) reminds us, suggests that domesticity is not utterly 
disconnected from death, even if, following Patterson (1982), it seems the 
opposite of social death. For not only does domesticity wrest  women out 
of history and into a changeless, if exalted, eternal time somewhat akin to 
the nontemporality of slavery, it also— akin to but not equivalent to so-
cial death— depends on the alienation of a  people (“ free”  women) from 
birth name and property. My aim  here is not to analogize domesticity and 
slavery, which  were indeed extremely diff er ent and often- counterposed 
forms of subjugation in that domesticity and its privileges  were entirely 
denied slaves. It is to point out that Brent’s symbolic death threatens to 
bring her not life, but another, however more velvet and attenuated, form 
of death via the genre of sentimental fiction. This may be why Jacobs so 
insistently avoids the ending that the latter genre demands, writing in the 
voice of Brent, “Reader, my story ends with freedom; not in the usual 
way, with marriage” ( Jacobs [1861] 1987, 201), citing Jane Eyre only to 
reverse that novel’s terms. Jacobs may have to occupy the genre of senti-
mental domestic fiction in order to be heard, but her protagonist  will not 
entirely yield to its rules, nor or ga nize her own life in accordance with 
them.8 Yet Brent does wish for a “hearthstone of my own” ( Jacobs [1861] 
1987, 201), especially for her  children, which suggests the possibility that 
physical well- being— shelter, warmth— and domestic ideology might be 
separable. In other words, if the genre that entraps Jacobs repeats death 
in a diff er ent, whiter key, Brent’s refusal of marriage and pragmatic wish 
for a hearth provide one more, decidedly not resurrectional, escape from 
death.
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To my eye, Brent’s compounding, antiresurrectional (or at least non-
resurrectional) relation to death— her movement from social death 
 toward and away from the threat of domestic death, from death to death 
and then out again, as it  were—is analogous to the Br’er Rabbit story.9 
This relation to death is dramatized rhetorically by Jacobs’s refusal to cast 
Brent as a virtuous married  woman and by her attempt to pry the fact of 
sanctuary away from the ideology of domesticity. In Br’er Rabbit, it is ef-
fected with the flesh, mutely, as it  were, repeating but not redeeming the 
vio lence enacted on black flesh, so often left to die or rot in the road.10 As 
we  shall see, that relation to death is recapitulated, albeit sometimes in 
meta phorical form, in several African American texts of the nineteenth 
 century: the ex- slave Henry Bibb’s autobiography ([1850] 2001); the per-
for mances of the ex- slave Henry Box Brown from 1851 through the late 
nineteenth  century; and a somewhat Gothic scene in Sutton E. Griggs’s 
Imperium in Imperio ([1899] 2003). Fi nally, it finds its most dramatic 
expression in what may be the paradigmatic African American trickster 
tale, the story of the Tar- Baby.
The  Family as Social Death: Henry Bibb,  
Queer Theory, Afropessimism
Henry Bibb’s Narrative of the Life and Adventures of Henry Bibb ([1850] 
2001) focuses specifically on the natal alienation of the slave, but not 
by arguing, along the lines of Harriet Beecher Stowe, that slavery’s pro-
foundest injury is the destruction of  family ties— nor even, following 
Spillers (1987), that the negation of African kinship ties in the  Middle 
Passage is fundamental to the reduction of black slaves to agendered, 
asexualized nonhumanity. Instead, the Life and Adventures clarifies how 
even the resistant, extralegal  family ties fostered by slaves could com-
pound rather than ameliorate social death. The title of Bibb’s narrative 
alone signals the disjunction played out in the text: this is not just “the 
life” of an ex- slave, expressed as a teleological movement from birth to 
marriage and to freedom or death and resurrection. The text also narrates 
his “adventures,” his periodic detours from that journey and, by exten-
sion, from narrative itself, using a term that connotes play. While Bibb 
does not literally play dead to escape,  there is an ele ment of the ludic 
in his “adventures” off the plantation, which he captures by describing 
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how from the age of ten onward he practiced “the art of  running away” 
(Bibb [1850] 2001, 15), and by figuring one of his  later escapes as “a tramp” 
(135). Nevertheless, escaping is a deadly game for him, not only  because 
each time he runs away (a total of five times in his adult life) he risks 
being  either killed or remanded back to the state of social death, but also 
 because Bibb, like Br’er Rabbit, must stage his escapes over and over. Re-
markably, he runs away to a  free state, Ohio, no less than three times out 
of his five escapes from slavery. But instead of staying  there or  going on 
to Canada, each time he goes back to his wife and child in Kentucky, 
pretending to have returned permanently while plotting to  free them. 
We might say that rather than playing literally dead like Br’er Rabbit or 
Linda Brent, Bibb plays socially dead, repeatedly enacting the role of an 
obedient and submissive returned slave.
 Because Bibb’s repetitions and returns are an effect of his  family ties, 
his narrative might also be readable in terms of queer theory’s “antiso-
cial thesis.” Within a strain of queer theory embodied by gay white men, 
namely Leo Bersani (1986, 1987) and Lee Edelman (2004), the antisocial 
thesis is shorthand for an insistence that queers are cast as the negation 
of sociability, much as, according to Spillers (1987), slaves  were cast as the 
negation of humanity through the annihilation of African kinship ties 
and the misrecognition and destruction of African American ones. But 
whereas Spillers (1984) first suggests that black  women’s sexual vernacu-
lar theorizes black desire and belonging other wise, and then  later (Spill-
ers 1987) advocates a kind of radical black androgyny as a position from 
which to dismantle white patriarchy, Bersani and Edelman cling to an 
unmarked whiteness to link queerness with the Freudian death drive. For 
Bersani (1987), the sex practice most imbued with the threat of death, 
anal sex, is a figure for the queer practice of rupturing the bound aries of 
the life- affirming, imaginarily  whole, dominating ego—an ego that is, of 
course, not granted black subjects, as even a cursory reading of Frantz 
Fanon ([1952] 1994) makes clear.11 Edelman advocates embracing the 
 homosexual’s structural place as an avatar of death, as this positionality re-
fuses every thing to do with the production of the po liti cal  future, which 
he argues is inevitably constructed in the name of life, and especially of 
 children— a position that does not acknowledge eugenic proj ects that 
aimed to curtail  people of color’s reproductive  futures. Nevertheless, in 
light of Bersani and Edelman, Bibb’s repeated movements back  toward 
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social death might also look like futile, self- deceiving movements back 
 toward the “life” indexed (in heteronormative terms) by his wife and 
 children.
But Bibb’s  family is actually, itself, a site of social death: far from re-
deeming Bibb back into social life along the lines suggested by Edelman 
especially, Bibb’s  family ties intensify his deadness. Early in the narra-
tive, for instance, he describes his courtship of and marriage to his wife 
Malinda as another form of oppression: “I suffered myself to be turned 
aside by the fascinating charms of a female, who gradually won my atten-
tion from an object so high as liberty” (Bibb [1850] 2001, 33). While this 
sounds simply misogynistic, it also acknowledges that much of Bibb’s 
“social” life is actually inseparable from death, as slave  owners cemented 
 family relations among slaves only to the exact extent that  these relations 
would generate more slaves and keep slaves from  running away. Marital- 
and repro- futurity, then, are almost the literal death of Bibb, and as my 
epigraph from Fred Moten’s “Black Op” (2008a) suggests, they sentence 
him to “the gift of constant escape,” since he must repeatedly undo his 
escape in order to attend to his  family: “I must forsake friends and neigh-
bors, wife and child,” he writes, “or consent to live and die a slave” (Bibb 
[1850] 2001, 47). Significantly, Bibb refers to his wife as “dead to me” 
(189) once he finds out that her male owner has taken her on as a concu-
bine. On the one hand, his dismissal of her as dead to him on hearing the 
news reflects his apparent inability to understand that Malinda’s adul-
tery is impossible to conceive of as such  under the condition of captiv-
ity, which forecloses a consent that entails owner ship of the self. On the 
other, following Spillers and Hartman, we might read Bibb as, by the end 
of the narrative, having bought a semblance of freedom through the mul-
tiply vectored social death of his wife, which involves not only her natal 
alienation and dishonor but also the negation of her humanity through a 
specifically sexual vio lence.
In any case,  because slaves’  family ties  were used by  owners to enmesh 
them further into captivity rather than to bestow liveliness and human-
ity on them, the antisocial thesis is a suggestive but incomplete way to 
understand Bibb’s repeated, doomed returns to a slave state, and to the 
state of slavery. In order to fully comprehend Bibb’s movements, we must 
consider the African American philosophical formation sometimes re-
ferred to as Afropessimism, to which I have alluded in citing Patterson, 
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Spillers and Hartman (who have been taken up by Afropessimism but 
differ from its main theorists in some impor tant ways), and Wilderson. 
I understand the term “Afropessimism” to comprise two developments: 
first, it is an extension of Patterson’s theory of slavery as social death that 
understands emancipation as an incomplete proj ect, and antiblackness 
as both the foundation and the con temporary aftermath of slavery. Sec-
ond, “Afropessimism” is an ironic détournement of the original term— 
which indexed the idea that sub- Saharan Africa was too damaged to ever 
“achieve” democracy and modernization— toward the work of, in par tic-
u lar, Fanon, especially Black Skin, White Masks ([1952] 1994).12 Critical 
Afropessimism takes as axiomatic that modern definitions of “humanity” 
and “the  human”  were forged against  people of African descent; indeed, 
 these formulations can be found in—at the very least— Kant’s Critique 
of Pure Reason (Kant, Weigelt, and Müller [1871] 2007; see also Judy 
1991), Thomas Jefferson’s Notes on the State of  Virginia ([1785] 1998), and 
Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of World History ([1837] 1981). Anti-
blackness is, in Afropessimist terms, the bedrock of humanism, a white- 
supremacist formation  under which the black person is the aporia, the 
negative, of modern consciousness and historical becoming: as Fanon 
writes, “[The Negro] has no culture, no civilization, no ‘long histori-
cal past’ ” (Fanon [1952] 1994, 34). According to David Marriott (2011, 
60), who also draws from Fanon, racism is thus “a discourse of time” 
 because—as Nicolas Abraham’s formulations in the previous chapter 
also reflect—it posits blackness as ahistorical.13
In this sense, then, chronothanatopolitics is originarily a tool of ra-
cialization, not only  because it involved the state’s investment in black 
death but also  because theories of  human beings as temporal and his-
torical emerged in contradistinction to the construction of blackness as 
atemporal and ahistorical. While Wilderson focuses on time, Marriott 
(2011) turns  toward the discipline and concept of history, claiming that it 
emerged to explain the pro gress (or lack thereof ) of “the race,” or of vari-
ous races, such that black life as “event,” as living possibility, is inconceiv-
able within history’s terms of pro gress and realization.
Given all this, in Afropessimist thought it is not pos si ble to intervene 
on antiblackness using discourses of humanity,  family, history, civility, 
national belonging, and so on, insofar as each of  these discourses 
of pro gress figures the black person as its constitutive outside.14  There 
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is something of a resonance, then, between Afropessimism’s refusal of 
 humanist futurity and queer theory’s antisocial thesis. Both recognize 
their objects, black and queer  people respectively, as being outside of 
time as it is conceived in Western humanist terms: reproductive and ge-
nealogical time, historical time, the time of pro gress. Furthermore, both 
refuse the central turn in queer theory, performativity, as a solution to the 
prob lem of being always- already deathly. The antisocial theorists refuse 
performativity  because their models for intervention are not invested in 
linguistic or semiotic resignification so much as in designification and 
the dissolution of certain psychic structures (though the antisocial thesis 
springs from the same deconstructionist roots as performativity theory). 
And some Afropessimists refuse performativity  because it relies on a 
legibly gendered body that must be denaturalized through per for mance, 
whereas they see blackness as the foreclosure of meaningful embodiment 
and the reduction of the black person to ungendered flesh. To put it more 
simply, both the queer antisocial thesis and Afropessimism are invested 
in the sociostructural position of the oppressed, rather than in a histori-
cal sedimentation of identity that might be denaturalized. They are both, 
one might say, productively ahistorical.
But  there is also a key difference between the queer antisocial thesis 
and Afropessimism: within the terms of white supremacy, black  people 
are antisocial not  because they do not reproduce but  because they have 
been defined within the terms of the social as not  human; even their 
reproduction has been cast in terms of animality or property relations. 
Queers may be rhetorically aligned with the inhuman, the unnatural, 
the sterile, and the deathly, but it is a stretch of the imagination to think 
that modern humanity—as opposed, say, to salvation or sinlessness— 
has been conceptualized as such against sexual aberrance itself. Indeed, 
as Foucault (1990a, 127) has shown, sexuality, “originally bourgeois,” is 
arguably the core of a modern- secular humanity understood in terms of 
an interiority secretly motored by erotic desire: it is a sign of the  human 
within humanism, if an unruly one sometimes attributed to animality. As 
Wilderson (2010, 290) might describe it, queers are structurally “alive” 
insofar as the concept of sexuality itself presumes the capacity to narrate 
and the possession of an interior,  whether soul or psyche. This is why 
black  people have been cast as having no desire, as in the sexless  Uncle 
Tom or Mammy ste reo types originally promulgated by minstrelsy, or, 
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conversely, as having sexual urges in excess of  human desire, as in the rhe-
toric of accused black rapists as animals and monsters.15 As Fanon ([1952] 
1994, 134–35) describes this absence of desire and superabundance of 
sex- without- sexuality, “the black consciousness is held out as an absolute 
density, as filled with itself, a state preceding any invasion, any abolition 
of the ego by desire.” Bersani’s (1987) model of anal sex as the paradigm of 
the ego abolished by desire and penetration clearly does not apply  here. 
And Fanon’s spatial language of density also infers a par tic u lar time, a 
time without difference, without the movement even of the drives that 
comprise desire, contradicting Edelman’s model of queerness as always 
negatingly mobile despite its antifutural aims.
Black antisociability or antirelationality is thus not quite the same 
kind of po liti cal option as white queer antisociability or antirelationality, 
even as Afropessimism thoroughly vexes the question of relationality: as 
Wilderson (2010, 18) puts it, “African, or more precisely Blackness, refers 
to an individual who is always already void of relationality” (emphasis in 
source). Note that he does not say that blackness means being “devoid,” 
but “void,” as in “voided,” or canceled by whites from the  Middle Passage 
onward, and as in “originarily bereft,” or as unintelligible in humanist 
terms— rather than, as with queer relationality, intelligible as the patho-
logical inverse of normative sociality. Queers are, it might be said, not 
entirely void of relationality insofar as even the most damning rhe toric 
about queerness understands it as a relation to other  people, as desire for 
the same sex must be by definition. Furthermore, in Bersani and Edel-
man, embracing the death drive is a kind of opt- out, a hygienic practice 
to cleanse the psyche of ego for Bersani, and for Edelman the basis of 
a(n anti)po liti cal stance operating as a force that deconstructs and de-
structs all pastoral notions of the good life:  there is something in the first 
place, however much a fiction it is, to give up or lose. But the death drive in 
Afropessimist terms is less an internal, psychic mechanism than it is an 
external, well- oiled machine ensuring that black  people have died sooner 
and in greater numbers proportional to their population than  others for 
centuries—we might call it a death drive appearing as the state itself.16
Black sociability, a black life drive, black hope:  these models of a non-
humanist futurity that is not the same as antifuturity seem on the face of 
it imperative. This is the gist of, for example, José Muñoz’s Cruising Utopia 
(2009), which is among several works that theorize queer of color world 
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making through per for mance and performativity, which offer glimpses 
of the  future in the pre sent.17 And yet Afropessimism offers a perhaps 
productive impasse for critical race and queer theory, even for queer of 
color critique. For as Wilderson (in Hartman 2003, 120) remarks in an 
interview with Saidiya Hartman, “per for mance cannot reconcile this gap 
between the place of slaves and the places of all  others.” Stylization is 
not, in and of itself, liberation. Or as Sexton (2011, 34) puts it, following 
Wilderson, performativity theory “remains insufficiently elaborated” if it 
cannot grapple with the condition of social death, which is, for Afropes-
simism, unending.
The queer antisocial thesis relies on a certain hyperbolic repetition of 
a social order in which queers represent death, a repetition reminiscent 
of if not coterminous with performativity— the self- shattering of anal sex 
for Bersani, for Edelman the sythomosexual who undermines and destroys 
formal and ideological coherence.  There is, then, a fundamental tempo-
ral contradiction between Afro- pessimism and the way that white queer 
performativity theory has depended on (re)iterability to formulate the 
possibility of change. I have written elsewhere (see Freeman 2010) of the 
temporal seductions of queer performativity theory, at least as it is repre-
sented by Judith Butler: briefly, performativity undoes the fantasy of an 
original through denaturalizing the repetitions that consolidate a social 
identity;  these repetitions “with a difference” (the difference of slowness, 
perhaps, or of gender nonconformity, race, even time period) clarify that 
 there is no anterior “ there”  there to imitate. Interestingly, in queer perfor-
mativity theory, an essentially rhythmic semiotic practice deconstructs a 
fantasmatic past, somewhat in the way that repeating the word “duck” 
a dozen times empties the term’s historically sedimented meanings and 
turns it into defamiliarized sound, available for other semantic possibili-
ties. Within black critical theory, especially as it intersects with per for-
mance studies,  these repetitions are what Henry Louis Gates (1988) calls 
“signifying” and Afro- optimist Fred Moten calls “the break,” the inter-
ruption that makes another per for mance pos si ble.18
Sexton and other Afropessimists, on the other hand, posit no break in 
antiblackness: they posit blackness, insofar as slavery has not ended but 
only mutated, as a continuation of social death. Sexton (2011, 6) poses 
the crucial question: “But how, then, does one mark time and think 
historicity, how does one engage the iterability of the performative, if 
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nothing ends? How to orient or make sense of lived experience, the lived 
experience of the black no less, without break or interval or punctuation 
in the fact of (anti)blackness?” Antiblackness is more than repetition, 
even without a difference, if such a  thing is pos si ble; it is simply, dura-
tion, ongoingness without even the promise of the break that allows for 
repetition. We might even say that social death is death without a drive, 
without the constant and teleological movement  toward inanimacy that 
renders the death drive destructive and thereby, however inadvertently, 
productive of the new. How, then, can  there be repetition within a condi-
tion of unending death, or a repetition of unending death?
Bibb’s repetitions— not precisely rhythmic, but certainly understand-
able as a kind of regressive, death- doubling “punctuation” of what would 
other wise be a linear journey from death to life, from enslavement to 
resurrection— echo Sexton’s (2011, 28) contention that “nothing in [A]fro- 
pessimism suggests that  there is no black (social) life, only that black life 
is not social life in the universe formed by the codes of state and civil so-
ciety, of citizen and subject, of nation and culture, of  people and place, of 
history and heritage.” It is precisely when Bibb moves  toward his own ap-
proximations of the civilizational codes of informal marriage and extra-
legal descent that he becomes entangled back into the social death that is 
slavery. The aspect of black social life  under slavery most uncongenial to 
the queer antisocial thesis is precisely that black  family relations are not 
at all sacralized; they are themselves a negative, if psychically ameliora-
tive, force, a set of shackles binding the slave to death and timelessness 
instead of promising life and futurity.19 Henry Bibb, like Harriet Jacobs, 
clearly casts himself in terms of  family but also acknowledges that the 
discourse of  family is in no way separable from the institution of slavery, 
that  family, too, is entangled with death. Thus in both Jacobs and Bibb, 
a return to  family is also a return to death, an embrace of death or a play 
with death in the form of interment for Jacobs and temporary reenslave-
ment for Bibb. Neither has an alternative to this interlacement of the 
social and social death; both of their protagonists, instead, hyperbolize 
and repeat death itself with no promise of its capacity for destruction 
of the status quo. Bibb’s and Brent’s seizing of death in this way, their 
willingness to mime it and then to escape it in ways that each recognizes 
as temporary or contingent, is a critical chronothanatopolitics— a kind 
of horizontal and repetitive movement between states of being rather 
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than, as with haunting and melancholia, a vertical movement backward 
in time.
However, Sexton also reminds us that though black life may not ad-
here to the codes of past and pre sent indexed by the civilizational, it is 
not, for that, antirelational. In this he differs from Wilderson, who ar-
gues that blackness is always already void of relationality. The latter is 
true only if relationality is reduced to its sanctioned forms or their ap-
proximation. If  family, friendship, and community all take place within 
the terms of a humanness from which slaves and their descendants have 
been barred, how to conceive of black relationality? And must relational-
ity be human- to- human? The story of Henry Box Brown uses the sense- 
method of playing dead to stage the same kind of question.
Rhythm in and as Relationality: Henry Box Brown
Henry Box Brown’s retellings and reenactments of his escape are eventu-
ally directly intertextual with Bibb’s narrative. The first of  these retell-
ings was the Narrative of Henry Box Brown, Who Escaped from Slavery, 
 Enclosed in a Box 3 Feet Long and 2 Wide, Written from a Statement of 
Facts Made by Himself, with Remarks upon the Remedy for Slavery, by 
Charles Stearns (Stearns 1849).20 This text was considerably revised in 
1851, republished as Narrative of Henry Box Brown, Written by Himself 
(Brown [1851] 2008), and performed in parts onstage in Brown’s lectures 
and “African Pa norama,” about which more below.
According to historian Jeffrey Ruggles (2003) as well as Brown’s two 
narratives, the slave Henry Brown enclosed himself in a custom- built 
wooden box and paid a sympathizer to mail the box to the Abolitionist 
Society in Philadelphia. Having been nearly suffocated, forced to travel 
hours while standing on his head, deprived of food and all but a  little 
 water, and tossed out of the train car that bore him, Brown was “unboxed” 
around 6 am on Saturday, March 24, 1849, which liberation his narrative 
rather typically calls “my resurrection from the grave of slavery” (Brown 
[1851] 2008, 87). He fainted before being helped out of the box, where-
upon according to him and his witnesses, he awoke and sang a hymn of 
thanksgiving. Shortly thereafter he joined the abolitionist lecture cir cuit 
as Henry Box Brown, penned a song about his escape, and eventually 
turned his lectures into a self- narrated pa norama of scenes from Ameri-
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can slavery of which his escape was a climax.  Toward the end of his  career, 
Brown reinvented himself yet again, as an “African Prince” who special-
ized in mesmerism, spiritualism, and, fi nally, magic (see Ruggles 2003; 
Brooks 2006; Rusert 2017).
As several critics have noticed, Brown’s Narratives are permeated by 
images of interment, and the box itself is a kind of traveling coffin.21 
His confinement is, too, more than literal, for as John Ernest (2007) 
demonstrates, early on his books and lectures  were constrained by the 
rhetorical confines of the abolitionist sentimental style, just as Harriet 
Jacobs’s narrative seems at first glance entombed in the discourse of 
sentimental domesticity. And just as Jacobs broke with sentimentalism 
by explic itly portraying her protagonist’s refusal to marry, Brown even-
tually broke with it by adopting the gestures and tenets of spiritualism 
in his per for mances as the African prince (Brooks 2006; Rusert 2017). 
But most impor tant for the purposes of my analy sis  here is the fact that 
just as Henry Bibb returned or was returned again and again to slavery, 
Henry Box Brown continually returned, or was returned, to his box. In 
the  latter’s case, this return to a symbolic live burial reflected not just 
the social death of slavery but also the extension of social death in the 
Compromise of 1850, whose Fugitive Slave Law dictated that officials and 
residents of  free states  were required to aid in the return of runaway slaves 
and thus created what per for mance theorist Daphne Brooks (2006, 66) 
calls an “age of anxious escape.”
The first manifestation of Brown’s dialectic of return was the flurry 
of visual repre sen ta tions of that container, the earliest extant example of 
which was a rendering of the box over the lyr ics to the improvised hymn 
that Brown claimed to have sung when he came back to consciousness 
and realized he was  free (figure 2.1).22
 Here, Brown is completely interred, the box figuring much more pow-
erfully than his escape. At the same time, the hymn itself is based on Psalm 
40, but incorporates repetition, presumably a call- and- response structure, 
in a way that blends the form of a psalm and African  music— signaling, 
perhaps, the importance of repetition to Brown’s per for mances.
This illustration also appeared on a song sheet featuring Brown’s re-
writing of the minstrelsy song “ Uncle Ned,” but this time the lyr ics 
feature Brown entering his box over and over. The chorus, repeated six 
times, proclaims that
2.1  “Engraving of the Box in which henry box brown escaped from slavery in 
 Richmond, Va.” and “Song, Sung by Mr. Brown on being removed from the box.” 
Laing’s Steam Press, Boston, c. 1850. Library of Congress, Rare Books and Special 
Collections Division.
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Brown laid down the shovel and the hoe,
Down in the box he did go,
No more slave work for Henry Box Brown,
In the box by Express he did go. (Ruggles 2003, 58)
Even within this four- line chorus, Brown goes “in the box” twice. In tem-
poral counterpoint to  these repetitive lines within a repeated chorus, the 
lyr ics narrate Brown’s story in linear fashion, describing how “they stole 
all [his] rights,” how his box went on a car to a steamboat north, where 
he was turned on his head and then righted by passengers who used his 
box as a seat, then tossed in the train yard, then carried on a wagon to his 
friends, who rapped and asked if he was alright, and opened the box and 
“set [him]  free from his pain.” But the chorus keeps putting him back 
into that box, over and over again.
This, in fact, was what kept happening to Brown— what he in many 
ways chose, and what was also thrust upon him. First, the Boston abo-
litionists who took him in  after his arrival in Philadelphia rechristened 
him “Henry Box Brown,” making him and his box inseparable, figura-
tively inserting the box into him, even casting him as a box, a form of 
property. Second, he began to lecture about his escape, renarrating his 
entrance into and emergence from the box for audience  after audience 
and distributing the aforementioned song sheets with their repre sen ta-
tion of the box. By the summer of 1849, Stearns and Brown had produced 
the book that tells of the escape, whose last page is a “Repre sen ta tion 
of the Box,” with the same illustration used on the song sheets (Ruggles 
2003, 62). Thus the narrative of Brown’s escape ends on the note of visu-
ally stuffing him back into his box. As Brooks (2006, 77) puts it, “A (re-) 
boxed Henry Brown at text’s end overturns the critical notion that ‘once 
the protagonist achieves his freedom, the nineteenth- century slave narra-
tive terminates’ ” (quoting Hedin 1982, 27). In other words, this image of 
the box reminds us that freedom is incomplete. But so, Brown’s reemer-
gences suggest, is social death.
The same year that Brown published the first version of his narrative, a 
 children’s book appeared with the first illustration of him actually emerg-
ing from his box (figure 2.2). Cousin Ann’s Stories for  Children (Preston 
1849) told the story of Brown’s escape in five pages, and included an il-
lustration in which Brown stands in an open box incorrectly addressed 
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to “Thomas Wilson,” presumably to protect the identity of the  actual 
recipient. Brown extends his hand to a white man holding a small axe. 
 Here, the gesture of equality between two men suggests Brown’s com-
plete liberation, but the facts that he has not yet stepped out of the box, 
and that the hand he extends to his patron is white, belie that possibility 
somewhat. Though the whitened hand is prob ably intended to indicate 
that Brown is holding his palm outward, it has the effect of suggesting 
that liberation occurs on white  people’s terms or “whitens” Brown, while 
the submersion of Brown’s lower third in the box suggests that he is not 
yet fully  free.
In 1850, Brown began to offer copies of a new print during his lectures 
and prior to the publication of his revised narrative. This print, titled 
“The Resurrection of Henry Box Brown at Philadelphia” and attributed 
by Ruggles (2003) to the artist Samuel W. Rowse, shows three white men 
and a black man gathered around a box (figure 2.3).
This time, the black man holds the axe, and one of the white men 
holds a hammer. The black man and one of the white men are holding 
2.2  Henry Box Brown illustration (dams 1250). From Ann Preston, Cousin Ann’s 
Stories for  Children (Philadelphia, PA: J. M. McKim, 1849). Call number: Am 1849 
Pre Wy 7627. Historical Society of Pennsylvania.
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the lid aloft, and Brown is shown only a third of the way out of the box, 
crouching and holding on to its side as his head, shoulders, neck, one 
elbow, and upper torso emerge. While the caption word “resurrection” 
alludes to the aforementioned trope of total freedom, and along with the 
axe clarifies that Brown is arriving, the focal point of the picture could 
as easily be read as the boxing in of Brown, the packaging of him rather 
than the unpackaging.  There is something about this image, in which the 
box lid could be coming up or  going down, in which Brown crouches 
and clings to the box rather than standing and shaking hands, that cap-
tures his jack- in- the- box per for mances of symbolically  going into a cof-
fin, then symbolically leaving it, and then returning, and so on, with each 
per for mance. As with Br’er Rabbit,  there is an exorbitance to the way he 
revisits his own symbolic deathbed that cannot be equated with a final 
resurrection. His per for mance expresses both momentary escape and the 
continuity of death- in- life.23
2.3   “The Resurrection of Henry Box Brown at Philadelphia, Who escaped from 
Richmond, Va in a Box 3 feet long 2 1/2 ft. deep and 2 ft. wide.” Deposited for copyright 
in Boston on January 10, 1850. Library of Congress, Prints and Photo graphs Division, 
lc- usz62, 1283.
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The rhythmic movement of playing dead and then undead that this 
lithograph suggests is, in fact, the one that animated Brown’s  career sub-
sequent to the publication of his first narrative. According to Ruggles 
(2003), by the end of 1849 Brown had conceived of and begun to execute 
a moving pa norama, The Mirror of Slavery. The pa norama, a newly popu-
lar media form, consisted of a long scroll unfurling horizontally, on which 
 were painted vari ous scenes. A precursor to the cinema, the pa norama 
gave the illusion of a moving, changing background in front of which a 
narrator told and occasionally acted out what ever story was keyed to the 
panel  behind him. A kind of visual travelogue, the pa norama was also a 
mode of historiography, a repetitive if not precisely circular one, as the 
scroll was rewound and began again for each new per for mance (Ruggles 
2003, 77; see also Brooks 2006, 80–81). As Ruggles (2003, 88) writes, 
Brown’s pa norama premiered in Boston on April 11, 1850, and included 
scenes of a “Nubian  family” before their enslavement, during capture, in 
the  Middle Passage, at auction, and at the moment of final separation. 
Ruggles speculates that the scenes then shifted to more general depic-
tions of chain gangs, prisons, punishments, work houses, plantations, and 
escapes. Included among the latter was Brown’s own escape, from boxing 
up to release, and the escape of the aforementioned Henry Bibb, drawn 
from Bibb’s own narrative and its illustration of Bibb with his  family fac-
ing a wolf in the swamp (figure 2.4).
Both protagonists  were, in this per for mance, liberated and then, in 
preparation for the next per for mance, symbolically unliberated when 
the scroll was rolled back up and the scenes reenfolded into one another. 
Brooks (2006) clarifies how Brown’s pa norama both mimicked the un-
furling motion and progressive temporality of US imperialism and, with 
its repetition of scenes of slavery, undermined it, much as, I am argu-
ing  here, the visual and performative repetitions of Brown’s interment 
 undermined both the smooth narrative of pro gress  toward freedom and 
the finality of social death.
Brown’s per for mance in front of the screen was yet another doubling 
of his movement in and out of symbolic death. For at least one adver-
tisement for the pa norama promised that “the box may be seen, and 
Mr. Brown in it,  after each exhibition” (Ruggles 2003, 105). The scholar-
ship on Brown offers no visual or textual rec ord of what this looked like, 
but it is pos si ble that he posed halfway out of the box in imitation of 
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the lithograph, in the manner of a tableau vivant, or that he restaged his 
 actual emergence from the box in a more kinetic per for mance. An en-
graving from the period of his per for mances, for example, shows Brown 
in an upright box, chest and shoulders out, shaking hands with a white 
man with one hand while gripping the side of his box with the other 
(figure 2.5).
All four men surrounding the box are white, and Brown’s face is indis-
tinct. This is more likely a repre sen ta tion of the escape itself than of the 
per for mance  after the pa norama, but it does invoke the scene that pa n-
orama audiences  were promised in some of the advertisements. In any 
case, the pa norama per for mance was the most insistent way that Brown 
played dead, entering and exiting his box at least once per show,  going 
 toward death one more time,  every time, and then rewinding the his-
torical narrative in ways that echo Marriott’s contention that racism casts 
black  people out of progressive time.
Ironically and terribly, the year that Brown’s pa norama and this per-
for mance debuted, the US Senate extended the reach of social death yet 
further by passing the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, which called for federal 
officers to enforce the 1793 Fugitive Slave Act remanding runaway slaves 
to their  owners. Whereas the 1793 law had been mostly unenforced, the 
2.4  “The Escape.” From Narrative of the Life and Adventures of Henry Bibb, an 
American Slave, Written by Himself (New York: published by the author, 1850). Image 
reproduction courtesy University of California, Davis, Special Collections.
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new law compelled citizens to abet the pro cess of slave capture by levying 
a one- thousand- dollar fine and six months in jail if they aided a runaway 
slave; it also denied fugitives the right to a jury trial. Claimants had merely 
to assert owner ship over a runaway rather than providing evidence for it, 
as they had  under the old law. The constant possibility of freedom’s undo-
ing, of a literal return to social death, was now cemented into American 
law. Surely black audiences for Brown’s per for mance could read his reen-
tering his box as a figure for the possibility that his freedom was precari-
ous at best. And indeed, Brown, like many former slaves, fled to  England 
for the next twenty- five years to avoid recapture.
What kind of temporality, though, and what kind of relationality are 
at play in Brown’s consistent movement back into his box? I have offered 
“rhythmic” as one possibility for thinking the temporality of Brown’s ex-
istence, attending to the pattern of repetition and recapitulation in his 
per for mances and the lit er a ture and images surrounding them.  Under 
 these terms, rhythm is useful analytically in that it offers no necessary 
2.5  Engraving from The Liberty Almanac for 1851. Published by the American and 
Foreign Anti- Slavery Society. Division of Rare and Manuscript Collections, Cornell 
University Library.
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break from the status quo; it can cohabit with duration and endlessness 
while giving  those conditions some shape. Indeed, the African poly-
rhythms incorporated into slave  music— surely in this new context even 
more connected to life and survival than they might have been before— 
modulated the work rhythms of slavery, texturing and giving form to, 
rather than rupturing, the extended duration of the workday.24
Thought as a mode of relationality, rhythm can, as I showed in the 
previous chapter, enable forms of engroupment that do not depend on 
subjectivity or the identity markers proper to humanity.  Here, though, it 
is difficult to conceptualize Brown’s stage work in terms of engroupment: 
perhaps he catalyzed some forms of community, perhaps not. Perhaps he 
felt connected to the captured Africans who endured the  Middle Passage 
when he traveled in his box and then went back into it over and over 
again, perhaps not. Rather than signaling a connection to other black 
 people, I would suggest, Brown’s per for mances mark a relationality with 
his box, and thus with death itself— most insistently with the negation 
of humanness, the void that is, in Afropessimist terms, blackness itself, 
or within Patterson’s more historically located terms, the social death of 
slavery. Brooks (2006, 122) calls Brown’s per for mances a “cheat[ing of ] of 
social death in slavery,” but I am not sure that the cheating is complete or 
permanent. Instead, Brown’s chronothanatopo liti cal returns to the box are 
equally well read as concession to the incomplete status of freedom itself, to 
the duration of social death, even as they punctuate and texture that condi-
tion in ways that acknowledge that social death is a historical phenomenon 
with the potential to change form and even potentially end, rather than an 
ontology. They are, one might say, a form of relation to nonrelationality. I 
 will return to this in the coda, but want to turn first to an instance of play-
ing dead that registers the only form of relationality concretely posited in 
Afropessimism, one that is both prefigured by Brown’s connection to his 
box, and commensurate with the gratuitous vio lence that defines slavery 
and its afterlife: putting the living out of the picture.
To Put the Living Out of the Picture: Imperium in Imperio
In Sutton Griggs’s Imperium in Imperio ([1899] 2003), the main black 
character, Belton, finds himself on a dissecting  table presumed dead, with 
the villainous white Dr. Zackland preparing him for dissection. Zackland 
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leaves the dissecting knife near Belton, and goes to get a pail of  water. 
When he returns, Belton attacks: “. . .  he now raised himself up, seized 
the knife that was near his feet, and at a bound was at the doctor’s side. 
The doctor turned around and was in dread alarm at the sight of the dead 
man returned to life. At that instant he was too terrified to act or scream, 
and before he could recover his self- possession Belton plunged the knife 
through his throat. Seizing the  dying man he laid him on the dissect-
ing board and covered him over with a sheet” (Griggs [1899] 2003, 107). 
Belton then forges a note to the other doctors for whom Zackland was 
preparing the dissection, buying time to escape by requesting that they 
not touch the body  until Zackland’s return.
While typical of the melodramatic style of much of Imperium in Im-
perio, this scene also recapitulates some of the Br’er Rabbit story, namely 
its figure of doubling death, of feigned literal death  under social death, 
this time the social death of the post- Reconstruction period— during 
which, as Hartman (1997) and  others have argued, slavery did not so 
much end as transmogrify. The scene also clarifies, in figures that echo 
Afropessimism’s claims about the endurance of social death, why the 
trope of playing dead is so power ful. For it appears within a chapter that 
condenses many of the ways that slavery continued  under other names: 
Jim Crow, imprisonment without due pro cess, the spectacularization of 
black bodies, the demotion of  free black  people to manual  labor, disen-
franchisement, lynching, and the use of black  people as subjects in medi-
cal experiments without their consent. The chapter begins with a survey 
of Jim Crow law: at the beginning of the chapter, Belton is hired to re-
place the white college president who has had to resign in the face of 
laws forbidding whites to teach in schools for “Negroes.” Recapitulating 
Plessy v. Ferguson, Belton travels to the college in the first- class coach of 
a train that, unbeknownst to him, passes into territory in which black 
 people are not allowed to  ride in the same coach as whites. The white 
passengers physically toss him off the train— much as Brown in his box 
was tossed— and into the mud. As he resumes his journey, he is refused 
seating at a lunch  counter, and refuses in turn to pay for his to-go meal. 
The owner calls the police, who jail him, fine him, and exile him from 
the city. Then the chapter turns to the spectacularization of black bod-
ies: on the next train we meet Dr. Zackland, whose eyes “follow [Belton] 
cadaverously” and who finds him “the finest lookin’ darkey I ever put 
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my eye on” (Griggs [1899] 2003, 100). As if to double the “cadaverous” 
expression of his eyes, Zackland states his wish to dissect Belton. Next 
we see the remanding of black bodies to manual  labor: apparently fol-
lowing Booker T. Washington’s Tuskegee plan for educating his fellow 
black  people, Belton adds an industrial wing to his college, but the black 
 people whom he hires to erect the building are overrun by whites, who 
steal their jobs and demote the black men to hod carriers and other ser-
vant roles. The chapter then moves rapidly to disenfranchisement: when 
Belton lectures his students on the importance of voting, a sympathetic 
black man warns him of the consequences of trying to foil the white- 
dominated po liti cal system, so he stops. Fi nally, the chapter culminates 
in a lynching:  after politely showing a white  woman in church where she 
can find her place in the hymnal, Belton is beset by a mob. Zackland asks 
the mob to keep the corpse pretty, and Belton is shot and hanged. He mi-
raculously survives by feigning his own death, and ends up on Zackland’s 
dissecting  table, whereupon he comes “back” to life and stabs Zackland. It 
is as if Griggs is somehow staging African American playing dead as a 
response to the entire history of US post- Emancipation terrorism against 
black  people.
With Belton’s return from death to kill the doctor, the chapter also 
invokes the racialized myth of zombies, who do not feign death but come 
back from it to eat and thus zombify the living.25 However, as Wilderson 
(2010) reminds us, the proj ect of black liberation cannot be to bring the 
dead to life. Instead, Wilderson writes,
If, when caught between the pincers of the imperative to meditate on 
Black dispossession and Black po liti cal agency, we do not dissemble, 
but instead allow our minds to reflect on the murderous ontology of 
chattel slavery’s gratuitous vio lence— seven hundred years ago, five 
hundred years ago, two hundred years ago, last year, and  today, then 
maybe, just maybe, we  will be able to think Blackness and agency to-
gether in an ethical manner. This is not an Afrocentric question. It is a 
question through which the dead ask themselves how to put the living out 
of the picture. (43; emphasis mine)
Wilderson  here seems to mean that slavery’s violent death world  ought 
to negate any humanist pretense to agency thought in terms of life. But 
Belton acts this out literally, returning the homicidal impulses of the 
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passengers on the train, the cruelty of Jim Crow law, Zackland’s blood-
thirsty gaze, the vio lence of menial  labor and disenfranchisement, and 
the murderous drive of the lynching posse to Zackland’s body itself, put-
ting it out of the picture by covering it and leaving it to remain, potentially 
for hours, before being discovered.
Yet as much as Belton achieves a form of freedom by bringing the liv-
ing to death as Wilderson figures it, his freedom too is bought with the 
price of black death, a death that figuratively substitutes for his own. The 
chapter  after Belton’s murder of Zackland focuses on Belgrave, the other 
protagonist of the novel, who convinces a jury to acquit Belton and then 
proposes to his (Belgrave’s) lover, Viola. In this Belgrave seems to want to 
match his (false) resurrection of Belton through the civil structure with 
an equally false rescue of Viola into the humanity conferred by marriage. 
But Viola tells Belgrave that she cannot marry him, and  will explain why 
at 10 am the next morning. When Belgrave arrives at her  house, he dis-
covers that she has committed suicide and left a note explaining that as a 
child, she read a book called “White Supremacy and Negro Subordina-
tion,” which argued that the white race intended to subjugate the black 
race by racial admixture: “It demonstrated that the fourth generation of 
the  children born of intermarrying mulattoes  were invariably sterile or 
woefully lacking in vital force” (Griggs [1899] 2003, 118). But this inter-
marriage, she writes, had no such effect on whites  because they cast their 
“half- breeds” back into the “Negro” pool, polluting it with white blood 
but not accepting any black blood into their own. In any case, Viola has 
pledged to refuse participation in this proj ect of exterminating the black 
race, and thus cannot marry Belgrave  because he is a “mulatto.” In the 
two chapters concerning Viola, then, even freely chosen familial relation-
ships unshackled from slavery are construed as death- bearing and geno-
cidal. The twist is that it is whiteness, and not blackness, that confers this 
deathly inheritance.
Viola’s death cannot be read as a feint; she is well and truly, permanently 
dead. As with Bibb, Belgrave’s freedom is fi nally achieved by redoubling 
the black  woman’s social death, rather than by  dying himself: instead of 
including sexual liberation in his platform for black freedom, Belgrave 
pledges to continue her mission against miscegenation. He realizes his 
pledge when Belton reappears, summoning him to become president of 
a black separatist state, the under ground “imperium in imperio” of the 
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novel’s title, which is eventually betrayed to the United States whose 
 mirror image it is. By contrast to this liaison with the state, Belton’s mo-
ment on the dissecting  table is a way of seizing not only social death and 
its nontemporality but also the living, life itself, by killing it. His mur-
der does not depart from death by looking to the nation- form for resur-
rection, as Belton and Belgrave’s society does; instead, Belton transfers 
death from his own body to a white one— prefiguring, as it happens, Big-
ger Thomas’s statement in Native Son (Wright [1940] 2005, 429) that 
“what I killed for, I am.”
Playing dead, then— whether by the side of the road as in the Br’er 
Rabbit tale, or via Henry Bibb’s daring reentries back into slave territory to 
rescue his  family, or through Henry Box Brown’s multiply- mediated per-
for mances, or in Belton’s exchanging his status as a corpse for another’s— 
cannot be read merely as a trick for gain or an escape strategy, though 
 these may be its immediate functions, and of course it is intimately con-
nected to what Moten calls, in the epigraph that begins this chapter, “the 
gift of constant escape.” Rather, playing dead is expressive of the “life” 
and “afterlife” (or we might say, “afterdeath”) of slavery itself, of a state 
of social death that changes form but does not abate, and that includes 
marriage and reproduction rather than just severing the slave from  those 
privileges. In  these texts and in Afropessimism,  there is no détournement 
wherein death itself becomes destructive of the system that produces it, 
as  there is in the queer antisocial thesis: only mass acts of counterviolence 
rather than the individual acts of men like Belton could produce this. And 
 there is none of queer antisociality’s hygienic renunciation of the social 
field or social ties  either, since  under slavery  these  were the own er’s 
prerogative anyway, and  after slavery they became the province of the 
courts, lynch mobs, drug cartels, and the police. Instead, in  these texts 
death extends its reach, proliferates, and mutates, and the response is 
what Kreiger (2008) calls “thanatomimesis,” a kind of willed inanimacy. 
In African American lit er a ture, then, only thanatomimesis fully indexes 
chronothanatopolitics.
The psychoanalytic lit er a ture on thanatomimesis is instructive  here, as 
well, for at base, it describes the would-be subject’s response to temporal 
incapacity. Clinical research on infants has shown that they respond very 
positively to feedback that they themselves control: kicking to make a 
bell ring, and so on. Psychologist Sally Moskowitz (2005) hypothesizes 
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that the infant takes similar plea sure in and sustenance from caregivers’ 
responses to its cries, gestures, and facial expressions. She hypothesizes 
that this experience is crucial to the formation of a bodily ego— that 
Freudian sense of the self as a bounded shape with receptive surfaces— 
and enables infants to modulate themselves in relation to an increasingly 
less nurturing world. I would add that this ego is also temporal, in the 
sense that the infant’s bodily coherence also depends on immediate re-
sponses that aggregate over time to allow it to survive the caregiver’s ab-
sences. But when that immediate feedback is withdrawn too early, and 
their activities no longer get a response, infants “suddenly lie motionless, 
breathe with sleeplike respiration, and stare into space with nonconverg-
ing eyes” (907–8). Similarly, presented with an adult face that is still, mo-
tionless, and inexpressive, infants try at first to elicit a reaction, and when 
they cannot, they “become somber, avert their eyes, and slump over non-
responsively” (908). This infant defense, Moskowitz suggests, is a kind of 
playing dead.
Set against Frantz Fanon’s work, this research offers one pos si ble ex-
planation for the trope of playing dead in African American lit er a ture 
and culture. Fanon ([1952] 1994) famously describes the bodily ego of 
the black person as socioculturally mediated, as, indeed, a shattering pro-
duced by being responded to as an object: “Look, a Negro!” The sub-
ject is first “sealed into . . .  crushing objecthood,” a coherent form, but 
not one that whose shape or timing he has control over. Then, Fanon 
describes a profound scene of nonrecognition: “I turned beseechingly to 
 others. Their attention was a liberation,  running over my body suddenly 
abraded into nonbeing, endowing me once more with an agility that I 
had thought lost, and by taking me out of the world, restoring me into it. 
But just as I reached the other side, I stumbled, and the movements, the 
attitudes, the glances of the other fixed me  there, in the sense in which 
a chemical solution is fixed by a dye. I was indignant; I demanded an 
explanation. Nothing happened. I burst apart” (109). Fanon’s scene ex-
actly recapitulates the experience of nonresponsiveness, or negative re-
sponsiveness, and its bodily results: the experience, within the  family, 
that bodily integrity and competence can be endowed by another, then 
in public, the shattering rescinding of this endowment, the blank gaze 
of the other—in the face of which the narrator freezes and then bursts 
apart.  Later he echoes this rhe toric: “Then, assailed at vari ous points, the 
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corporeal schema crumbled, its place taken by a racial epidermal schema” 
(112).  Here, the externalization of the self, the making of the self into 
an object, is not the achievement of somatic coherence but “an ampu-
tation, an excision, a hemorrhage that splattered my  whole body with 
black blood” (112). Fanon’s ego is, like Freud’s, first a bodily ego, but also 
second, a bodily ego, insofar as it remains utterly epidermal: the black 
person is read by his or her skin and experiences the white gaze as a physi-
cal undoing. The black ego is also denied temporal capacity: Fanon’s nar-
rator describes attention “ running over” his body and making him agile, 
then being withdrawn so that he “stumbles,” losing rhythmic control over 
his body, and then being “fixed” in both space and time, denied what 
both Moskowitz (2005, 898) and Wilderson (2010, 250) describe as an 
essentially formal coherence. This form, as Fanon’s rhe toric of stumbling 
and being “fixed” clarifies, is not only spatial but temporal.
The lit er a ture that Moskowitz reviews suggests that an infancy char-
acterized by a lack of caregiver response can lead to  later be hav iors coded 
by psychoanalysis as “masochistic”— anorexia, cutting, and other kinds 
of self- administered pain— which she understands, quoting Kerry Kelly 
Novick and Jack Novick (1987, 374), as efforts to “stabiliz[e] the repre-
sen ta tional world,” to give the body and its context bound aries and form. 
But unlike cutting or anorexia—or, to glance back at Bersani, anal sex— 
playing dead is a strategy that does not depend on a conception of agency 
or  will, or even of selfhood expressed through vio lence to the self. In-
stead, it breaks through the need for recognition, as it is autogenerated, 
autoauthorized (note that I do not say “self-”).  Under social conditions 
characterized by nonresponse— that is, a country’s consistent turning 
away from its black  people— playing dead is, itself, a way of stabilizing 
the repre sen ta tional world. It is a response to an environment that is not 
so much chaotic and formless as distorted like a fun- house mirror, and 
bifurcated in the way that W. E. B. Du Bois ([1903] 1997) describes in 
his model of double- consciousness, in which black subjects must experi-
ence themselves to be objects as the very condition of their subjectiv-
ity. Playing dead is a mode of asocial (in Jared Sexton’s [2008] sense), 
if not antisocial, quasiautonomy. If playing dead marks the perdurance 
of antiblackness, of social death  under and beyond slavery, it does so in 
black— with black, as black on (anti)black. That this mark is not total 
transformation or liberation is its very point.
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One final figure for playing dead in the nineteenth  century offers a 
model of this asociality, this lack of social relations “in the structural 
sense,” as Wilderson (2010, 250) puts it. African American folklore’s 
Tar- Baby is inanimate:  silent, resistant, and black if not quite of Afri-
can descent, figured in Joel Chandler Harris’s (1881b, 24) retelling by the 
refrain “Tar- Baby, she  ain’t sayin’ nuthin.” Br’er Fox, susceptible though 
he is to Br’er Rabbit’s per for mance of playing dead in the previous tale I 
discussed, creates this figure as a way to entrap Br’er Rabbit. Br’er Rabbit 
rails against the Tar- Baby’s lack of recognition, and fi nally punches the 
effigy in an attempt to reanimate this inert  matter. Of course his hand 
sticks, as does the other hand, and then his feet when he kicks, and fi nally, 
when he tries to butt the Tar- Baby, his head. On the one hand, his body 
is entangled and deformed, much as Fanon’s narrator describes his own 
body in his first encounter with racism. On the other, his enmeshment 
with the Tar- Baby is a form of relationality that depends not on repudiat-
ing death but on figuratively embracing it. Br’er Rabbit is well and truly 
stuck in and with blackness, with death social and other wise. In some 
versions of the story he outwits Br’er Fox in the end, convincing Br’er Fox 
that an apt punishment for Br’er Rabbit’s crimes is being thrown back 
into the bramble bush that is his home. In  others, though, Br’er Rabbit is 
left stuck to the Tar- Baby, with Br’er Fox promising to “take dinner” with 
him:  either eat with him or, more likely, eat him. Suspended in the time 
between life and death, Br’er Rabbit can only hold on to his own deathly 
avatar.
Coda: Playing Dead in the Twenty- First  Century
In 2012,  after Trayvon Martin was shot and killed by a vigilante neigh-
borhood watchperson, the Black Lives  Matter movement was catalyzed. 
Black Lives  Matter focuses on what Saidiya Hartman (2008, 45) calls 
“the afterlife of slavery,” the ways that the random vio lence enacted on 
black bodies has, since slavery, shifted modes but not diminished: the 
own er’s whip has been replaced by what Black Lives  Matter, in its guiding 
princi ples, calls a system “where Black lives are systematically and inten-
tionally targeted for demise,” including but not  limited to extrajudicial 
police and vigilante vio lence and the prison system (Black Lives  Matter, 
n.d.). Black Lives  Matter leashes the power of the social media meme and 
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Twitter hashtag, as well as more traditional modes of protest and coun-
tercultural experiments in living.
Certainly, Black Lives  Matter could be read as gesturing  toward what 
Afropessimists might view as the unviable value- form of the “life.” But 
the pun on “ matter” complicates this, as it invokes not only importance 
but also the “fleshliness” that Hortense Spillers (1987) describes as the 
end- point of the  Middle Passage. As a verb, “mattering” implies both 
coming to importance and becoming- inert- substance, giving the phrase 
a positive and negative valence (see Butler 2011). More to the point, a 
“ matter” is an event or situation, the sort of thing- in- time that some 
 Afropessimists argue is foreclosed by blackness as a structural position. In 
its shimmering between negativity and becoming, “mattering” implies 
an equivocal stance  toward the enforced temporal incapacity that de-
fines blackness in Afropessimist terms. And indeed, Black Lives  Matter 
has directly confronted time: the times of shortened lifespans and slow 
death, the times of instantaneous violent responses and of stubborn 
nonresponse to black  people, the times of posthumous condemnations 
(Trayvon Martin’s reputation ruined  after his death) and agonizing sus-
pensions of closure (Michael Brown’s body left in the road for four hours, 
just as slave “transgressors”  were left dangling from nooses, placed at 
crossroads to terrorize would-be insurrectionists, and so on). As Nicholas 
Mirzoeff (2015) succinctly puts it, “All #BlackLivesMatter protest memes 
call attention to time and duration.” He goes on to cite the chant “Hands 
Up  Don’t Shoot”: “performed with raised hands, [it] repeats a version of 
what activists believe  were Michael Brown’s last words. It freezes time in 
that crucial moment before he died and defies the imaginary police to 
shoot” (Mirzoeff 2015). In other words, this per for mance turns  toward 
rather than away from the timelessness accorded to Africans and their 
descendants.
And of course, Black Lives  Matter has revived the die-in, a particu-
larly stark example of thanatomimesis enacted by the aids Co ali tion 
to Unleash Power (act up) before it, and by the anti- war movement 
before act up. Mirzoeff describes variations on the die-in that are spe-
cific to Black Lives  Matter and that enact temporal conjoinments with 
death rather than resurrections from it: “A participant might count out 
‘I  can’t breathe’ 11 times, as Eric Garner did. Or the die-in might be 
timed to last four- and- a- half minutes to symbolize the four- and- a- half 
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hours that Michael Brown’s body lay in the street.” Miming death and 
temporal incapacity rather than seizing life and temporal capacity, Black 
Lives  Matter thus far has eschewed a literal version of Wilderson’s sug-
gestion that the only response to being cast as always- already dead is to 
bring the living closer to death: murder is not on their agenda. But in 
their  dying on the streets, playing dead in the road over and over again, 
Black Lives  Matter activists commit to an (a)social life within death even 
as they fight for an end to the annihilation of blackness.
Cast out of humanity by Eu ro pean Americans, enslaved 
African Americans  were also cast out of what counted 
as history. As discussed in the previous chapter, some 
nineteenth- century slaves and freed  people used their 
bodies to stage a direct encounter with death in a rhythmic 
play not so much with specific historical events and eras, 
as with a structural position as the deathly,  inhuman, 
unchanging void for which the  Middle Passage and the 
social death of slavery are paradigmatic, and against 
which humanism  shaped its ideals and history was 
 understood to unfold. But this intervention has the ef-
fect of deemphasizing change over time, paradoxically 
reiterating the ahistoricity of blackness. The Afropessi-
mistic account with which I framed the sense- method of 
playing dead is less concerned than is black per for mance 
studies with what Dana Luciano (2003, 152; emphasis 
mine) calls “a stylized and historically informed black-
ness,” or Daphne Brooks (2006, 290; emphasis mine) 
FEELING HISTORICISMS
Libidinal History in Twain and Hopkins
The four untimely essays are altogether warlike. They demonstrate 
that I was no ‘Jack ’o’ Dreams,’ that I derive plea sure from drawing 
the sword— also, perhaps, that I have a dangerously supple wrist.
friedrich nietz sche, Ecce Homo
3
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calls “historically thick black identity formation.” In other words, the 
structuralist logic of Afropessimism can sometimes downplay the way 
that African American subjects have lived and performed not only a tem-
poral position outside of linear pro gress but also a historical position of 
becoming and changing outside of the dominant rec ord.
One way that nineteenth- century black historians countered dominant 
accounts of the past was simply to write their own collective histories, 
beginning with William Cooper Nell’s Ser vices of Colored Americans in 
the Wars of 1776 and 1812 (1851) and The Colored Patriots of the American 
Revolution (1855), and culminating with George Washington Williams’s 
two- volume History of the Negro Race in Amer i ca from 1619 to 1880 (1883), 
a history of African Americans that accorded with the professional his-
torical standards of the era (see Bruce 1984a, 1984b). Like their white 
counter parts, postbellum black historians aimed for “scientific” historio-
graphical conventions, along the lines of Ranke and Humboldt, which 
purported to rigorously separate fact from fiction, narrated events “ob-
jectively” in the third person to distinguish the writing of history from 
genres such as poetry and travel writing, and focused on the interpre-
tation of primary documentary sources (see Lorenz 2009; B. G. Smith 
1998, 70–156). Another mode of writing history was fiction. Though the 
historical romances from which professional historians attempted to dis-
tance themselves freely borrowed dramatic, poetic, and novelistic con-
ventions and time schemes, like documentary history they also invoked 
prior events and aimed to give a sense of  earlier times, sometimes even 
incorporating historical allusions and documentary sources.
But within disciplinary history and the historical romance alike— the 
two nineteenth- century forms of narrative most distinctly engaged with 
collectively experienced events of the past— there was, for most of the 
 century, no analogue for the bodily breaching of life and death that we 
see in the thanatomimetic theme I’ve traced in folk tales, ex- slave narra-
tives, and Sutton E. Griggs’s Imperium in Imperio— even in the work of 
Charles Chesnutt, this kind of movement was relegated to dreams, hal-
lucinations, superstition, and magic. Nor in white fiction did the theme 
of direct contact with a historically specific era (as opposed to with death 
or with a personal past) appear in the form of a novel  until William Mor-
ris’s A Dream of John Ball (1888), though the latter was preceded by the 
anonymously published short story “Missing One’s Coach: An Anachro-
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nism” (1838)— and  these texts, too, figured time travel as a hallucination 
or dream. In American fiction, the historiographical equivalent of than-
atomimesis, or corporeal context not with death but with a par tic u lar 
past, would initially appear with Mark Twain’s A Connecticut Yankee in 
King Arthur’s Court (1889), considered the first time travel novel in the 
En glish language (Collins 1986, 102).1 And in African American fiction, 
the literal encounter between a con temporary person and bygone times 
emerged with Pauline Elizabeth Hopkins’s extraordinary Of One Blood, 
Or, The Hidden Self, published serially in The Colored American Maga-
zine between 1902 and 1903. Taken together,  these two novels posit a 
mode of writing and enacting history in which, as with dance and than-
atomimesis in the previous chapters, the sensate body is itself a method 
of knowledge and transformation.
Twain’s and Hopkins’s novels, in fact, might be read as literary ver-
sions of historical reenactment, a popu lar practice of amateur histori-
ography that began in the eigh teenth  century with tableaux vivants (see 
Holmström 1967) and the mock  battles that  were part of military drills 
(see During 2010, 192–93).  These novels precede the invention of Civil 
War reenactment in 1913 (Schneider 2011, 8), but they partake in reenact-
ment’s fantasy that bodies can repeat events from the past, and in repeat-
ing them transform them. Reenactment wagers that participants can feel 
themselves into other eras rather than becoming surrogates for or descen-
dants of specific historical characters; it generally traffics in the fantasy 
of ordinary  people becoming historical as they dissolve into an event, a 
persona, and/or an environment, in what per for mance theorist Rebecca 
Schneider’s con temporary Civil War– reenacting in for mants call a “war-
gasm” (35). But rather than staging bodies seamlessly reentering historical 
events, Connecticut Yankee and Of One Blood depict present- tense bodies 
encountering past environments. And  these novels depend on the shock 
of misalignment between con temporary sensibilities and past ones, late 
nineteenth- century ways of having and feeling a body and prior ones.
Elsewhere, I have described the imagination and per for mance of en-
fleshed encounters with the past as “erotohistoriography”: a carnal and 
pleas ur able encounter with history (Freeman 2010). What this term im-
plies, which I  will develop more fully in this chapter, is that the writing 
of history, the feeling of oneself and one’s community as “historical” or 
 embedded in collective endeavors with meaning for the  future, and the 
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encounter with relics from the past all have a libidinal logic, one that mixes 
po liti cal desire with sensory encounter. Though historicizing proj ects 
and pro cesses cannot be understood as universal and biological drives, as 
Freud understood the libido, they are  matters of desire; they also engage 
the body. They are  shaped by the kind of body that undertakes them and 
in turn they engage and shape  those bodies. “Erotohistoriography,” in my 
 earlier work, privileged sexual, often genital, plea sure  because queer criti-
cism and theory had so insistently turned  toward melancholia, shame, 
and loss, and  toward the psyche rather than  toward sex practice. But 
 here, I also wish to claim, as part of erotohistoriography, sensory expe-
riences are not always recognizable as sex, and not always pleas ur able. I 
 will begin,  then, with the more obviously erotohistoriographical novel 
A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur’s Court, moving  toward a broader 
account of libidinal historiography as a sense- method in Of One Blood.
Historical Hankerings: A Connecticut Yankee  
in King Arthur’s Court
Versed in the academic historical works that  were canonical in his 
time, as well as engaged with the question of how to write a historical 
novel that did not repeat the romanticizing offenses of Sir Walter Scott, 
Mark Twain set many of his novels in previous periods.2  These included 
fifteenth- century France in Personal Recollections of Joan of Arc (1896) 
and the same Austrian era in No. 44, the Mysterious Stranger (1902–8). 
Twain also wrote of sixteenth- century  England in The Prince and the 
Pauper (1881) and of the early eigh teenth  century in The Chronicle of 
Young Satan (1897–1900). He explored the antebellum United States 
with The Adventures of Tom Sawyer (1876), Adventures of Huckleberry 
Finn (1884), and Pudd’nhead Wilson (1894). But it is A Connecticut Yan-
kee in King Arthur’s Court (1889), set in sixth- century Camelot, that most 
self- consciously and metacritically takes on the prob lem of how to make 
history— both how to make a distant past immediate to readers and how 
to influence the course of events in time.
In this novel, Twain uses the body of his protagonist, Hank Morgan, 
as a wrench in the works of stadial, evolutionary history. In 1879, Hank’s 
malcontent factory hand Hercules clonks him over the head with an 
iron bar and sends him back to the year 528.  There, Hank decides to fast- 
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forward the modernization of  England by 1300 years, but his underlings 
rise against him, and he kills them en masse. This counterfactual, tongue- 
in- cheek history asks, as science fiction writers such as Castello Holford, 
H. G. Wells, and Robert Heinlein would do  after Twain,  whether bygone 
events might have happened other wise— though Twain stops short of 
imagining the resulting, transformed pre sent or  future. Instead, following 
nineteenth- century, female, amateur historians’ emphasis on every day life 
and the immediate experience of  people of the past, Twain depicts Hank 
as a sensory receptacle for the medieval period (see B.  G. Smith 1998, 
159). Hank variously sweats, itches, lusts, and starves his way through Ar-
thurian  England: his corporeal discomforts hint at the dangers of acutely 
sensing the past. A Connecticut Yankee also revels in the trope of a con-
temporary man modernizing the premodern, and reminds us that this is 
generally the figure that imperialist and colonialist ventures used to justify 
themselves. It suggests that  these ventures acted directly on both the bodies 
of the colonized, whose indigenous gender and sexual norms  were over-
written and reshaped by their oppressors, and the bodies of the colonizers, 
whose gender and sexual norms  were made relative and often influenced by 
the  people over whom they ruled.3 Hank Morgan’s sensory immersion in 
history, then, is inextricable from his erotic designs on the inhabitants of 
another time and place and, as I’ll elaborate below, on himself.
If Hank’s eventual destruction of Camelot figures the idea of forcing 
one’s body too insistently into the course of  human events, it may also 
stand in for Clemens’s single moment of putting his own body on the line 
in the ser vice of official national history, and his only military exercise. 
One intertext for A Connecticut Yankee may be Twain’s humorous essay 
“The Private History of a Campaign That Failed,” published in  Century 
Magazine in December  1885, in which Twain reveals that he is, tech-
nically, a deserter of the Confederate army. In 1861, Clemens’s home 
state of Missouri was attacked by Northern forces, and the governor called 
for a militia of fifty thousand to defend the state. Young Clemens and 
several friends in Marion County got together and formed a military com-
pany, the Marion Rangers, of which Clemens was made second lieuten-
ant. The essay foreshadows Connecticut Yankee’s contempt for medieval 
knight- errantry and for the French (about both of which more below), 
for Twain relates that the boy who proposes the name Marion Rangers 
for the group is “full of romance, and given to reading chivalric novels” 
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(Twain 1885, 194). The young man’s name is Dunlap, but Twain claims 
he changes it to “D’Un Lap,” or “of a stone,” or “Peterson” (194) and  later 
refers to him as “the ass with the French name” (195). But Peterson is not 
the only Ranger given to theatricality, for the hapless group finds out that 
war is predominantly boring and uncomfortable.  After bumbling about 
the countryside, falling down a hill, being attacked by farmers’ dogs, and 
variously responding to and sleeping through false alarms, Clemens’s 
com pany sees a man on  horse back outside of their barn. In an overzeal-
ous display of firepower akin to Connecticut Yankee’s famous final  Battle 
of the Sandbelt, the young men shoot the stranger five times only to find 
that his corpse is in civilian clothes and unarmed. Dismayed, Clemens 
vows to leave the war effort; Twain writes, “It seemed to me that I was not 
rightly equipped for this awful business; that war was intended for men, 
and I for a child’s nurse. I resolved to retire from this avocation of sham 
soldiership while I could save some remnant of my self- respect” (203). 
And  there, feminized by Twain in the figure of a child’s nurse, young 
Samuel Clemens exits the masculine- historical stage.
Connecticut Yankee, likewise, tells the history of a masculine- imperial 
campaign that fails. Attempting to modernize sixth- century  England 
according to the technological and ideological developments of the nine-
teenth  century, Hank Morgan crowns himself “Sir Boss,” arrogating mili-
tary and managerial powers. When his subjects eventually rebel, he builds 
an electric fence, deserts by escaping from the  battle into a cave, and from 
 there watches the fence electrocute the  whole of the Camelot army. The 
wizard Merlin casts a spell on him that lasts thirteen hundred years,  until 
he awakens, grizzled and old, and hangs around Warwick  Castle telling 
his tale to strangers, one of whom is the narrator in the novel’s frame tale. 
The Twain of “The Private History” ends his narrative by ruefully not-
ing, “I could have become a soldier myself, if I had waited. I had got part 
of it learned; I knew more about retreating than the man that in ven ted 
retreating” (Twain 1885, 204). Hank Morgan, likewise, ends his life in 
complete retreat, mumbling and fading away in a bedroom in the  castle, 
with no trace of his heroic adventures left except a bullet hole in a suit of 
armor (which the  castle’s docent suggests was introduced in  Cromwell’s 
era) and the manuscript he has handed over to the narrator, which makes 
up the bulk of the tale. And of course Hank’s entire journey backward 
to the sixth  century can be read as a retreat from the complexities of the 
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nineteenth, specifically from the failure of the Reconstruction,  after 1877, 
to liberate African Americans from de facto, if not de jure, slavery. In 
both of Twain’s texts, then, the protagonist’s attempt to make his body 
into an instrument of radical historical change—of secession in “The 
Private History” and of revolutionary modernization in A Connecticut 
Yankee— results in depletion: effeminization in the first, enfeeblement in 
the second.
Connecticut Yankee’s literal deflation of the historically agentive body 
points to another piece of Twain ephemera that could serve as one of 
the novel’s intertexts: Twain’s satirical speech against masturbation for a 
gathering of the Stomach Club in 1879, “Some Thoughts on the Science 
of Onanism” (Twain [1879] 1976). In this speech, Twain admonishes his 
listeners, “When you feel a revolutionary uprising in your system, get 
your Vendôme Column down some other way— don’t jerk it down” (25). 
 Here, he directly associates masturbation with po liti cal activity, analogiz-
ing onanism not to the priapic monument honoring Napoleon Bonaparte 
but to the Paris Commune that “jerked” it down in 1871. Twain com-
pares masturbation to the sort of historical action that aimed to upset the 
supposedly smooth movement of monarchical and electoral succession 
and the invisible hand of the market, and to the radical working class— 
indeed, it is notable that 1879 marks the year of both his speech to the 
Stomach Club and the fictional Hercules’s uprising against the factory 
boss Hank Morgan. It would be too literal to say that Hank masturbates 
his way into Camelot, but as we  shall see, the novel does go on to cor-
relate his po liti cal overreachings with the kind of failed masculinity that 
masturbation indexed in the nineteenth  century. In other words, “The 
Private History of a Campaign That Failed,” “Some Thoughts on the Sci-
ence of Onanism,” and Connecticut Yankee align gender and sexual aber-
rance with flawed interventions into history.
Hank Morgan is certainly a figure for capitalism as the motor of 
history. Aligned with American robber barons, he is named  after the 
nineteenth- century cap i tal ist J. Pierpont Morgan and was drawn by il-
lustrator Dan Beard in the first edition of the novel with the head of 
American financier Jay Gould. But Hank is not just a meta phorical 
American robber baron. He becomes a slave across several chapters, 
when he and the king are wandering Camelot to get a feel for the plight 
of the common man and are captured by a slave driver. Parallels between 
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Hank and French revolutionaries of vari ous eras also appear in his op-
position to the Catholic Church, and in the destruction of his own 
Vendôme Column in the form of Merlin’s tower, which he blows up. 
Fi nally, Hank is a kind of closeted Napoleon. Critics have traced the 
very worst of Camelot’s debauchery in Connecticut Yankee to descrip-
tions of the revolutionary masses in Carlyle’s The French Revolution 
(see, e.g., Fulton 2000). It is thus tempting to read the fictional events 
of 1879 in Connecticut Yankee as Twain’s commentary on the events of 
1789 and  after, as if he slyly reversed some digits and the  whole novel 
makes a mockery of the French Revolution. This makes some sense of 
Twain’s in ven ted device of traveling backward in history, since one of 
the notable accomplishments of the revolutionaries was a form of time 
travel— a new calendar instantiated on October 5, 1793, but beginning 
analeptically on September 22, 1793 (and, it might be noted, picked up 
again by the Paris Commune of 1871). The year Hank gets brained by 
his factory hand, 1879, also marks the year Twain traveled to France and 
received a lukewarm welcome from the French  people, as well as find-
ing himself “appalled by French sexual standards” (Britton 1992, 197). 
Like his mockery of “D’Un Lap” in “The Private History,” both his joke 
about the Vendôme Column in the Stomach Club speech and Connecti-
cut Yankee draw on his reputed hatred of all  things French, especially 
French sexual mores. Most impor tant, in Twain’s complex scrambling of 
French revolutionary moments, historical actors of both 1789 and 1871 
seemed to possess the capacity both to deform sex and to turn back time, 
the latter only the most literal of their many deformations of stadial, 
developmental history.
But in Connecticut Yankee, the Camelot peasants’ uprising against the 
freedom that Hank supposedly offers them is not, like the French revo-
lutions, a rational response to his increasingly autocratic rule or to their 
economic subservience to him as Sir Boss; rather, it is an outgrowth of 
their bawdy, infantile worldview, congruent with their civilizationally 
 underdeveloped status. Indeed, Twain portrays the peasants in ways 
typical of nineteenth- century repre sen ta tions of not only medieval folk, 
black  people, and the colonized but also the white and multiethnic 
working class: like Hercules, the brawny Greek factory hand who attacks 
Hank with a phallic tool, the  people of Camelot are sexually excessive, 
physically strong, and given to childish pursuits. Thus Connecticut Yankee 
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is haunted by a sexual specter less vis i ble and perhaps more power ful than 
 simple working- class unrest.
The Arthurian peasants seem, on the face of it, to be foils to the os-
tensibly demo cratic, modern, masculine Hank Morgan. But throughout 
his visit to Camelot, Hank himself acts something of the reactionary fop, 
nostalgic for the homosociality inherent in chivalry, overly invested in 
nudity and  little  children, uninterested in the ramblings of the medieval 
wife he takes, and too fond of theatrical “effects” to pass as completely 
heteromasculine. Fi nally, he fails most prominently at a sexual self- 
mastery for which his limitations as a historical actor and a historian are 
symptomatic— and this correlation of deviant history making and im-
proper sex acts suggests the pleasures and dangers of amateur historiogra-
phy as a sense- method, especially for the white man.
Bonnie G. Smith (1998), Mike Goode (2009), and Carolyn Dinshaw 
(2012) have each demonstrated that the amateur historian, of whom 
Hank is a ste reo type, was a sexually charged figure in the eigh teenth and 
nineteenth centuries as disciplinary history took shape. Bonnie G. Smith 
(1998, 18) claims Germaine de Staël as an early amateur historian for 
whom opium use was a relay to historical genius, a corporeal knowledge 
practice that Smith calls “narcohistory.” De Staël, Smith argues, inspired a 
 whole line of female amateur historians for whom excitement, eroticism, 
and trauma formed the basis of historical knowledge (67), in contradis-
tinction to the growing scientism of documentary, seminar- based, pro-
fessional history (103–7). Thus amateur historiography has been coded 
as feminine. Goode demonstrates that as disciplinary history took shape 
in the late eigh teenth and nineteenth centuries, antiquarianism in par tic-
u lar was correlated with aberrant masculinity, reproductive sterility, and 
perverse sexual practices such as fondling statues. Dinshaw links the ama-
teur historian, especially the con temporary reenactor of medieval times, 
to queer sexuality through the trope of temporality: in her analy sis, the 
amateur refuses progressive and reproductive time for an immersive, tac-
tile relationship to the past. In all of  these accounts, amateur historians 
are feminized, linked to suspect bodily states and practices, and queered.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, then, Connecticut Yankee, a novel written by 
the amateur historian Twain, framed by the amateur historian who reads 
Hank’s manuscript, and taking up the aberrant historical practice of time 
travel, is rife with perversions. As “Sir Boss,” Hank may aspire to cap i tal ist 
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manhood, but he continually lapses into the voyeurism, homophilia, 
 pedophilia, and flamboyance that marked the poor,  people of color, and 
the revolutionary French in Twain’s and other nineteenth- century Eu-
ro pean and American ste reo types of them.  These sexual aberrations also 
characterized the late nineteenth- century sexual “deviant” of the white 
leisure classes. They are most clearly condensed in Hank’s relationship 
with his medieval sidekick, Amyas “Clarence” Le Poulet, who appears 
to him at first sight as “an airy slim boy in shrimp- colored tights that 
make him look like a forked carrot” (Twain [1889] 1982, 15), and whom 
illustrator Beard drew with the head of the French actress Sarah Bern-
hardt. Shortly  after, both doubling Clarence and for the first time expos-
ing his own nakedness, Hank finds himself stripped of his supposedly 
enchanted clothes by the king’s men, and thus “naked as a pair of tongs!” 
(26). Part of Hank’s failure as a historian is that he  mistakes historically 
specific difference for infancy, hewing to a linear model in which  earlier 
times stand for the childhood of the  human race. His relationship with 
Clarence brings out the erotic aspect of this misapprehension: at a ban-
quet, responding to tall tales of Sir Kay the Seneschal’s military prowess, 
Clarence whispers to Hank, “Oh, call me pet names, dearest, call me a 
marine!” (20), and then “nestle[s] upon [Hank’s] shoulder and pretend[s] 
to go to sleep” (23). Clarence’s real name, “Amyas le Poulet,” is perhaps an 
anachronistic pun on the Puritan Sir Amyas Poulet but most definitely 
translatable, too, as “love the chicken.” 4 That Twain was aware of the 
sexual innuendo is confirmed by Hank’s  later reference to the deadly and 
beautiful Morgan le Fay as “fresh and young as a Vassar pullet” (99). In 
other words, Hank Morgan likes a twink.
But of all the perversions coded into A Connecticut Yankee, the most 
suspicious one is Hank’s status as a masturbator. At the end of the novel, 
he expires in a suspiciously onanistic pose: at the closing of the novel’s 
nineteenth- century frame, he dies in bed, glassy- eyed, pale, and delirious, 
“mutter[ing] and ejaculat[ing]” endlessly while “pick[ing] busily at the 
coverlet,” the very picture of the solitary vice (Twain [1889] 1982, 258). 
This is a fitting end for him. Over the years, as Hank conquers the Arthu-
rians with nineteenth- century technology disguised as magic, Clarence 
becomes Hank’s “head executive [and] right hand . . .  a darling” (52), re-
calling again Twain’s speech to the Stomach Club, in which he prefaces 
his admonition about the Vendôme Column with the winking warning, 
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“If you must  gamble with your sexuality,  don’t play a Lone Hand too 
much” (Twain [1879] 1976, 25). In fact, it is Hank and not right- hand- 
man Clarence who becomes the ultimate Lone Hand, playing the part of 
a “lone” ranch “hand” with a lasso in a jousting competition.
As well, Hank’s last name “Morgan” may suggest his cap i tal ist agenda, 
and his full name, Henry Morgan,  after the famous seventeenth- century 
Welsh pirate, may imply that his program is another form of robbery— 
but his nicknames add an erotic fillip or two. In calling Hank a “Yankee 
of the Yankees,” Twain ostensibly suggests that Hank was a solidly white 
New En glander, as per the most popu lar etymological explanation for 
the term “Yankee,” a North American Indian approximation of the word 
“En glish” (yengee).5 More recently, though, Henry Abelove (2008) has 
also traced the word “yankee” to the slang term “yankum,” or masturba-
tory act, rereading the song “Yankee Doodle Dandy” as a bawdy com-
mentary on masturbation. As Abelove suggests, “doodle” was eighteenth- 
century slang for “penis,” and “dandy” carried its current meaning of 
a fash ion able fop; so, in Abelove’s words, “a yankee doodle dandy is a 
primping penis puller” (Abelove 2008, 14). The figure of a “Yankee of the 
Yankees,” then, conjures up two  things: first, it evokes the kind of extreme 
whiteness associated with both racial purity and the pallor incurred by 
self- abuse, and second, it figures a yanker yanking other yankers in an 
endless circle jerk. Indeed, the novel’s most literally shocking event, the 
mass electrocution of the knights of Camelot, is, precisely, a yanking Yan-
kees’ cir cuit of bodies electric. During the final  battle between medieval 
peasants and modernization, twenty- five thousand En glish knights in 
armor die as they hit a high- voltage fence that Hank has built. In a gro-
tesque parody of demo cratic fraternity and spiritual magnetic attraction 
alike, the current is passed, man to man,  until Hank and his army of fifty- 
two men are surrounded by an enclosure of corpses.
Even Hank’s all- American nickname is not safe from ribald punning: 
an obsolete meaning for “hank” is “a propensity; an evil habit,” from 
which it’s pos si ble we get the verb “to hanker.” But it is also “a . . .  curbing 
hold; a power of check or restraint,” the psychological equivalent of reins 
or a noose.6 A hank embodies both dissolution and restraint, the very dy-
namic that or ga nized the meanings of both white middle- class selfhood 
in US industrial capitalism, and masturbation in transatlantic medical 
and popu lar lit er a ture (Castronovo 2000, 198). It was not an accident 
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that the American lit er a ture against masturbation was directed  toward 
white  people, even  toward Yankees: as Kyla Tompkins (2014, 253) ar-
gues, anti- onanistic discourse was part of a “proj ect of national embodi-
ment . . .  linked to the consolidation of whiteness as the dominant racial 
position.” Hank the Yank(er) exemplifies what could go terribly wrong 
with that proj ect.
In sum, then, Connecticut Yankee and its Twainian intertexts make 
several suggestions about nineteenth- century historical sense- methods. 
The first is that the seemingly incommensurable domains of histori-
cal consciousness and eroticism might have to do with one another, as 
Schneider’s (2011, 35) in for mants’ phrase “wargasm” reminds us. Twain 
also suggests that to be out of tune with one’s own historical moment— a 
less directly po liti cal feeling than, say, radical opposition to a par tic u lar 
regime or system of oppression, but one on a continuum with it— might 
be a somatic feeling. In A Connecticut Yankee, being out of time is vis-
ceral, akin to being clonked with an iron bar and waking up temporally 
elsewhere. And while the sense of being out of step might inspire pub-
lic, extravagant physical action such as blowing  things up, Connecticut 
Yankee, read with its intertexts, suggests that historical unbelonging 
might also inspire something banal and seemingly private, such as mastur-
bation. Conversely, this cluster of Twainian texts reminds us that directly 
po liti cal be hav ior or sentiment might be, as Castronovo (2000, 194) 
argues, discursively “recast . . .  as nonsystemic and private, as a  failing 
in individual hygiene.” In other words, as Castronovo demonstrates, 
nineteenth- century American social conflicts  were often displaced onto 
psychic or libidinal conflicts within the individual.
Castronovo’s analy sis of analogies between masturbation and slav-
ery also clarifies that Hank’s stint in Camelot  under a slave driver is not 
just a Prince- and- the- Pauper- like exchange of the aristocratic body for 
the bondsman’s intended to bring to light the injustice of US slavery, 
which had in any case been abolished by the time of both Twain’s writ-
ing and Hank’s 1879. Nor, though Connecticut Yankee can certainly be 
read as an indictment of the post- Reconstruction era as a return to slav-
ery, does Hank’s time as a slave frontally index racial injustice. Instead, 
the enslavement of Hank, a white man—as with the meta phor of the 
slave that eventually attached to Shakers—is a sign of his essential han-
kiness, his inability to master his desires. This is, itself, symptomatic of 
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his own nineteenth- century moment’s construction of whiteness, even as 
Hank proj ects his desires onto the denizens of Camelot. For Castronovo 
(2000, 196) correlates the flowering of antimasturbation lit er a ture in the 
American 1830s and 1840s with “agendas of self- culture that encouraged 
young [white] men to discard allegiances to dead institutions and live ac-
cording to the rhythms of natu ral law,” individualist agendas most clearly 
distilled in the Emersonian doctrine of self- reliance. Castronovo also sees 
the antebellum era’s obsessive interest in white male self- governance as a 
mode of containing anx i eties about the presence of chattel slavery in a 
supposed democracy.
Within  these terms, Twain’s satirical attention to masturbation in 
1879, and Hank’s status as a wanker in an 1889 novel, seem somewhat 
anachronistic. But Connecticut Yankee is deeply concerned with individu-
alism, if not precisely with the doctrine of self- reliance: the novel’s big-
gest questions are  whether and how men may be trained, and  whether or 
not  there is a core to them that resists training. Hank’s contempt for the 
knights of Camelot is in part based on the fact that even before he defeats 
them and makes them into literal objects, they are merely material: “They 
did not exist as individuals, but merely as homogeneous protoplasm, 
with alloys of iron and buttons” (Twain [1889] 1982, 249). Connecticut 
Yankee famously compares the men of Camelot to “white Indians” whose 
stoicism, Hank declares, is “not an outcome of  mental training, intellec-
tual fortitude, reasoning” but is “mere animal training” (19). Yet as Walter 
Benn Michaels (1987) has noted, Twain’s “Indians” are also  those who 
resist training and thus, paradoxically, embody a salutary, individualist 
antipathy to groupthink and tyranny. Despite their fey Frenchness, they 
also emblematize the Teutonic “essence” that Anglo- American disciplin-
ary historians sought to establish as having been passed down to the En glish 
and their descendants in the United States (Tolliver 2015, 29).
The fact that Twain calls the schools where he retrains young Ar-
thurians who show this kind of gumption “Man- Factories” clarifies this 
paradox: “men” are  those whose re sis tance to ideology qualifies them 
for Hank’s proj ect of turning them into more sophisticated automata. 
Hank purports to want to lead his men away from the superstitions of 
the Catholic Church and their blind allegiance to an unelected king and 
 toward freedom, but of course he is simply transforming them into fac-
tory workers of the sort whom he “bossed” in the nineteenth  century. 
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The fact that the product they make is themselves, of course, links Hank’s 
man- factories with just the sort of self- governance promoted by antimas-
turbation lit er a ture in the antebellum years. At the same time, Hank’s fac-
tories manufacture another product, soap: in short, they are purveyors of 
the kind of cleanliness celebrated by antebellum reformers and the social 
hygienists of Twain’s Progressive Era alike. And fi nally, Hank’s factories 
make one more product, soap “missionaries” who wander the countryside 
wearing placards that read, “Persimmon’s Soap: All the Prime- Donna 
Use It” (Twain [1889] 1982, 78). Hank’s factories are purveyors, then, of 
consumer desire, the very  thing that threatens to  undermine individual 
autonomy even as it seems to provide a relay to a new kind of individual-
ity founded on freedom of choice and self- expression.
And this is where Twain provides an updated, if also old- fashioned, 
picture of the prob lem of masturbation as a response to and figure for his 
own historical moment. It is updated  because Twain wrote Connecticut 
Yankee  after his coauthored novel The Gilded Age (1873) but still during 
that era in which speculation and finance capitalism indexed and in-
flamed all kinds of desires. It is old- fashioned  because Thomas Laqueur 
(2004, 13) has connected the emergence of the antimasturbation panic, 
which sprang full- blown in medical discourse “in or around 1712,” when, 
with no pre ce dent in  legal or religious doctrine, the pamphlet Onania 
appeared and was distributed. Laqueur connects the emergence of anti-
masturbation discourse in the eigh teenth  century with the emergence 
of two new forms of imaginative work: novels and credit. Like reading 
novels, he argues, masturbation was a solitary bedroom activity. Like 
credit, masturbation trafficked in imaginings of limitless satisfaction, of 
ever- escalating desires met by instantaneous gratification.
Twain’s late nineteenth  century is more like Laqueur’s emerging eigh-
teenth  century than it is like Castronovo’s early republic or, of course, like 
Camelot: Hank looks like a masturbator simply  because he is a financier, 
and joins the long history of repre sen ta tion in which sexual deviance and 
the fluctuations endemic to the market stand in for one another. For 
example, Hank declares that
knight- errantry is a most chuckle- headed trade, and it is tedious 
hard work, too, but I begin to see that  there is money in it,  after all, 
if you have luck. Not that I would ever engage in it as a business, for 
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I  wouldn’t. No sound and legitimate business can be established on a 
basis of speculation. A successful whirl in the knight- errantry line . . . 
it’s just a corner in pork, that’s all, and you  can’t make anything  else 
of it. . . .  And moreover, when you come right down to the bed- rock, 
knight- errantry is worse than pork; for what ever happens, the pork’s 
left, and so somebody’s benefited, anyway; but when the market 
breaks, in a knight- errantry whirl, and  every knight in the pool passes 
in his checks, what have you got for assets? Just a rubbish- pile of bat-
tered corpses and a barrel or two of busted hardware. (Twain [1889] 
1982, 98)
Hank equates financial investing in what we would now call “ futures” 
with a form of courtship he loathes: heterosexual knight errantry. The 
prob lem, as he sees it, is that knights go lumbering quixotically around, 
fighting  imagined demons on behalf of unattainable  women, returning 
only with fantastic stories, the equivalent of kited paper checks.
Yet despite Hank’s protests, Twain’s in ven ted history of “what might 
have been” also follows the logic of “gambling away your life sexually” 
that he seems to condemn in his speech to the Stomach Club— a logic in 
which investments tend  toward a  future not yet realized, in which high 
risk may yield high profits, and in which the virtual supplants the material 
just the way paper money supplanted the gold standard. Hank rebuilds 
Camelot in the image of nineteenth- century Amer i ca while acknowledg-
ing that his proj ect must remain incomplete. He averts his own execution 
in what he calls a “saving trump” (Twain [1889] 1982, 30) by predicting an 
eclipse and claiming he has the power to blot out the sun: “In a business 
way,” he claims, “[the eclipse] would be the making of me” (31). He names 
the new currency of Camelot the “mill,” and claims that “our new money 
was not only handsomely circulating, but its language was already glibly 
in use” (175), suggesting a collapse between linguistic and financial signs 
that undermines any pretense to a gold standard; indeed, part of what 
makes Hank an unreliable narrator is not only his own rambling, “glib” 
narration but also the way his actions fail to back up his words.
In all of  these ways, then, Hank is an exemplary cap i tal ist, a status that 
threatens to make him an exemplary masturbator. And this intersection 
is part of his relationship to time. Peter Coviello (2013, 33) writes that 
we might think of a nonreproductive, dissident, or culturally aberrant 
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sexuality as a way of “inhabiting a unique temporality, one that renders 
the body at once out of step with modernity’s sped-up market- time and 
exquisitely responsive to the call of an intuited but inarticulate  future.” 
In Connecticut Yankee, Hank’s onanistic sexuality is in a kind of two- step 
with market time, emblematic of it in Laqueur’s terms, but also continu-
ally getting in the way of it insofar as his reveries thrust him into a time 
before capitalism. What Hank hears, though, is not the call of the inar-
ticulate  future. Instead Hank’s body is tuned to an inarticulate past of 
erotic possibility, a fantasy of what Carolyn Dinshaw (1999) has named 
“getting medieval.” In fact, Laqueur (2004, 22) has also written of mas-
turbation that “no form of sexuality is more profligate with time,” and 
among the many physical and  mental ills with which it was associated 
by the nineteenth  century, a striking one is memory loss. Samuel Tissot’s 
Onanism ([1758] 1832, 14), for example, describes masturbation causing 
impairment of “all the faculties of the mind, particularly the memory”; 
memory loss is also mentioned in Benjamin Rush’s Medical Inquiries and 
Observations, upon Diseases of the Mind (1812) and Homer Bostwick’s A 
Treatise on the Nature and Treatment of Seminal Diseases (1860). With 
this symptom, masturbation becomes a figure not only for the time of 
capitalism but also for history, or historiography, gone awry. Indeed, 
Hank suffers from memory trou bles at the novel’s end, when he babbles 
about times gone by but does not seem to remember his nineteenth- 
century self. More generally, both Hank and the novel suffer from a kind 
of cultural amnesia about the complexities of the medieval era. Hank’s 
most damaging quality is that he is completely ahistorical: a living anach-
ronism, he actually supposes that he can introduce new technologies and 
modes of production to the  Middle Ages, and force a revolution against 
feudalism before the contradictions of this system have come to a head 
on their own.
Eve Sedgwick (1991, 820) has cited masturbation’s “affinity with am-
nesia, repetition or the repetition- compulsion, and ahistorical or history- 
rupturing rhe torics of sublimity,” which is an accurate description of 
Connecticut Yankee as well: Hank goes back in time to repeat the me-
dieval with a modern difference. And the novel resolves its own histori-
cal contradictions— predominantly the one that Hank’s interference in 
medieval culture would also have resulted in a very diff er ent nineteenth 
 century—by blowing every thing up in a last blast of the technological 
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sublime. In other words, Connecticut Yankee is less a novel about time 
travel per se, than about  doing history badly. Connecticut Yankee casts the 
somatization of history in comic terms and is skeptical that the outcome 
of a corporeal sense- method  will be salutary in world- historical terms.
By interlacing the themes of sexual deviance and faulty historicism, 
Connecticut Yankee points to a longer history of the prob lem of history. 
This prob lem is that  doing history badly, as the case of amateur histo-
rians shows, frequently appears as a kind of perversion. Not only a late 
eighteenth- and early nineteenth- century phenomenon, the specter of 
the sexually deviant “bad” historian runs through the Frankfurt school 
condemnation of pleas ur able sensation as always already antithetical 
to proper historical consciousness, to con temporary Marxist dismissals 
of queer theory as ludic and ahistorical.7 Marx and Engels’s ([1845–46] 
1970, 103) famous statement “Philosophy and the study of the  actual 
world have the same relation to one another as masturbation and sexual 
love” puts the issue succinctly: masturbation is as much a part of the sexu-
ality of history as it is part of the history of sexuality.8 Connecticut Yankee, 
then, is best read as an inquiry into the erotic logic of nineteenth- century 
habits of historicizing, and perhaps even our own con temporary ones— 
and an excursus into possibilities for rethinking  these habits.
Twain is not the first author to displace the threat of sexual- historical 
deviance onto the bad timing of the French,  either. As Marx famously 
writes in the Eigh teenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, citing Hegel, events 
in world history “occur, as it  were, twice. [Hegel] forgot to add: the first 
time as tragedy, the second time as farce” (Marx [1869] 1963, 15). Marx is 
speaking specifically of the younger Bonaparte’s coup of December 2, 
1851, that restored the French empire  after the revolutions of 1848, re-
peating his  uncle Napoleon’s coup in November  1799 that overthrew 
the revolutionary government. This latter, original coup was called the 
“Eigh teenth Brumaire”  because it occurred on the eigh teenth day of 
“Brumaire” in the year 8 on the French revolutionary calendar: Marx 
is, then, ironically applying a calendar that ended in 1805 to a mid- 
nineteenth- century imperial act that seemed to turn the clock back by 
half a  century. And French history’s temporal drag (see Freeman 2010)— 
the insistent, distorting pull of its past failed glories on its imperial 
pre sent— appears, in Marx, as camp per for mance: he describes the Prot-
estant revolution as “Luther don[ning] the mask of the Apostle Paul,” 
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the revolution of 1789 “drap[ing] itself alternately as the Roman republic 
and the Roman empire” (Marx [1869] 1963, 15), the revolution of 1848 as 
a parody of 1789, and the coup of 1851 as the resurrection of Napoleon I. 
For the Marx of the Eigh teenth Brumaire,  there is no turning back to the 
past that is not rearguard, and looking backward is an act of what Hank 
Morgan might have called “dudery,” or dress- up.9
Connecticut Yankee has in common with The Eigh teenth Brumaire the 
use of stigmatized sexual activity as a meta phor for a faulty relationship 
to history: just as costume drama stands in for a failure to apprehend 
the pre sent in Marx, in Connecticut Yankee drag, masturbation, and an 
unseemly interest in boys stand in for the failure of par tic u lar kinds of 
pseudohistoricist consciousness. At first, Hank seemingly returns to the 
period before the Norman Conquest, the Anglo- Saxon era celebrated by 
commentators from Blackstone onward as prior to feudalism and hence 
possessed of an originary freedom (Horsman 1981, 14). Hank’s use 
of   parodic Germanic “abracadabras” such as “Transvaaltruppentropen-
transporttrampelthiertreibertrauungsthraenentragoedie!” (Twain [1889] 
1982, 125) to accompany his feats of technological vio lence skewers an 
in ven ted po liti cal etiology in which the period of Germanic rule counted 
as the apex of national sovereignty (and invoking “Transvaal” also slyly 
alludes to the South African Republic’s defeat of the British in the first 
Boer War, foreshadowing Hank’s demise). Yet the denizens of Camelot 
also, like D’Un Lap of the Missouri Rangers, bear suspiciously Franco-
phone names such as Le Fay, Le Desirous, and Le Poulet.
The anachronistic Frenchness of Camelot is doubtless influenced by 
the nineteenth- century vogue for the Arthurian romances pioneered 
by Chrétien de Troyes in the twelfth  century, but it also allows Twain 
to poke fun at the aristocracy by way of an effeminacy coded as French, 
though it is a gendered drag less immediately weighed down by the 
past than that condemned by Marx. Hank Morgan’s same- sex infatu-
ations and dubious masculinity are signs not just of his scrambling 
 Norman and Saxon history but also of his investment in coding me-
dieval times as a restorative tonic for American dissipation, and as the 
prototype for British and US manhood, in a way typical of many of the 
writers who retooled the medieval era in the image of the nineteenth 
 century— most egregiously, in Twain’s eyes, Sir Walter Scott. Both 
Twain and Marx, then, suggest that to lack historical consciousness is 
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to be addicted to costume play and/or, we might say, to be a bit of a 
wanker.
Yet Connecticut Yankee risks the poetry of the past, and this pastness 
is both temporal and historical: Hank himself is portrayed as sexually 
regressive through references to his onanistic tendencies and interest in 
Clarence, and historically regressive through the figure of time travel. 
Connecticut Yankee’s narrative mode is also regressive: it allegorically tells 
a story of nineteenth- century Amer i ca’s failures through a return to me-
dieval texts such as Le Morte d’Arthur. But it is less what Michael Colacur-
cio (1984, 425) calls “an allegory within history,” which stops historical 
time, than it is an insistence on the historicity within allegory. Critics have 
produced historicist interpretations of the novel almost as constantly as 
Hank’s “Man- Factory” churns out men ready for nineteenth- century life 
within the novel. According to the scholarship, Connecticut Yankee al-
legorizes the modernization of China (Hsu 2015). Or it critiques US im-
perialism (Rowe 1995). Or it accedes to the logic of nineteenth- century 
industrialization, in which  people are machines (Weinstein 1995). Or it 
transcodes Twain’s experiences with the Paige typesetting machine  (Collins 
1986; Gelder 1989). Or it is about the crisis of realist repre sen ta tion dur-
ing the Gilded Age (Michaels 1987). Or it condemns feudalism in Hawaii 
(Lorch 1958). And so on, as we move backward in time through literary 
criticism. In this way, Connecticut Yankee is as much about an excess of 
historical meaning making, or about historical meaning making as inher-
ently allegorical— and thus inseparable from fiction—as it is about any-
thing  else. By making a mockery of all our attempts to historicize it, by 
generating a surfeit of historicist readings that all boil down to more alle-
goresis, Connecticut Yankee suggests something that the Eigh teenth Bru-
maire entirely renounces: that the making of history is a pro cess in which 
events and texts are invested and reinvested with meaning, prepared for 
 future use in a pro cess that is, as Pauline Hopkins’s Of One Blood clarifies, 
ultimately libidinal.
“Over the Surface of History”: Of One Blood
A generation  after Twain, African American writer and historian Pauline 
Elizabeth Hopkins would also take up the proj ect of historical reenact-
ment through lit er a ture. Cedric Tolliver (2015, 26) describes her novel 
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Of One Blood, serialized in the Colored American Magazine in 1902–3, 
as the Africanist counterpart to exactly what Connecticut Yankee mocks: 
late nineteenth- and early twentieth- century academic historians’ con-
cern with the Anglo- Saxon past as the blueprint for a more perfect 
 future. Tolliver cites George Bancroft, William Prescott, John Motley, 
E. A. Freeman, and Francis Parkman as the era’s preeminent “Teutonic- 
Whig” historians, whose proj ect was to track an unchanged spirit of lib-
erty in  those descended from the Anglo- Saxons (Tolliver 2015, 28). As 
with Twain, Hopkins’s work suggests familiarity with  these dominant 
historiographical texts of her period, and also with Afrocentric histori-
ography such as the aforementioned History of the Negro Race in Amer i ca 
(G. W. Williams 1883), which used the writings of Herodotus to argue 
that Egyptian civilization derived from Ethiopia (Bruce 1984a), with 
Volney’s work on Egypt, and with the abolitionist writings that drew 
from Volney to argue for the greatness and priority of ancient African 
civilization (Bruce 1984a, 691). Hopkins’s interest in ancient Ethiopia as 
a setting was not mere antiquarianism or even entirely tuned to the proj-
ect of locating pre ce dents for the black freed person’s value and potential 
to contribute to American civilization. As Dana Luciano (2003, 150) has 
clarified, Hopkins was also part of a proj ect, according to the Colored 
American Magazine’s stated aims, of “reviving black history,” which in-
volved not only, or even primarily, recovering the forgotten or repressed 
events and texts from the African American past but also galvanizing the 
African American  future: “perpetuating” history, as the magazine put it, 
or, I would add, animating its body.
This proj ect, in Of One Blood, is not just a  matter of print culture but 
also a  matter of sex. What makes the novel unique among its contem-
poraries in fiction and among Africanist historiographical writings of 
the period is the fact that it combines the heterosexual romance infused 
with racial questions that was common to the nineteenth- century Af-
rican American domestic novel, with the fabulations of time and space 
 developing in the emergent genre of American science fiction, but with an 
eye  toward reconstructing the past rather than just the  future.10 In short, 
Of One Blood is a romance of alternate history.11 Its closest analogue in 
fin de siècle African American fiction may be Griggs’s Imperium in Impe-
rio ([1899] 2003), discussed in the previous chapter, whose plot turns on 
the existence of a secret African American secessionist empire within the 
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post- Reconstruction United States— except that Griggs’s empire fails to 
integrate  women or heterosexual marriage, and thus is not motored by 
sex in quite the way that Hopkins’s revival of ancient Africa turns out to 
be. And rather than wrinkling national space as Griggs does, Hopkins 
wrinkles transatlantic space and time. Her love story crosses from one 
pos si ble historical moment to another, for while its protagonist falls in 
love in the postbellum United States, that love is eventually fulfilled by 
his marriage to the queen of Telassar, the sole surviving city of the an-
cient Ethiopian kingdom of Kush, located on the present- day map by the 
ruins in the capital city of Meroë, now in Sudan. Telassar, which Hopkins 
named  after the biblical home of the  people of Eden, marks a challenge 
to Eu ro pean American historiography: what if African civilizations  were 
understood as the crucible of modernity? Of One Blood even challenges 
the course of history itself: what would  human society look like if Kush, 
among other ancient African empires, had not been conquered?
Hopkins’s novel bridges the two sense- methods that the previous 
chapter and this one thus far have discussed, thanatomimesis (playing 
dead) and erotohistoriography. For in Of One Blood, episodes of feigned 
or near- death mark the blurring of bound aries between distinct eras: as 
Luciano (2003) demonstrates, reviving dead or seemingly dead bodies 
in this novel also reanimates encrypted and foreclosed histories.  These 
revivals are also erotic, for they are galvanized by a melancholic sexual 
desire: the protagonist’s longing to be united with a  woman who appears 
first as a phantom, then as a dead body, and fi nally as a queen in ancient 
Telassar. Importantly, erotics is the relay to the kind of historical recon-
struction and realignments that can, in Hopkins’s view, potentially move 
African Americans out of the structural position of social death and into 
the dialectic of history. In Hopkins, visceral encounters with the past 
work in the ser vice of creating a mode of black being that is not so much 
structurally alive and  human in liberal terms as incipient and charged in 
historical- materialist ones: Of One Blood, among its other accomplish-
ments, provides a response to con temporary Afropessimism that does 
not cede to liberal humanism.
Of One Blood also understands historicism as a sense- method, one 
that expands beyond the genitality of masturbation and the whiteness 
of Connecticut Yankee, to encompass voice and skin. Like Twain’s novel, 
Hopkins’s is both authored by an amateur historian— from 1900 through 
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1902, Hopkins published essays about famous African Americans 
throughout history— and about one, for the main character is an African 
American doctor who explores ancient African civilizations as part of a 
team of archaeologists. And, as with Connecticut Yankee, its action begins 
with an erotic charge between an avatar of the past and a denizen of the 
fin de siècle pre sent. In the opening chapters of the novel, protagonist 
Reuel Briggs sees the phantom of a beautiful  woman in the woods. That 
eve ning, he goes to hear the Fisk Jubilee Singers and falls instantly in love 
with one of their members, Dianthe Lusk, whose per for mance almost 
literally enchants him, as he recognizes the face of the singer as that of 
the phantom he saw  earlier.
Dianthe’s status as a phantom is not her only connection to pastness. 
As Daphne Brooks (2006) has demonstrated, her singing is already, itself, 
a historiographic sense- method, before the more properly historicist as-
pect of the novel unfolds. For the Jubilee singers  were “perceived by many 
as the physical and aural manifestation of slavery’s traumas” (Brooks 
2006, 298), and the scene of Dianthe’s concert suggests that the theater 
is a place where historical meaning and desire are “improvised and rene-
gotiated” (Brooks 2006, 302). Dianthe’s rendition of “Go Down, Moses,” 
Brooks writes, is encrypted with historical references;  these catalyze not 
only Briggs’s sexual desire but also his desire for a collective past, for his 
love for Dianthe eventually leads him to join an expedition to Africa in 
the hopes of making himself wealthy and worthy enough for her. While 
in Connecticut Yankee the figures of white male dudery, dress-up, and 
drag index a promisingly faulty historical methodology, in Of One Blood, 
as Brooks demonstrates, the figure of the black female diva does a similar, 
more expansive kind of work.
 After the concert, Briggs sees Dianthe again in the woods on Hallow-
een, where she tells him, “You can help me, but not now. . . .  The time 
is not yet” (Hopkins [1903] 1988, 461–62). Dianthe’s forestalling of the 
pre sent time foreshadows her entanglement with multiple temporalities, 
the first being, in an echo of the theme of playing dead, the time of life 
and the time of death— for the next morning, Briggs is summoned to the 
hospital, where Dianthe is seemingly lifeless  after a train wreck. In this 
episode of reversible death, the novel’s first, Briggs diagnoses Dianthe 
with “suspended animation,” claiming that “this  woman has been long 
and per sis tently subjected to mesmeric influences” and that the train ac-
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cident has induced a “cataleptic sleep” (465). Mesmerism  here is not yet 
a direct conduit to other times, as it  will become  later in the novel, but 
rather indexes the long history of the sexual violation of black  women, 
for it was, in eighteenth- and nineteenth- century Anglophone lit er a ture, 
a figure for rape.12
Yet Briggs is not innocent of sexual intent himself. He senses a “mys-
terious mesmeric affinity” between himself and the catatonic singer 
(Hopkins [1903] 1988, 466), and revives Dianthe in front of a group of 
fellow physicians with a secret technique he calls “volatile magnetism” 
(468). Though Briggs explains volatile magnetism in technical terms, as a 
compound made up of salt, ammonia, and a magnetic agent found in the 
 human body, he also tells his colleagues, “I supply this magnetism” (468), 
hinting that his own body, and specifically his erotic longings, precipitates 
both Dianthe’s return from the dead and her enmeshment in what we  will 
 later learn are complex relations with dead ancestors and previous histori-
cal eras. In other words, Dianthe’s state of suspension between life and 
death is not simply corporeal but also sexual; not simply masturbatory, as 
in Twain, but also other- relational; and not simply structural, as in narra-
tives of playing dead, but, as the novel  will reveal, world- historical as well.
In Of One Blood, thanatomimesis becomes sociopo liti cal  because it 
invokes an alternate, Afrocentric global history. Once Dianthe is revived, 
Of One Blood begins to shut tle between the past and the pre sent, both 
in the structure of its plot and historically. Dianthe has no memory of 
her past or her racial identity, and so Briggs— who has been passing for 
white— and his white friend Aubrey Livingston conceal her true iden-
tity, renaming her Felice Adams and bringing her into the fold of their 
white friends, who include a college chum named Charlie Vance and his 
 sister Molly, Livingston’s fiancée.  Here, Dianthe is no longer suspended 
between life and death but between white and black, and then between 
virginity and marriage, for though Briggs marries her, they do not con-
summate their nuptials. Instead, seeking to be wealthy enough to support 
Dianthe and goaded by Livingston, who has also fallen in love with her, 
Briggs goes to Africa with Vance for two years to research the history 
of ancient Ethiopia, the two men accompanying a scholar who hopes to 
prove that all of mankind is descended from that first major  human civi-
lization. In Ethiopia, Briggs dreams of Dianthe calling to him for help, 
and then learns that she, Livingston, and Molly are all dead; Dianthe’s 
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telecommunication marks yet another moment when the boundary be-
tween living and dead seems to be  violated by a romantic attachment.
Despairing, Briggs wanders alone into a pyramid at night, falls un-
conscious, and wakes up in a secret Ethiopian city, Telassar, where the 
original high civilization has continued undisturbed for six thousand 
years: indeed, Telassar is an entire city that has “played dead” for millen-
nia. Briggs’s African heritage, which the novel has only implied  earlier, is 
made explicit as he learns that he is the heir to the Telassarian throne and, 
thinking he is a widower, marries their queen, Candace— a  woman with 
a distinct likeness to Dianthe. The novel then flashes back to reveal that 
Livingston has preyed on Dianthe’s suggestible mind, recapitulating the 
association of mesmerism and sexual assault. As Dianthe’s memory returns 
and she realizes that she is African American, Livingston convinces her to 
marry him in secret so that she  will not be destitute when Briggs— whom 
Dianthe thinks is white— finds out her black ancestry and abandons her. 
 After Dianthe protests that Livingston is betraying Molly, he takes the two 
 women on a boating trip, drowns Molly, and makes it look as if he and 
Dianthe are dead too, and then he and Dianthe marry in secret.
The Telassar section of the novel also inaugurates a more directly 
Twainian form of time travel, though it is anything but comedic in 
Of One Blood. Notably, Telassar is coeval with the nineteenth- century 
United States, but off its timeline, and appears to Briggs as if it  were still 
an ancient civilization whose technological and artistic won ders  were 
fully equal or superior to  those of his own time but differently developed. 
Among their accomplishments, the  people of Telassar have learned how 
to transcend death, and so the ancestors mingle with the living. As well, 
both the living and the dead can prophesy the  future, which explains 
Briggs’s psychic powers and links his mesmeric abilities to time travel. 
Fi nally, Telassar’s own timeline is scrambled according to Eu ro pean 
American standards. On a huge sphinx in the middle of Telassar’s central 
plaza is an engraving from Ecclesiastes 3:15, “That which hath been, is 
now; and that which is to be, has already been; and God requireth that 
which is past” (Hopkins [1903] 1988, 552). The last lines, “that which is 
to be, has already been; and God requireth that which is past,” refer to 
the fulfilling of an ancient prophesy in the form of Briggs’s return and 
the restoration of Ethiopia to its former world dominance. But the first 
line, “That which has been, is now,” suggests that in Telassar, “now” is no 
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 simple presence of the pre sent. It echoes Dianthe’s first words to Briggs, 
“not now . . .  the time is not yet,” and suggests that the American nine-
teenth  century contains the residuum of a past it does not acknowledge. 
Thus, though the subtitle of Of One Blood, “Or, The Hidden Self,” seems 
at first to have only psychological implications— indeed, the novel’s very 
first scene shows Briggs pondering an essay by M. Binet that he has just 
read, “The Unclassified Residuum,” described as a work of psy chol ogy— 
Telassar reveals that the “hidden self ” of African Americans is, in fact, 
historical. As Binet’s essay puts it, “All the while, however, [super natural] 
phenomena are  there, broadcast over the surface of history” (Hopkins 
[1903] 1988, 442).
The engraving on the sphinx, then, links the Binet essay to a deep 
collective past rather than just to the recesses of the psyche— even “The 
Unclassified Residuum” itself, written in a time supposedly  after the con-
struction of the sphinx, has “already been” in ancient Ethiopia, where 
time flows two ways. The psychological texts’ words, in turn, suggest that 
the past has a “surface,” a kind of skin or membrane that Briggs is now 
touching in Telassar. The epidermalization of black  people, that is, their 
reduction to skin color as described by Frantz Fanon ([1952] 1994),  here 
becomes an epidermalization of history, or its expansion into something 
permeable and elastic. The Twainian trope of faulty or bad historiogra-
phy as masturbatory has also expanded to a more somatically diffuse, 
sensory but not genitalized encounter with the past. Likewise, the Afri-
can American literary trope of play with the boundary between life and 
death now encompasses play with the tissue seeming to separate now 
and then, the nineteenth  century and ancient Ethiopia. Of One Blood 
confirms history’s skinlike permeability and reversibility with the figure 
of a lotus birthmark, which the sages of Telassar see on Briggs’s breast 
and recognize as the sign of their royal  family. The lotus, in turn, signals 
a crossing of temporal bound aries, for its meaning in Egyptian my thol-
ogy as a sign of reincarnation and creation comes from the way that it 
closes its petals at night and opens back up in the morning. In sum, alter-
nate history has and is a skin: it is a literalization of Raymond Williams’s 
“structures of feeling” (1977), a way of sensing, on the body’s surface as 
well as in the psyche, residual and incipient events and social formations.
This crossing of temporal bound aries also indexes a tangling of the 
lines of kinship, in ways similar to the works I discussed in the previous 
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chapter, for Dianthe, Livingston, and Briggs are bound by more than 
a romantic triangle. In a technological demonstration of their ability 
to confound past and pre sent, the Telassarians show Briggs a special 
reflecting glass, which inaugurates the flashback that confirms Living-
ston’s activities during the previous several months and reveals that 
Dianthe is still alive, and so Briggs leaves Telassar to find Dianthe. His 
companions on the expedition try to find him but accidentally release 
a nest of snakes that attack their servant, Jim, just as Briggs returns. Be-
fore  dying, Jim reveals to Briggs that Aubrey Livingston is Briggs’s half- 
brother through their  father, the elder Mr. Livingston, and that Dianthe 
is Briggs’s full  sister through the elder Mr. Livingston and their  mother 
Mira, Livingston  Sr.’s enslaved mistress who was sold away along with 
Briggs but without Dianthe. This blood relation again confirms the sex-
ual content of mesmerism, now fully retroped as a mixing of past and 
pre sent— for Livingston Sr. had not only literally raped Mira to produce 
Dianthe and Briggs but also, as Briggs and readers have already learned at 
a party  after Dianthe’s revival, ongoingly mesmerized Mira, forcing her 
to do parlor tricks while in a trance. One of  these tricks, Aubrey Living-
ston reveals when he tells a story  earlier in the novel, was foretelling the 
 future: Mira predicted Livingston Sr.’s ruin in the Civil War, for which 
he angrily sold her off.
Before Mira is revealed as the  mother of Dianthe and Briggs, she has 
floated through the novel unhinged from time and space, appearing to 
Briggs as a ghost twice on his expedition and to Dianthe during the 
time Briggs is away, and allowing each to divine something about what 
is happening to the other. Mira is “mired” in time, unable to step out of 
her enslaved past and into the pre sent, yet also never pre sent in the pan-
theon of ancestors and descendants who are eventually united in Telassar. 
Given her name, Mira (meaning “look!,” and an echo of “mirror”), she 
also seems to be the living embodiment of the Telassarian time- bending 
and space- overcoming reflective glass— except that her capacity to travel 
across temporal bound aries is entangled with, and perhaps even a result 
of, sexual violation. In the figures of Dianthe and to an even greater ex-
tent Mira, mesmerism and the physical encounters between past and pre s-
ent that it makes pos si ble are sense- methods that do not reduce to pure 
plea sure as they do in Twain’s onanistic historiography. They are genital 
insofar as they index rape, but as rape itself cannot be reduced to genital 
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contact, they are not only that; insofar as mesmerism registers the viola-
tion of the psyche as well as the body, it also figures the kind of porosity 
that Binet’s phrase “the surface of history” suggests. And unlike playing 
dead, mesmerism represents and furthers contact with not only histori-
cally specific but also sexually specific forms of vio lence.
Mira’s time bending, like Briggs’s travel to and from ancient Ethiopia, 
is also figured and elaborated through the distorted kin relations of which 
she is a part. Through one of Mira’s visitations  after Dianthe is married to 
Livingston, Dianthe finds out about his deception and despairingly wan-
ders the woods, where she meets an old  woman, Hannah, reputed to be 
a witch. Hannah reveals herself to be a former sexual victim of the eldest 
Livingston master, Aubrey’s grand father, with whom Hannah conceived 
Mira, who in turn was serially raped by Aubrey’s  father, Livingston Sr. 
(in the novel’s first incestuous twist, then, Aubrey’s  father is already 
his  mother Mira’s half- brother). Mira then conceived Reuel Briggs and 
Dianthe, who  were raised separately. Thus Hannah is Dianthe’s grand-
mother. Hannah also tells Dianthe that Mira is her  mother and that Au-
brey Livingston, as well as Reuel Briggs, are her full  brothers rather than 
half- brothers,  because Hannah had switched Mira’s newborn baby boy 
(Aubrey) with Mrs. Livingston’s stillborn one. The third generation of 
Livingstons, then, are full siblings. They all have not only the same white 
grand father in the eldest Mr. Livingston, and the same white  father in 
Livingston Sr., but also the same black grand mother in Hannah and the 
same black  mother in Mira. Dianthe is now revealed as a bigamist with 
both  brothers and a committer of physical incest with one, Aubrey— 
sexual “deviancies” made pos si ble, as American lit er a ture of the South so 
often reveals, by the denial that black and white are kin: Hannah’s baby 
swap, echoed by her palindromic name, recalls the famous switching of 
white and black babies in Mark Twain’s Pudd’nhead Wilson (1894). Both 
exchanges highlight the irony that  under slavery a “black” and a “white” 
baby might be indistinguishable, but only one would be claimed by its 
white  family.
This is the tangle of American kinship, the “American grammar book” 
(Spillers 1987) where white supremacy by its very logic produces endog-
amy/incest, where  because white  fathers did not acknowledge their en-
slaved  children the latter could end up in sexual connections with their 
black or white siblings, and where the system of chattel slavery, by making 
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both black- white and slave marriage illegal, promoted quasibigamy in 
the form of white  owners legitimately marrying white wives and keeping 
slaves as concubines, and of slaves coupling without dissolving previous 
 unions if spouses  were sold away from one another. But as  later specu-
lative fiction would elaborate in such figures as Toni Morrison’s ghosts 
(Beloved, 1987), Octavia Butler’s ooloi (Lilith’s Brood, 2000), and Jew-
elle Gomez’s black lesbian vampires (The Gilda Stories, 1991), Dianthe’s 
sexual aberrations are part of the production and repression of alternate 
histories rather than just bodies or kin networks. Of One Blood clarifies 
how Anglo- European repression of the Ethiopian past, which is clearly 
also an allegory for the American repression of its own past of slavery 
and of African American history in general, produces “perversions” in 
the social field as well as the historical rec ord. Hopkins suggests that a 
white- supremacist history bent on repressing the contributions of  people 
of African descent has ramifications for the horizons of African Ameri-
cans as a  people and for humankind in general: it is not that the condi-
tion of not knowing one’s collective history makes one a practitioner of 
incest or a bigamist in the literal way that not knowing one’s personal his-
tory might; rather, not knowing one’s collective history threatens to limit 
or distort the social tout court, for which  family is  here only a figure. For 
the phrase “of one blood” indexes not only the African blood that links 
ancient Ethiopia, nineteenth- century African Americans, and the three 
dispersed Livingston siblings, but also the entire  human species, which 
cannot acknowledge that all are related.
Having produced a crisis in historical knowledge as a crisis in socio-
sexual arrangement, Of One Blood resolves it through a final series of 
episodes of thanatomimesis and eroticized time travel. In the novel’s last 
few chapters, Aubrey Livingston finds himself immobilized by an invis-
ible power, a mesmeric spell that Hannah has helped Dianthe cast, and 
one that hints at a retaliatory sexual assault. Though para lyzed, he sees 
his wife glide into his room and substitute a new glass of  water for his 
customary nightly one. But Dianthe’s spell breaks too early, and he over-
powers her and forces her to drink the concoction, a slow- acting lethal 
poison. Knowing she is  dying, Dianthe feigns sleep and refuses medical 
help, using what is left of her energy to wait for Briggs. As the life force 
drains from her body, a musical outpouring swells over the town— “the 
welcome of ancient Ethiopia to her  dying  daughter of the royal line” 
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(Hopkins [1903] 1988, 615). This burst of  music, the first since Dianthe’s 
singing scenes, suggests that song has now transcended its association 
with the sexual vio lence of mesmerism and become, directly, an agent of 
the reunification of past and pre sent.  Here, the historicizing function 
of the diva has also become collective and diffuse. Hearing the  music, 
Dianthe calls out the names of her Ethiopian ancestors whom we assume 
she  will be joining. One of them is “Candace,” the name of the queen 
whom Briggs has married in Telassar. As both ancestor and double, Can-
dace links Telassar with the underworld of death, and further cinches the 
novel’s binding of past and pre sent, death and life.
By the end of Of One Blood, making history right again makes sex 
right again, in ways that are somewhat less expansive than the novel’s 
 earlier figure of history and skin as mutually receptive surfaces. Briggs ar-
rives, and Dianthe dies in his arms. From the woods, Aubrey Livingston 
sees Dianthe and his fiancée, Molly, gliding along together, presumably 
on their way to the afterlife. He is eventually charged with their two mur-
ders but acquitted. Though freed by the earthly, American justice sys-
tem, Livingston has an “interview” with an impromptu court composed 
of two representatives from Telassar, as well as the witch Hannah, who 
has been revealed as a descendent of the noble court, and Reuel Briggs. 
 There, the prime minister of Ethiopia cases a spell on Livingston, releases 
his soul, and whispers the prophesy to him that  those in direct line of 
the throne— which Livingston is by virtue of his descent from Hannah 
and Mira— must, if guilty of the crime of murder, die by their own hand. 
Accordingly, and possibly also  because he now knows he is legally black 
in the United States, Livingston drowns himself, recapitulating the open-
ing of the novel in which Briggs contemplates suicide and asks himself if 
it is wrong. Briggs returns to Telassar with Hannah, whose palindromic 
name now reaches back and forth through time to re unite her and her 
nineteenth- century  family and, by the end of the novel, her present- day 
descendants with their ancient relatives. Briggs’s  union with Candace, in 
the secret city where past and pre sent intermingle like the blood of black 
and white Americans, now not only fulfills the prophesy that Telassar 
 will be re united with the pre sent but also consummates his initial mag-
netic and otherworldly attraction to Dianthe.
The novel’s solution, though, is emphatically heterosexual. Though its 
historiography is radical both in method and in content, Of One Blood 
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finishes on a somewhat conservative sexual note, marrying Briggs out of 
his feigned whiteness and back into his racially pure ancestral blackness, 
and also out of his incestuous relation with his  sister Dianthe and back 
into proper exogamy. In fact, Dianthe’s departure with Molly actually 
does not make sense in the novel’s economy of ancestral copresence with 
the living, for she too is Telassarian royalty and should end up in the 
secret city— but the novel must dispose of her by substituting Candace 
for her, in order to correlate the restoration of history with proper dy-
nastic succession. Despite this ending, though, through its discussions 
of the “surface” of history and its motif of the lotus birthmark, the novel 
has hinted that history can be felt and made other wise than through 
romantic, intraracial heterosexual love. It has suggested that the sense- 
method of alternate, amateur historiographies, derided and ignored by 
the emerging nineteenth- century profession of scientific history, is both 
productive of and emerges out of less sanctioned libidinal and corporeal 
encounters: the trauma of rape, the corporeal transfer of energy in animal 
magnetism, and the shape- shifting and doubling of ancestors. In short, 
the novel has offered up speculative history as a sense- method, and the 
body’s sensorium as a way of transmitting and receiving history.
On Libidinal Historiography in Twain and Hopkins
But to cast  things this way—to say that the body is a transmitter of his-
tory and that history has a sensible, permeable surface—is to leave out the 
psychic question of desire on which speculative fiction, and speculative 
history in par tic u lar, are based.  These are genres whose plots are mo-
tored not only by corporeal contact but also by longings for and imagi-
nations of the better pre sents and/or  futures that could be animated by 
a changed past. As if to fend off this possibility, Twain’s Hank Morgan 
seems to dismiss speculation precisely  because it is based on desire, opin-
ing, “No sound and legitimate business can be established on a basis of 
speculation” (Twain [1889] 1982, 98) and, as discussed  earlier, linking 
the romantic pursuits of knight- errantry to gambling. Hank’s economic 
meta phor also gestures  toward the question of what made history sound 
and legitimate in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Ini-
tially, then, we might read historiography in Twain and Hopkins as a cure 
for what ails the libidinalized marketplace that Hank condemns.  After 
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all, historiography, as nonfiction, purports to  settle the meaning of the 
past (something that Twain satirizes and Hopkins seems earnestly in-
vested in), offering a hermeneutic gold standard. And time travel would 
seem on the face of it to offer the least speculative, most accurate account 
of the past in that it ensures perfect correspondence between witness and 
event. This is, in a sense, the conceit of Of One Blood, in which African 
American competency for citizenship and  future making is certified 
through Reuel Briggs’s direct witness of Ethiopian technological accom-
plishment and the narrator assures readers that they may ascertain “the 
correctness of the historical rec ords” (Hopkins [1903] 1988, 538) about 
Ethiopia from Briggs’s descriptions of the ruins of the  actual Meroë and, 
by extension, of the fictional Telassar.
Yet despite Hank’s contempt for speculation, Twain himself estab-
lishes Connecticut Yankee as conjectural from the very beginning, writing 
in the preface, “It is not pretended that  these laws and customs existed 
in  England in the sixth  century; no, it is only pretended that inasmuch 
as they existed in the En glish and other civilizations of far  later times, it 
is safe to consider that it is no libel upon the sixth  century to suppose 
them to have been in practice in that day also. One is quite justified in 
inferring that what ever one of  these laws or customs was lacking in that 
remote time, its place was competently filled by a worse one” (Twain 
[1889] 1982, 4). The language of “pretending,” “considering,” “supposing,” 
and “inferring” immediately establishes the novel as a self- consciously 
imaginary— a speculative— account of the past. Twain’s historiography, 
then, has more in common with con temporary speculative fiction than 
with the disciplinary history proper to his time, or even with nineteenth- 
century popu lar histories aimed at mass audiences in which a gripping 
plot without any metacommentary took pre ce dence over factual accu-
racy (see Pfitzer 2008). In short, Twain gleefully admits to speculation, 
showing up Hank’s spurious investments in hard money and hard facts.13 
Similarly, despite its gesture  toward the historical rec ords, Of One Blood 
encodes the idea of speculation in Mira’s looking- glass name, for “specu-
late” originates in the Latin speculare, “to observe.”
As Hank implies when he dismisses Camelot’s knights- errant as a 
pool of gamblers, speculation has a nonheteronormative erotic charge, 
for it eschews the “bed- rock” of reproduction for imaginative flights of 
fancy about unattainable  women. It also has this charge in Of One Blood, 
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in which Reuel Briggs connects speculation with dissipation in his re-
mark to the leader of his expedition, “ Don’t touch upon the origin of 
the Negro; you  will find yourself in a labyrinth, Professor. . . .  Speculation 
has exhausted itself, yet the mystery appears to remain unsolved” (Hop-
kins [1903] 1988, 521).  Here, notably, speculation is so self- referential as 
to exhaust not only its prac ti tion ers but also itself. As Briggs’s meta phor 
of self- exhaustion implies, the idea of imaginative risk cleaves tightly to 
masturbation, the more so when the risk is financial—as, indeed, we 
must remember that it is, not only for Hank but for Briggs, who “never 
before builded [sic] golden  castles, but now . . .  speculated upon the pos-
sibility of unearthing gems and gold from the mines of ancient Meroe 
and the pyramids of Ethiopia” (496). The prob lem with investment, it 
seems, is precisely its capacity to inflame the imagination, as, indeed, an-
timasturbation lit er a ture recognized in its correlation of onanism with 
not only checks and credit but also reading too much of another kind of 
paper, fiction. The idea that speculative writing,  whether of ious or of 
novels, is inherently libidinal, had been around for almost two centuries 
prior to the nineteenth.
The literary mode that would correspond to history’s hermeneutic 
gold standard would, on the face of it, seem to be allegory. Just as history 
purports to fix the meaning of the past, allegory purports to fix literary 
meaning by anchoring one text firmly to another. And both Twain’s and 
Hopkins’s novels can be read as allegory— Connecticut Yankee in all the 
ways critics have read it as a retelling of American imperialism, indus-
trialization, economics, et cetera, and Of One Blood as an allegory for 
the repression of slavery in dominant American historiography and as a 
series of scriptural allusions and rewritings that culminate in Acts 17:26, 
“[God] hath made of one blood all nations of men for to dwell on all 
the face of the earth, and hath determined the times before appointed, 
and the bounds of their habitation.” Yet as Fredric Jameson (1982, 30) 
reminds us, allegory can also unfix meaning, serving to prepare a text 
“for further ideological investment,” that is, for new ways of figuring the 
relationship between an individual and “transpersonal realities such as 
the social structure or the collective logic of History.” In other words, 
allegory is a way of critiquing the pre sent, perhaps even of dreaming the 
 future, of making history in the sense of assuming historical agency by 
setting up the past as a transactional site— one that primes the desire to 
Feeling Historicisms 119
understand one’s position within larger coordinates in the pre sent and 
presumably, through such understandings, to change  those coordinates.
On this model, Hank Morgan’s faulty historicism, represented vari-
ously as masturbatory vicariousness and prurience, as the failed narra-
tive drive of his tale, as his attempt to short- circuit the stadial movement 
of History- with- a- capital- H from feudalism to capitalism, and even 
signaled by Twain’s incitement of the critical desire to anchor his tale 
in events of the nineteenth  century, looks like something queer histo-
rians might want to claim. While Twain’s contemporaries prepared the 
 Middle Ages for a rearguard ideological investment in Anglo- Saxonism, 
he himself seems to have prepared them for something  else. We might 
also claim several aspects of Of One Blood: Reuel Brigg’s amateur histori-
cal inquiry, represented as both a suspect sexual violation of Dianthe 
and a more promising open and porous body; the black female characters’ 
use of haunting, voice, and prophesy as historical methods; and the ama-
teur historiography signaled by Hopkins’s own traffic in speculation, re-
workings of secondary histories by her contemporaries, and the biblical 
model of prophesy and recapitulation. While Hopkins’s Afrocentrist 
contemporaries prepared ancient Africa for ideological investments that, 
as Saidiya Hartman clarifies in Lose Your  Mother (2008), can produce an 
African continent innocent of participation in the slave trade, Hopkins, 
like Twain, prepares her readers for something  else. In other words,  these 
“bad,” literary, corporeal, allegorical histories may prime their readers to 
make history other wise.
The world- historical investments made pos si ble by allegory, in turn, 
are  matters of race, gender, and sexuality. Allegory can be understood not 
only as a form of historiography, a narrative mode that, by pointing to an 
anterior time, can suggest vio lence, ruination, and change, and thus  future 
making, but also, since Walter Benjamin ([1963] 2009), as a form of drag: 
a way of dressing up the  future in the garb of the past. But what is Twain 
“getting up” in the persona of Hank, or of medieval culture in general? 
Countering his historicist critics, I would suggest that Twain is less inter-
ested in retelling a par tic u lar aspect of nineteenth- century culture through 
the medieval conceit than he is in revealing and exploiting the libidinal 
logic of historiography itself. Connecticut Yankee suggests that our habit 
of historicizing— our hank for it—is fundamentally erotic, perhaps even 
autoerotic, and that this might not be such a bad  thing. Twain’s looking 
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backward is neither triumphantly nostalgic nor properly po liti cal in the 
Marxist sense of what it means to do history: it simply marks a refusal, 
like Hank’s final one, to accede to con temporary norms of gendered and 
sexualized identity, even as it fully accedes to the norms of whiteness.
Likewise, the erotics of Of One Blood become both clearer and queerer 
when read through this lens. By  going back to and rewriting Western his-
tory in terms of a forgotten biblical city and the Bible as a whole— a text 
that the ghostly Mira literally writes her name in, as well as underlining a 
prophetic passage, when she appears to Dianthe— Hopkins participates 
in the logic of allegorical recapitulation that animates that very Bible, 
a logic that supersedes the heteronormative alliances that Of One Blood 
seems to champion at its end. For in Hopkins’s novel, mesmerism, reani-
mation, reincarnation, and the transmission of both melancholic affect 
and historical understanding across generations take the place of preg-
nancy and childbirth; parent- child relations are so distorted by slavery 
as to make biological reproduction an untenable blueprint for the  future. 
Sexual longings, in this novel, do get resolved into the privatized and per-
sonal figure of exogamous marriage, but they do not get resolved into 
pregnancy and parenthood. Instead, they retain a historical and collec-
tive charge insofar as they revive and reinvest a dormant past for  future 
use. Of One Blood looks backward to an in ven ted history on another 
continent, furnishing ancient Ethiopia with technologies reminiscent of 
the nineteenth  century to repudiate the racist pre sent of a nineteenth- 
century United States in which black  people counted as primitive and 
uncivilized, imbuing that refusal with a libidinal logic in which  people 
connect through time via bodily affinities rather than descent. Of One 
Blood thus might be called, with a nod to Claudia Tate (1992), an antido-
mestic allegory of po liti cal desire.
All of this brings me, at long last, to the epigraph with which this chap-
ter begins, Nietz sche’s remark about his Untimely Meditations ([1873–76] 
1997): “The four untimely essays are altogether warlike. They demonstrate 
that I was no ‘Jack o’ Dreams,’ that I derive plea sure from drawing the 
sword— also, perhaps, that I have a dangerously supple wrist” (Nietz sche 
[1908] 1992, 54).  Here, Nietz sche paradoxically suggests that his articles, 
which include “On the Use and Disadvantage of History for Life,” are 
military in their temporal imprecision, foiling the idea that collective po-
liti cal action requires the temporal simultaneity of the drill or the pro-
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gressive directionalities of nation and empire. Counterposing fantasy, or 
“dreaming,” with historiography’s “drawing [of ] the sword,” Nietz sche 
stakes a claim for the “unhistorical” in the  battle against the status quo, 
echoing his assertion in “On the Use and Disadvantage of History for 
Life” that forgetting is necessary to action. But this insistent ahistoricism 
brings with it a dangerous supplement (see Derrida 1998). Drawing the 
analytic blade of the untimely is not so distinct from the other manual 
exercises associated with dreaming: indeed, the creative abuse of his-
tory that Nietz sche champions implies, with that supple wrist, a bit of 
self- abuse.
By the early twentieth  century, the (a)historical allegory—in which 
the past  will neither retreat altogether, as in biblical allegory’s fusion of 
past and pre sent into recurrence and eternity, nor provide a triumphant 
origin story for the pre sent, as in Anglo- American nationalist allegory, 
but hovers as a site of potential critical investment, as in Connecticut 
Yankee and Of One Blood— would become the refuge of  those inheritors 
of the masturbator and the nonprocreator, the newly specified “homosex-
uals” whose erotic interests  were “wrongly” invested. Fixating on a past 
in which they could not have lived, even fixing their own protagonists 
within an in ven ted but historically specific past, inverts and  others whose 
sexual practices did not fit into the heterosexual- reproductive matrix 
could practice a kind of dialectical nostalgia: the past might be embar-
rassing, but it could also signal the validity of a diff er ent lifeworld, in-
cluding its norms of gender and eroticism (Nealon 2001). And, crucially, 
by featuring an archaic historical period that could not be dissolved into 
a moment on a personal timeline, or even be situated in a coherent, qua-
sinationalist po liti cal pro gress narrative, sexual dissidents could signal 
the absolute inaccessibility of  these alternate lifeworlds,  these temporal 
and sexual imperiums in imperio, to so- called normals.14
This logic might explain the peculiarly regressive moves of explic itly 
lesbian and gay lit er a ture  later on, such as the ending of Radclyffe Hall’s 
“Miss Ogilvy Finds Herself ” (1934), in which the main character, a clas-
sic version of what Esther Newton has called the mythic mannish lesbian, 
slips into a dream sequence and finds herself a caveman courting a cave-
woman, never returning to consciousness or the pre sent moment (see 
Newton 1984). And it may help explain the queer, pseudohistoricist odd-
ities, often classed as de cadent works, that  were contemporaneous with A 
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Connecticut Yankee and spanned the de cades in which sexology  rose and 
fell, from Flaubert’s Salammbô (1862, another African historical fantasia) 
through  Virginia Woolf ’s Orlando (1928, in which the main character 
changes from male to female while in Turkey). For  these texts, each in 
their own way, embrace bad historicism as an erotics. They toy with alle-
gory’s shuttling movement to prior texts, but no overarching interpretive 
point guides their time travels. They delight in the sheer alterity of other 
sex/gender systems, but use  these as material for fantasy, courtship, and 
erotic worldmaking rather than for analytic distance.
 These other literary works are also doggedly and determinedly colo-
nialist, in a way that Twain mocks in the figure of the blustering Hank 
Morgan, and that Hopkins reflects on in the final chapter of Of One 
Blood— which may be explained by the fact that they are white- authored. 
In Of One Blood, Briggs “views . . .  with serious apprehension, the advance 
of mighty nations penetrating the dark, mysterious forces of his native 
land” (Hopkins [1903] 1988, 621). Having assumed the role of “native” 
despite his status as a (re)settler, Briggs seems faintly to recognize that his 
own incursions into Telassar have not only re united the royal  family but 
also represent an early form of what we might now recognize as heritage 
tourism, the very activity of which Saidiya Hartman (2008) is so skep-
tical in Lose Your  Mother. Works such as “Miss Ogilvy Finds Herself,” 
Salammbô, and Orlando, similarly, engage in what Joseph Allen Boone 
(2014) calls “the homoerotics of Orientalism,” in which spatial alterity 
offers sexual adventure;  these texts temporalize that alterity. Through 
them we can see, on the one hand, that the fantasy of feeling history with, 
on, and even as the body is a power ful alternative to disciplinary histories 
that, in denying the libidinal investments of historiography, understand 
themselves as innocent of imperialist vio lence. Libidinal historiography 
offers constituencies whose bodies are understood as the basis of their 
inferiority a way to mobilize that stigma into a world- historical imagina-
tion. But on the other hand, it also risks preparing the past for a  future 
that, as Briggs recognizes, might further rather than reduce “caste preju-
dice, race pride, [and] boundless wealth” (Hopkins [1903] 1988, 621).
Fi nally, the limits of libidinal historiography are, ironically, corporeal. 
For they depend on the fiction of able- bodiedness that attends all travel 
lit er a ture: the conceit that feeling historical, as a sense- method, is a  matter 
of action, of making the body literally go places. I have thus far treated 
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populations whose physical movements could be understood as po liti cal 
ones: Shaker rhythms as a critique of heteronormative gender roles and 
of whiteness; playing dead as a confrontation with social death; amateur 
historiography, literalized in time travel, as a form of queer and queer- 
of- color worldmaking. But during the early nineteenth  century, which 
celebrated a masculine- capitalist body in control of its energetic capaci-
ties, and the Progressive era, which celebrated a masculine- imperial body 
moving through a temporalized space and eventually a spatialized time, 
the sense- methods of  those who could not “go” so completely  were very 
diff er ent. As the following chapter  will show, the inability or unwilling-
ness to move, or to be moved, is a sense of another kind, with a politics 
of its own.
At the end of Of One Blood, Reuel Briggs won ders in 
relation to the imperialism threatening Telassar, “When 
 will it stop? What  will the end be?” (Hopkins [1903] 
1988, 621). This question emphasizes duration, and turns 
us  toward the idea of ongoingness, rather than inquiry 
into the past, as a sense- method. Not to stop, at least pe-
riodically, not to have an end or even a picture of what 
the end could be, is a condition of being uninflected by 
tense. This lack of inflection was particularly threaten-
ing at a historical moment concerned, as Of One Blood 
is, with anchoring the pre sent in the correct past, and 
also—as we can see from that novel’s program of re-
aligning Briggs with a technologically advanced African 
dynasty unadulterated by whiteness— with the eugenic 
movement  toward a perfected  future. If the erotohisto-
riographical proj ect of using the body to recalibrate the 
past and the eugenic proj ect of using it to procreate the 
 future both conjure up states of somatic capacity, the state 
THE SENSE OF UNENDING
Defective Chronicity in “Bartleby, the Scrivener”  
and “Melanctha”
How much wood would a woodchuck chuck if a woodchuck 
would chuck wood? And how much wood would a woodchuck 
chuck if a woodchuck only could? Now a woodchuck could 
make good and would, but  there  ain’t no reason why he should. 
But how much wood would a woodchuck chuck if a woodchuck 
would chuck wood?
theodore f. morse and robert hobart davis,  
“The Woodchuck Song”
4
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of tenselessness invokes a less capacitated body, whose directionality and 
endpoints cannot be guaranteed. In a  century marked by the machinic 
rhythms of industrial capitalism, the increase of work time due to electric 
lighting, and other methods by which the body’s actions  were extended 
and prolonged, a tenseless and perpetual mode of being, unhampered 
by memories, energy fluctuations, or pessimism about the  future, might 
seem ideal. But the lure of the perpetual brings with it another mode of 
tenselessness: the threat of inertia, of not starting in the first place, of 
being per sis tently out of commission— a possibility made starkly evident 
by the  Great Railroad Strike of 1877.
Perhaps inflected by technology’s ability to produce bodies marked 
by both perpetuity and inertia, in the late nineteenth  century a key tem-
poral term, “chronic,” took on pejorative connotations: it came to mean, 
simply, ongoingly bad, as in chronic weather or a chronic flavor. At its 
simplest, “chronic” simply means “of time,” though that meaning does 
not seem to have survived the early modern period. To say that some-
thing was chronic, before about 1600, was to say that it was timeish, about 
time, that it took time as its primary subject or material, as in the modern 
“chronological.”1 But by the eigh teenth  century, “chronic” had narrowed 
to designate only lingering medical conditions. Chronic sufferers  were 
(and are) marked by unspecified or unknown etiology and uncertain out-
come: they are, as the anthropologist Jean E. Jackson (2005, 344) puts 
it, “out of place temporally, if no one knows  whether the painful state 
 will improve, deteriorate, or remain the same.” The time of the chronic 
is diff er ent from what anthropologist S. Lochlann Jain (2013, 27) has 
described as “living in prognosis,” which involves reimagining the past 
in light of one’s disease (in Jain’s words, “what alternatives and what ne-
cessities [the past] contained” [ Jain 2013, 44], unbeknownst to us), or 
knowing the end from what becomes a new beginning point, the time 
of diagnosis. With a chronic disease, prognosis is  really more of an ag-
nosis: as long as a condition remains chronic, one simply has it; one can 
go into remission or experience relapse or return, but one is never fully 
cured. Nor are chronic diseases necessarily terminal. By definition they 
do not terminate in a cure, but they also do not automatically terminate 
in death; one can have a chronic disease such as lupus and not die of it. 
Indeed, “chronicity” correlates with a certain shapelessness in time, and 
chronic conditions seem to belie narrative altogether. The chronic foils 
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differences between not only beginnings and ends but also transgression 
and the reproduction of the status quo, ability and disability, action and 
passivity. Chronic conditions, like the original meaning of “chronic,” are 
simply time- ish.2
Perhaps the nineteenth  century’s most famous avatar for this lack of 
tense— its ability to indicate  either machinic perpetuation or complete 
inertia, along with its connotations of pathology—is the protagonist of 
Melville’s short story “Bartleby, the Scrivener” (Melville [1853] 1979). 
Bartleby seeks employment as a copyist at a law office and, once hired, 
simply refuses to do his job. As a scrivener, he figures the industrial nine-
teenth  century’s fantasy of unceasing  labor, for he is the  human precursor 
to the photocopy machine. And he is tenseless, without past, pre sent, 
or  future. First, as the  lawyer who employs him and narrates the story 
declares, “Bartleby was one of  those beings of whom nothing is ascer-
tainable except from the original sources, and, in his case,  those are very 
small” (103). Second, Bartleby’s pre sent consists of standing in reveries 
before walls. Fi nally, without a futural orientation, he ends up dead, 
curled in the fetal position against a prison wall. In short, the scrivener is, 
according to the  lawyer, altogether “deficient in what landscape paint ers 
call ‘life’ ” (105). His lack of vitality is captured in the story’s most famous 
phrase, Bartleby’s continual declaration that “I would prefer not to.” He 
is also, the  lawyer fi nally decides, a chronic: “What I saw that morning 
persuaded me that the scrivener was the victim of innate and incurable 
disorder” (122).
Bartleby’s fin de siècle  sister is Gertrude Stein’s Melanctha, from the 
triptych Three Lives (1909). A mixed- race African American  woman, 
Melanctha wanders through life recurringly  doing  things that do not 
add up to a purpose. She has a somewhat foreshortened past, told in a 
set of digressions by the narrator, but her main prob lem seems to be her 
lack of movement  toward the  futures dictated by her subject- position: 
marriage and reproduction, and/or the kind of public ser vice dictated 
by Progressive- era ideals of racial uplift. Instead, Melanctha drifts in an 
eternal pre sent, a series of moments that do not accumulate into a life 
story. Stein does not use the language of disease to describe Melanctha; 
rather, her story is mostly a series of dialogues with a doctor, her lover Jeff 
Campbell, narrated in a patterned syntax that features repetition, a kind 
of stuttering copying of previous phrases that echoes both the work of 
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Melville’s scriveners and the repetition of Bartleby’s “I would prefer not 
to.” Melanctha’s lack of forward motion, of the characterological devel-
opment that readers of Stein’s era might expect from a novel, is encoded 
into Stein’s very grammar, in sets of sentences such as “Melanctha Her-
bert had always had a break neck courage. Melanctha always loved to be 
with  horses; she loved to do wild  things, to  ride the  horses and to break 
and tame them” (Stein [1909] 2000, 92). Typical of the writing in “Me-
lanctha,” the anaphora of Melanctha’s name, the repetition of the infini-
tive “to,” and the doubling of the words “break,” “loved,” and “horses” give 
 these sentences a static quality, even as they describe intense emotions 
and physical action. Mirroring this syntax, Melanctha’s life consists of 
what we might now call repetitive be hav ior patterns, alternately narrated 
in the third person and recounted in habitually complaining conversa-
tions with her lover and a  couple of other friends.
“Bartleby” and “Melanctha,” as I  will go on to demonstrate, offer up 
the chronic as a method of knowing and inhabiting the latter part of a 
“long nineteenth- century” world that demanded temporal obeisance 
in the form of punctuated periods of activity and rest for the purposes 
of maximum productivity, and forward motion connected to national 
pro gress.3 While  these two stories are not precisely disability narratives, 
I want to claim them, following Jasbir Puar (2017), as debility narra-
tives, or stories of attrition, erosion, exhaustion, and decline that are also 
stories of endurance, protraction, per sis tence, and dilation in spite of it 
all. “Bartleby” and “Melanctha” stake a claim for the chronic, or for a 
tenseless modality of being that is understood, though not necessarily 
lived, as a pathology. And they do so in the form of the case, perhaps 
the preeminent genre in which what counts as a life is negotiated. Mel-
ville suggests this way of apprehending Bartleby with the invocation 
of documentary sources that could explain the scrivener and “his case” 
(Melville [1853] 1979, 103); Bartleby becomes a  legal case as the  lawyer 
tries to figure out how to evict him; he fi nally becomes a clinical case 
when the  lawyer diagnoses him as having some innate and incurable 
disease. Similarly, Stein positions Melanctha as a case by giving her pro-
tagonist a doctor for an interlocutor. Furthermore, Stein’s  simple title 
for the triptych containing “Melanctha,” Three Lives, is not only a claim 
to the form of “a life” on the part of Melanctha and the other subjects 
in the triptych but also an indicator that what is to follow  will exemplify 
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something, as cases do. But  these two literary figures’ positions in and 
as chronic cases (or cases of the chronic), I  will argue, are more than just 
studies of dysfunction. They engage with the question of  human energy 
and its conservation, eventually offering up a sense- method that I call 
chronocatachresis: opposed to producing and channeling  human vitality 
 toward industrial- capitalist proj ects tuned to the reproduction of profits 
and populations, chronocatachresis involves the stretching out of time 
beyond its instrumental uses.
Bartleby: A Story of  Wouldn’t
Melville’s Bartleby, though his name echoes two verbs (“barter” and 
“be”), is a man of stunning inaction. When first tasked with cross- 
checking his copy with that of the other scriveners, he famously replies, 
“I would prefer not to” (Melville [1853] 1979, 112). He eventually pre-
fers not to copy, eat, leave his place of employment, or live at all. Critics 
have generally focused on Bartleby’s famous verb “prefer” (see Deleuze 
1997), but that verb is a feint, a way for Bartleby to signal a potential for 
an action, even an emotional one, that he never realizes. For “prefer” is 
actually optional to his meaning. Bartleby, that is, could have eliminated 
“prefer” and said, albeit somewhat archaically, “I would not [do that].” 
In fact, the word “would” appears in Melville’s story of 14,463 words ex-
actly ninety- eight times, most pointedly in Bartleby’s fifteen statements 
that he “would prefer not” to do what he is asked to, and his two that he 
“would prefer” to be left alone or do something  else. As with my epigraph 
above, “The Woodchuck Song,” Melville’s repetition of the word “would” 
echoes the word “wood,” suggesting that Bartleby’s ligneous opacities 
and vexed relation to paper reduce him to the status of a  thing, what we 
might now call a blockhead. The story’s conundrum is precisely  whether 
and how not  doing something can count as an act of  human  will; indeed, 
the  lawyer asks, incredulously, “You  will not?” (Melville [1853] 1979, 116; 
emphasis in source) and receives in answer, “I prefer not” (117; emphasis 
in source), an answer that equivocates the question of  will.
At the center of the story, then, are not so much Bartleby’s prefer-
ences, as the verb “would,” whose function exemplifies the tenselessness I 
have been discussing. Grammatically, “would” is a modal verb. In linguis-
tics, modal verbs are called “defective” (see, e.g., Baerman and Corbett 
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2010)  because they are not inflected for tense ( there is no “ will would,” 
or “woulded”). They are, simply, incompletely conjugated, as yet un-
done. “Would” is also distinguished by what linguists call the “dynamic 
modality,” in which the condition of possibility for the verb is internal, 
concerned with the subject of the sentence’s ability or willingness to act 
(Palmer 2001, 9–10). As the past tense of “ will,” “would” is connected 
with questions of agency, drive, inclination, disposition, appetite, desire, 
plea sure, vitality: all aspects of what it means to live and have a life.4
What does it mean to be able to do something, at least theoretically, 
but not to do it?5 The  lawyer actually knows the answer to this question, 
for he himself has preferred not to do much of his job, especially not 
the part that involves  going to court: “I am a man who, from his youth 
upwards, has been filled with a profound conviction that the easiest way 
of life is the best. Hence, though I belong to a profession proverbially 
energetic and ner vous, even to turbulence, at times, yet nothing of that 
sort have I ever suffered to invade my peace. I am one of  those unambi-
tious  lawyers who never addresses a jury, or in any way draws down public 
applause; but in the cool tranquility of a snug retreat, do a snug business 
among rich men’s bonds and mortgages and title- deeds” (Melville [1853] 
1979, 104). In fact, the “unambitious”  lawyer has exempted himself from 
the “energetic and ner vous” pace of mid- nineteenth- century American 
business life, and retreated, just like Bartleby,  behind a series of walls and 
screens.
Importantly, one of the ways that the  lawyer has achieved equanimity 
amid the hustle- bustle of Wall Street pertains to the only temporal func-
tion that “would” actually has: to indicate habit or repetition in the past. 
The  lawyer employs two other clerks, Nippers and Turkey, each of whom 
is dysfunctional for half the day. During the morning, Nippers has indi-
gestion, and spends most of his time banging at his  table and adjusting 
its height  until the lunch hour,  after which he is “comparatively mild” 
(Melville [1853] 1979, 109). In the after noons, though, Turkey arrives back 
from his lunch drunk, and  there is “a strange, inflamed, flurried, flighty 
recklessness of activity about him” (105–6) as he blots documents, bumps 
his chair, throws his pen, and stirs up his papers. The  lawyer’s solution is to 
make the most of his employees’ habits, relying on Turkey in the morning 
and Nippers in the after noon. “Their fits relieved each other like guards,” 
he reports: “When Nippers’ was on, Turkey’s was off; and vice versa. This 
130 chapter 4
was a good natu ral arrangement  under the circumstances” (109). This is, 
effectively, a rhythmic arrangement, but one attributed to nature rather 
than to the  lawyer’s power as an employer. Indeed, the  lawyer further 
naturalizes this oscillation insofar as he keeps time more or less by his 
copyists’ skin tones, relying for a clock on Turkey’s flushed face, “which 
gaining its meridian with the sun, seemed to set with it, to rise, culmi-
nate, and decline the following day, with the like regularity and undi-
minished glory” (105). The third clerk, a copyboy named Ginger- Nut, is 
notable only for the fact that he goes out and gets cake and apples for the 
other two on a daily basis. By naming his employees  after purely physi-
cal characteristics and counting on their habits— naturalized, perhaps 
even racialized, as complexion—to mark the days, mornings, meridians, 
after noons, and eve nings, the  lawyer arrogates clock time back to natu-
ral time, beating the mechanical time of wage capitalism, and exempting 
himself from the anxiety- making tempo of Wall Street. The  lawyer’s use 
of his employees as chronometers is reflected in the other predominant 
use of “would” in the story: it is generally used to indicate a repetition 
in the past, as in “[Turkey] would be incautious in dipping his pen into 
his inkstand” (106). For the  lawyer, then, habit organizes time so that it 
is bearable.
The  lawyer’s use of “would” emphasizes predictability, making the 
verb itself akin to copying, the repetitious activity to which much of the 
 lawyer’s office is dedicated: in the locution “[Turkey] would be incau-
tious,” Turkey repeats his own actions often enough that they can be 
anticipated— they also form a rhythm of sorts. But Bartleby’s “would” 
interrupts the “would” of habitual repetition, the accretions from the 
past that give “would” a claim on the  future and that get  things done in 
a safe and “snug” way. Thus it is impor tant that Bartleby utters his first 
“I would prefer not to” in response to the  lawyer’s request that he read a 
copy of a document out loud while the  lawyer cross- checks it with the 
original. Bartleby’s first “would” interrupts the routine of the office (so 
tacit that the  lawyer has called Bartleby to him without raising his head, 
merely extending the copy in his hand), the repetition of  legal documents 
in the pro cess of copying, and the tense of habitualness that makes both 
the past and the  future pos si ble. Bartleby’s habits are not like Turkey’s, 
Nippers’s, or Ginger- Nut’s— punctual episodes that make time livable 
 because their intervals are clearly patterned. Rather, Bartleby’s habits are 
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an incalculable mass of re sis tance, the  doings of an “unaccountable scriv-
ener” (Melville [1853] 1979, 119) whose actions cannot be broken down 
into predictable parts. As the  lawyer remarks, “Nothing so aggravates an 
earnest person as a passive re sis tance” (115).
But though this comment would seem to indicate that the  lawyer 
 understands Bartleby’s actions as a form of social protest against the mo-
notony and hierarchy of his work environs, he moves quickly to diagnose 
his clerk in the individualizing, privatizing terms of medical pathology. 
Describing his turn from sympathy  toward Bartleby to repulsion, the 
 lawyer rationalizes that the heart cannot bear a misery it cannot alleviate, 
and that his recoil from Bartleby stems from “a certain hopelessness of 
remedying excessive and organic ill” (Melville [1853] 1979, 121). Incur-
able, hopeless, excessive, organic, ill: this is the language of chronic dis-
ease, of the static bodies it indexes and the defective temporalities it en-
genders. The modality of the chronic, then, is less the safely habitual than 
the compromised, the unconjugated, the “would” in the sense of being 
able or unable to realize one’s  will. Or, in its more recalcitrant modes, the 
modality of the chronic might run something more like this: rather than 
succumbing to incapacity (“I would if I could but I  can’t”), actually liv-
ing with chronic illness might involve expressing not  doing as a  matter of 
preference (“I could, but I would prefer not to,” or “I could, but I would 
not”), so as to conserve oneself for more impor tant  things.6
“Bartleby” was published in 1853, before chronic disease became a 
 matter of public, national- level discussion in the United States in the 
early 1900s. But it anticipates some  things about that discussion. First, 
Bartleby, who eats as  little as pos si ble and does as  little as pos si ble, seems 
intent on safeguarding himself and his energy. And in fact, during Theo-
dore Roo se velt’s administration the US government became interested 
in public health, including chronic disease, as part of what we now know 
as the nature conservation movement— a movement originally  imagined 
to involve the preservation of both  people and the environment. In 1908, 
responding to the exploitation of natu ral resources that had marked 
the rise of industrial capitalism and the wealthiest classes, Roo se velt 
 appointed the Federal Commission on the Conservation of Natu ral 
Resources. Two Yale economists, J. Pease Norton and Irving Fisher, had 
already seized on the question of health as part of the national wealth. 
Accordingly, the American Association for the Advancement of Science 
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set up a Committee of One Hundred on National Health to advocate 
for a federal department of public health (Rosen 1972). Fisher submit-
ted his Report on National Vitality, Its Wastes and Conservation (I. Fisher 
1908) to Roo se velt’s Commission, though it took  until the Taft admin-
istration for a cabinet to be established. With the Fisher report, the idea 
of  human resources was born, inaugurating an American- style biopolitics 
that, in a cap i tal ist rather than a state vernacular, took as its object the 
optimization— the capacitation—of dominant populations (see Fou-
cault 1990 and [1978–79] 2008).7 This capacitation included not only 
work but also rest, leisure, and preventative health programs that would 
preserve and restore the worker.
Second, “Bartleby” anticipates the conservation movement, and the 
Report on National Vitality in par tic u lar,  because Melville’s story is shot 
through with the language of liveliness and the lack thereof, from “the life 
of Bartleby . . .  the complete life of Bartleby” (Melville [1853] 1979, 103), 
to the “life- lease of . . .  profits” (104) that the  lawyer counts on as Master 
of Chancery, to the  lawyer’s “predestinated purpose of . . .  life,” (131) to 
the “errands of life” (140) on which the letters at Bartleby’s former place 
of employment, the Dead Letter Office, famously speed “to death” (140). 
Likewise, the most impor tant aspect of Fisher’s report, besides its gener-
ally eugenic thrust, is its insistence that the American population lacks 
“vitality,” that the country’s “vital assets” are “three to five times the physi-
cal” ones that comprise its property (I. Fisher 1908, 1). In Fisher’s view, 
the promotion and preservation of “ human vitality” (2) means prevent-
ing rather than just curing diseases, and it means reducing the “incapaci-
tation” of the workforce in order to conserve “national efficiency” (3). In 
other words, Fisher characterizes the United States as a par tic u lar kind of 
body: lively, propertied in itself, capable, waste- free, and time- conscious. 
Conservation of the individual body is  here recycled, as it is emphati-
cally not with Bartleby, into the conservation of national time. Indeed, 
Fisher went on to influence the insurance industry, through his founding 
of the Life Extension Institute in 1913, promoting the quest for more and 
better quality lifetime. And the insurance industry eventually began to 
require periodic physical examinations for the insured (Rosen 1972, 19), 
the most impor tant means of identifying the chronic illnesses that  were 
asymptomatic in everyday life.
The Sense of Unending 133
What makes Bartleby chronic, then, is less his physical pain or ill-
ness, than his refusal of vitality and especially of its temporal regimes of 
prevention, conservation, and efficiency in the name of a greater good. 
He spurns the system of discipline that manages the story’s other chron-
ics, the alcoholics Turkey and Nippers, whose episodes of dysfunction 
can be timed and worked around so that the law offices remain efficient, 
and who relegate their incapacity to specific parts of the day so that the 
 lawyer’s work can get done. Bartleby, by contrast, conserves, but con-
serves himself, only for himself, or perhaps for nothing at all: part of the 
reason that the  lawyer repudiates him so thoroughly is that when he goes 
back into the office on a Sunday, snoops in Bartleby’s desk, and finds the 
scrivener’s savings knotted in a handkerchief, he realizes that Bartleby 
spends no money, and recalls that Bartleby neither reads, nor drinks 
beer, tea, or coffee, nor goes for walks, but remains mostly motionless 
 behind his screen. In other words, Bartleby refuses the rhythms of work 
and leisure, the mea sures that would restore him to decent health and 
concomitant productivity, preferring not to waste the energy that it takes 
him, first to compare copies, then to copy at all, then to do any work for 
the  lawyer, and fi nally even to eat in the prison, or live at all. If by the 
early twentieth  century Fisher was advocating temperance, nonsmoking, 
exercise, a low- protein diet, and a shorter workday to preserve “national 
efficiency,” even in the mid- nineteenth we find Bartleby both invoking 
and refusing at least some of the habits that would presumably make his 
body a fitter part of the workforce.
Bartleby’s one- man conservation efforts exemplify what Michael Sne-
diker (2015, 19), in an essay on “Bartleby,” Stein, and chronic pain, calls 
“degeneratively tak[ing] up space as though in a parody of functioning.” 
But importantly, Snediker refers  here to words, specifically to the  lawyer’s 
attempt to steer Bartleby from preferring not to do  things to “liking” a 
 career as a clerk, a bartender, a bill collector, or a traveling companion. 
Snediker writes, “The  lawyer’s unsuccessful attempt to force Bartleby’s 
preferences into the deeper (less neutral) shade of liking has every thing to 
do with the  lawyer’s wish to calibrate language (Bartleby’s and his own) 
along an axis of utility. Which words do something, versus which ones 
degeneratively take up space as though in a parody of functioning?” (Sne-
diker 2015, 19, emphases in source).
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Snediker sees “preference,” or “liking,” as this sort of parodically func-
tioning word, but the defective modal verb “would” is even more exem-
plary of this condition, and of Bartleby. Scattered throughout Melville’s 
story, and appearing in almost  every one of his protagonist’s refusals, 
“would” blocks function, and specifically the function of tense, while also 
blocking the fantasy of machinic perpetuation that tenselessness seems to 
promise. If machines and preferences can be calibrated, “would,” and the 
dumbly opaque natu ral substance it conjures up, wood, cannot.
As Snediker shows through his pairing of Melville and Stein,  there 
is no better parody of function than Gertrude Stein’s syntax. Famously 
exemplified by her phrase “Rose is a  rose is a  rose” (Stein [1913] 1922, 187), 
Stein’s words and sentences refuse utility and functionality and, in early 
works such as Three Lives and The Making of Americans, expand to fill up 
paragraphs’ worth of space without advancing anything like an ordinary 
novelistic plot. Bartleby’s status as an arrested copyist, the attenuated eti-
ology and nonfuturity of his actions, his lack of vitality, and his “defec-
tive” tenselessness are aspects not only of Stein’s portrayal of the most 
Bartlebian heroine in American lit er a ture— Melanctha Herbert, of Three 
Lives— but also, as I’ll go on to argue, of Stein’s method of writing, and 
of the sense- method of chronocatachresis that she eventually develops in 
contradistinction to the progressivism of Irving Fisher and his compatri-
ots in public health.
Melanctha, or, Each One as She Would (Not)
The  middle narrative in Gertrude Stein’s novella Three Lives (1909), 
“Melanctha” is the only one of the three stories whose protagonist is un-
modified by an adjective. The other narratives are “The Good Anna” and 
“The Gentle Lena,” their adjectives implying that  there are other Annas 
and Lenas (and that  these par tic u lar ones, through their goodness and 
gentleness respectively, have achieved normative femininity), whereas 
Melanctha remains singular. “Melanctha” is also the only heroine in the 
triptych to be qualified by a modal auxiliary verb— for while the other 
titles stand alone, the subtitle of “Melanctha” is “Each One as She May.” 
With the singular quality of Melanctha and the subtitle, our attention is 
immediately called, as with “Bartleby,” to questions of agency, permission, 
and possibility: “Each One as She  Will” would characterize Melanctha as 
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a creature of intent, but “Each One as She May” suggests a certain sus-
pension of  will or action for possibility and inclination (indeed, “may” is 
in this phrase yet another dynamic modal auxiliary). Fi nally, “Melanctha” 
is the only section of the triptych whose protagonist is black, tying issues 
of the case study, of  will and agency, and of tense to issues of racialization 
in the United States in the early twentieth  century and beyond. Whereas 
“Bartleby, the Scrivener” attaches chronicity to white fragility, repeatedly 
calling the clerk “pale,” “Melanctha” attaches it to the condition of being 
black and poor in Amer i ca. In Stein’s story, that is, we can see debility 
more clearly as an effect and a motor of racialization.
Of the stories in Three Lives, “Melanctha” is the most obviously situ-
ated within the medical discourse of its own historical moment, for it is 
a psychological portrait, a map of desires and frustrations. Furthermore, 
opening with the birth of an African American baby who does not sur-
vive beyond a few days, “Melanctha” hints at its own eugenic context, the 
same one in which Irving Fisher (1908, 101) could advocate that “ ‘steril-
ization’ laws  will reduce the number of marriages of degenerates.” Fi nally, 
the bulk of the story reads like the transcript of a psychoanalytic session, 
for it consists of dialogues between Melanctha and Dr.  Jeff Campbell 
about the proper way to live a life.
Melanctha’s very name is charged with racialized questions of agency 
and pathology as well as sexuality: possibly a compound of the ancient 
Greek melano (black) and anthos (flower), the name also chimes with 
the timid and often ill Reformation theologian Philip Melanchthon, and 
with the words “melancholy” and “malinger,” at once granting Melanc-
tha some psychological complexity and recalling the myth that black 
 people do not feel pain.8 The moniker, then, is a tangle of ste reo type, 
historical pre ce dent, and diagnosis, all of which inflect the genre of the 
case study. But Melanctha the character is not so easy to assay. While she 
could be described as a nymphomaniac, a repressed lesbian, or a person 
suffering from repetition- compulsion, the story avoids attaching nouns 
to her or her condition. Instead of naming her psychological complex, 
the narrator calls Melanctha “complex with desire” (Stein [1909] 2000, 
89). Within the terms of literary analy sis, too, Melanctha cannot be de-
scribed as a heroine whose choices help her triumph over circumstance 
as in the bildungsroman. She also refuses the part of the tragic mulatta, a 
victim whose death from consumption, which Stein portrays as incidental 
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and tacks onto the end of the story, would culminate a plot of decline. 
Melanctha’s many long dialogues with Jeff are an endless duet of mutual 
dissatisfaction, though unlike Jeff, who prizes middle- class respectabil-
ity, Melanctha knows a lot more about what she  doesn’t want than what 
she does want. Directionless, she seems determined only to wander, a 
term that appears fifty- six times in the story. Her connection with psy-
chopathology and sickness, her long complaining arias, and her plotless 
life story all point to a state of tenselessness that  counters the dominant 
temporal patterning of the American (and even African American) turn 
of the  century, about which more below.
Like “Bartleby,” “Melanctha” initially seems to foreground space more 
explic itly than time. If Bartleby is hemmed in by walls, Melanctha is 
cramped by her story’s small number of characters (Melanctha’s parents; 
her friends Rose and Sam; her lovers Jane, Jeff, and Jem); its segregated set-
ting (the fictional Bridgepoint, a middle- class black town); and its poverty 
of physical spaces (the town,  people’s  houses, and architectural features 
such as stairs and rooms are named but never presented pictorially). But 
even more than with “Bartleby,” whose narrator has a huge lexicon to bal-
ance the spareness of its main character’s, what feels most impoverished 
and shrunken about “Melanctha” is the story’s language, in both its nar-
ration and its dialogue. Stein’s sentences, paragraphs, and even plot struc-
ture are so repetitive, with such a  limited vocabulary, that they annoy most 
readers: as an anonymous reviewer on Goodreads has written online, “I 
never want to read the story of Melanctha again in my life. No never no 
more do I want to read Melanctha. Never no more in my life do I want to 
read Melanctha. No never no more again” (“Andy’s review” 2010). That’s 
actually pretty fair parody of what “Melanctha” sounds like. Stein’s mono-
chromatic prose, her long sentences made up of basic, mostly one- or two- 
syllable words, echo Bartleby’s flat repetitions of “I would prefer not to.”
Though Stein is a canonical modernist by now, the surprise of 
 “Melanctha,” and its unbearability, do not lie in modernism’s usual set of 
juxtapositions, neologisms, or fragments, textual imitations of the collage 
aesthetic or the “shock” of synthetic cubism. Rather, “Melanctha” is the 
linguistic version of analytic cubism, whereby a single motion is broken 
down into linked, only slightly differing increments, as in Marcel Duchamp’s 
famous painting Nude Descending a Staircase (No. 2) (figure 4.1).9
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However, in “Melanctha,” what is broken down and made incremen-
tal is not physical motion but thought itself. For example, Jeff describes 
himself as a “very quiet kind of fellow” (Stein [1909] 2000, 113) and then, 
a few pages  later, as a “very slow- minded quiet kind of fellow” (116); 
the narrator refers even  later to his “slow fighting resolution” (132) and 
“slow way” of  doing  things (157); and eventually, Melanctha comes to 
hate what Jeff already recognizes as “the cold slow way he always had to 
feel  things in him” (146). This portrait of Jeff is built up bit by bit, with 
a single word placed at diff er ent syntactic  angles to other words, which 
allows for slight semantic changes not so much in the word “slow” as 
in Jeff ’s personality as a  whole: in the first phrase, his slow- mindedness 
dominates his quietude; in the third it has receded; in the next it has be-
come a kind of strength; by the final one it has become a sign of his lack of 
humanity. This is something like the movement of, for instance, the hip 
in Nude Descending a Staircase, which is seen at vari ous  angles in succes-
sion, all on the same plane.
4.1  Marcel Duchamp, Nude Descending 
a Staircase (No. 2), 1912. © Association 
Marcel Duchamp/adagp, Paris/Artists 
Rights Society (ars), New York 2018.
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Just as analytic cubism features repetition across space, “Melanctha’s” 
prose style performs at the level of the sentence a pos si ble way of living 
that features repetition over time— habit, or constancy. Jeff Campbell, 
like “Bartleby’s”  lawyer and even his other employees, is an impresario 
of this quality: “Dr. Campbell said he wanted to work so that he could 
 understand what troubled  people, and not to just have excitements, and 
he believed you  ought to love your  father and your  mother and to be reg-
ular in all your life, and not to be always wanting new  things and excite-
ments, and to always know where you  were and what you wanted, and 
to always tell every thing just as you meant it” (Stein [1909] 2000, 109).
 Here is the middle- class doctor’s version of the Melvillian  lawyer’s 
proclamation that he suffers nothing of the turbulent lawyerly profession 
to invade his peace. Jeff Campbell wants, above all, to be oriented—to 
know where he is in space (“where you  were”) and what is the point of his 
directionality (“what you wanted”), and to speak intentionally. However 
slow and fixed he seems, then, he is cumulative, like the nude on the stair-
case: on the map, moving  toward something, in control of his language. 
Melanctha’s other heteronormative friend, Rose Johnson, captures this 
way of being succinctly, as “proper conduct” (Stein [1909] 2000, 90).
Melanctha’s actions and thoughts, on the other hand, do not accrue 
into any kind of consistent direction for her life. Jeff accuses Melanc-
tha of transgression, of wanting “new  things” and “excitements” (Stein 
[1909] 2000, 134), and suggests over and over again that being habitual 
and punctual  will grant her happiness. But Melanctha’s plot and the sen-
tences that describe it are as repetitive and incremental as Jeff ’s; it’s just 
that unlike his, they  don’t add up to anything. Ironically, Melanctha’s 
movements  toward events, novelty, and difference become a sign not of 
her brilliance at rupturing the status quo but of her stasis and incom-
pleteness. She can achieve neither departure from nor completion of the 
dominant form of a life. Instead, Melanctha occupies what Lauren Ber-
lant (2011, 4) has called the “impasse”: a stretched- out scene demanding 
of its denizens a “wandering absorptive awareness” and an alert scaveng-
ing for what ever looks like a pos si ble form to inhabit momentarily, if 
only to take a rest.
As the repetition of the word “slow” in the depiction of Jeff, and the 
tooth- grinding difficulty of remaining attentive to such a reiterative story 
suggest, though, what look like prob lems of space— Melanctha’s inability 
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to fit into a narrative genre that would give her life meaning; the histori-
cal situation of Jim Crow; the counterpoint between proper  houses and 
dangerous streets and alleys; the attempts of vari ous men in Melanctha’s 
life to limit her movement— are also, and perhaps predominantly, prob-
lems of time. “Melanctha” highlights the role of what I have elsewhere 
(Freeman 2010, xxii) called chrononormativity in the assessment of lives 
as meaningful and worthy of enhancement. Rather than following a 
culturally sanctioned sequence or even just inclining herself  toward re-
covery, Melanctha represents  those who fill time, wait till it’s time, do 
time, or kill time. The story’s style suggests that Melanctha’s relationship 
to time is simply that she is in it— for life, but not as a (sanctioned) life.
In light of Kyla Schuller’s (2017) discussion of sentimentality, sen-
sation, and whiteness, referenced in the introduction, let us recall that 
 these questions of how bodies are timed and how they adjust or malad-
just to normative temporal schemata are inseparable from the question 
of race. At base, the optimization of some lives and the debilitation of 
 others, described by Foucault ([1978–79] 2008), Puar (2017), Schuller 
(2017), and  others as biopower, is a racializing technique. For not only 
are the bodies that biopower marks as disposable or unworthy of im-
provement often  those of  people of color, but that very pro cess of deg-
radation is used to buttress arguments about the relative strength and 
weakness of racial groups (in this sense, biopolitics is merely a seemingly 
kinder, gentler eugenics). Likewise, no discussion of “Melanctha” could 
be complete without acknowledging its focus on African American life 
and the period of eugenic thinking in which it was written. Despite its 
repre sen ta tion of a psychologically complex African American female 
character, “Melanctha” also contains all kinds of racist imagery: Rose is 
described as “a  simple beast” (Stein [1909] 2000, 87) and “sullen, child-
ish cowardly, black” (87), and, most (in)famously, the narrator speaks 
approvingly of “the warm broad glow of negro sunshine” (87). Yet it is a 
 mistake to assume that the story’s racial dynamics can be contained by a 
description of the ste reo types in which it traffics. Rather,  these dynamics 
seem to be nonrepre sen ta tional, not dependent on the “vis i ble” in the 
way that ste reo types are.
Stein’s portrait of Melanctha as a mixed- race  woman with a chronic 
desiring condition— one that inflects both her speech and her actions or 
lack thereof— inflects the question of race temporally. On the one hand, 
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Melanctha exemplifies both the turgid, unresponsive racial other and the 
impulsive, enthusiastic one that Schuller describes. The slowness and sta-
sis of her story, and the character’s floundering among a  limited set of 
ste reo typed narrative possibilities, or genres, also perform on a syntactic 
and structural level the continual deferral of African American mobility 
and autonomy, perhaps even that population’s “slow death” (see Berlant 
2011), and certainly its status as the target of debilitating laws and poli-
cies. Yet the very terms offered for mobility and autonomy, in the char-
acter of Jeff, are a form of further discipline in and through time: ways 
of capacitating the black body for sanctioned modes of production and 
social reproduction. In short, where racism appears most consistently in 
“Melanctha” is not just in Melanctha’s characterization as too slow or 
too quick but in the two poles of chrononormative possibility for late- 
nineteenth- century African Americans: endless waiting and debilitation, 
or mandatory capacitation according to the march of pro gress.
By tying Melanctha’s way of being in time to her race, Stein reminds 
us that the model of chronicity is shot through with progressive, devel-
opmental, industrial- capitalist, and/or teleological uses of time that have 
moral valence: chronic conditions require management, which in turn 
implies self- discipline, adherence to protocols that are often very much 
tied to Western clock and calendar time, and most importantly, a future- 
directed outlook on the parts of doctors, patients, and populations. 
What we can see in the Fisher report published contemporaneously with 
“Melanctha,” and what continues in con temporary biomedical discourse, 
is that chronicity itself has been arrogated for a biopo liti cal narrative of 
futurity. At the turn of the  century, Fisher wrote, “As it is usually the 
normal healthy man who provides life insurance for his  family, so it  will 
be the normal healthy nation which  will take due care of its resources for 
the benefit of generations yet unborn” (I. Fisher 1908, 13). In his view, 
just as citizens’ bodily self- regulation guaranteed a  future in which  family 
members would not depend on the state, conservation of national re-
sources guaranteed a healthy  future population. In con temporary bio-
medical discourse, the chronic has been paradoxically associated with 
the “modern,” according to a paradigm in which nations industrialize, 
eliminate, or contain acute infectious diseases (polio, smallpox, and ma-
laria), only to find their populations beset with the chronic conditions 
that are associated with toxic chemicals, overconsumption, sedentary oc-
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cupations, and disrupted kinship and community ties (cancer, asthma, 
diabetes, obesity, and depression) (Manderson and Smith- Morris 2010, 5). 
Puar (2017) and Berlant (2011) have described this as a shift from the 
epidemic to the endemic. The “chronic,” then, does not just demand a 
future- oriented outlook but now also proclaims the arrival of a popula-
tion to its own  future, as suggested by Fisher’s description of neurasthenia 
as “on the increase” and prevalent among “persons who take no reason-
able recreation— businessmen among  others” (I. Fisher 1908, 39). We can 
glimpse in Fisher’s diatribes against smoking, overly protein- rich diets, 
and fatigue the way that the medical crises arising via modernity, in turn, 
are referred to a moralizing, individualizing narrative of “lifestyle excess 
and cost,” in a model of what another anthropologist, Dennis Wiedman 
(2010), calls “the chronicities of modernity.”10 And in the end, Fisher as-
cribes  these conditions more to  people of color and the poor, his “de-
generates,” than to the white and wealthy. In the moralizing narrative of 
chronicity, then, peripheral countries and the marginalized populations 
of dominant countries have become the “de cadents” of global capitalism, 
whose overcivilization is leading to their decline.
This recalibration of a historically specific aspect of capitalism into 
a narrative of individual or demographic degeneration in the face of 
modernity—of  those whose supposedly excessive desire and consump-
tion, no  matter how deprived their conditions actually are, mark them 
as modernity’s inevitable waste product—is constitutive of biopolitics. 
In both current biomedical discourse and late nineteenth- century dis-
courses on race, sex, and public health, the solutions to overinvestment in 
the pleasures of consumption, laziness, and anti- or nonfamilial affinities 
have been “parsimony and manual  labor” (Manderson and Smith- Morris 
2010, 6–7) along with marriage. In con temporary global developmen-
tal discourses of epidemiology, this means that overly modernized sub-
jects of “developing” countries are encouraged to return to traditions of 
minimal subsistence and hard work for their own health, and to small 
nuclear families. During the post- Reconstruction and Progressive eras 
and beyond in the United States, this has meant that  women,  people 
of color, and sexual “perverts” have received the benefits of citizenship 
and inclusion insofar as they adhered to the “traditional”  family, with 
its rhythms of production and reproduction, and to thrift and mostly 
manual or ser vice  labor (Gaines 1996). This sense that newly modernized 
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subjects are prone to chronic  mental and physical health prob lems to 
which the solutions are work and traditional  family structures is central 
to “Melanctha”: Dr. Jeff Campbell is a figure for the African American 
population’s official entrance into US modernity, supposedly achieved 
through heterofamilial life events, the tempo of cap i tal ist productivity, 
and a future- directed outlook. Melanctha, on the other hand, marches 
to another drummer.
The Grammar of Chronicity
Melanctha’s relationship to time— her chronicity—is nowhere more ap-
parent than in her story’s grammatical aspect, which is somewhat diff er-
ent than the grammatical ele ments I have discussed thus far, tense and 
modality. Whereas tense refers to the time of an event in the past, pre s-
ent, or  future (as in “did,” “does,” or “ will do”), and modality refers to the 
question of  whether an event is actualized or remains only a possibility 
(as in “would do”), aspect refers to an event’s extension over time— its 
completion, duration, or frequency (Comrie 1976). Tense is the “when” 
of an action; modality is the “if ”; aspect is the “how”: the texture, feel-
ing, or sense of time and timing. The main grammatical aspects are the 
perfective, or completed, and the imperfective, or uncompleted. The 
imperfective aspect denotes a state of sustained  doing or being, rather 
than of moving forward or developing  toward an endpoint. “Melanctha,” 
then, is written in the past tense. But along with the familiar perfective 
aspect (the  simple past of a completed action, as in “she slept”), the bulk 
of “Melanctha” uses one form of the imperfective aspect, the continuous 
imperfect (“was” plus a gerund, or— ing construction, as in “she was sleep-
ing”). In her 1926 lecture “Composition as Explanation” (Stein [1935] 
1993, 498), Stein calls the imperfective the “prolonged pre s ent.” In this 
contradictory piece, she does talk about “beginning again,” that is, the 
recursive mode so celebrated in poststructuralist theories of citational-
ity.11 The mode of beginning again looks more like the second form of the 
imperfective, the habitual imperfective, marked by the phrase “would,” as 
in “she would go to sleep  every night.” But Stein is more concerned with 
how to use repetition to produce continuity, protraction, dilation, and 
extension than with repetition as return.
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In attempting not just to gesture at but to calibrate alternatives to 
chrononormativity—to track other chronicities— Gertrude Stein was, 
like the Shakers I discuss in chapter  1, a practitioner of rhythmanalysis 
(Lefebvre 2004), or the use of rhythm as a methodological tool for mean-
ing making. Stein wondered and wrote about  people’s modes of existing 
with and through time. She understood  people as fundamentally rhyth-
mic, and sought all her life to find the mea sure of  those she encountered, 
as if individuals had par tic u lar frequencies that she could tune into and 
replicate in language. She defined personality itself in terms of “repeating 
being” (Stein [1903] 1993, 62), as a temporal phenomenon in which the 
sameness of self or identity was modified by differences of emphasis, or 
bodily maneuver, not always in ways the person had control over, and not 
always in ways that the person simply surrendered to. To Stein, personal-
ity was a kind of attenuated agency, a way of adjusting  toward or aslant 
from the social. It did not change  things dramatically, nor did it lead a 
person inevitably one way or another. But in meeting up with other fre-
quencies, Stein understood, a personality could shift in small ways, could 
become other to itself. As the literary critic Omri Moses (2014, 135) puts 
it, “Stein would have us witness the way  people go about extending them-
selves in their situation, how they feel themselves modified by the occa-
sion. To announce an attitude over and over again is to feel it change and 
accumulate duration.”
Moses claims that Stein refused to equate a lack of transgressive agency, 
a lack of dominance over time, with demise: “Stein for her part simply 
does not accept the charge that the habits, the temperaments, the forms 
of decency that incline  people  toward their par tic u lar brand of unthink-
ing sociability are dead” (Moses 2014, 117). This is why both Melanctha 
and Jeff are very much alive, however their rhythms clash and what ever 
greater cultural value Jeff ’s life might be accorded. Yet the “unthinking 
sociability” to which one might attribute both Jeff ’s accretive regularity 
and Melanctha’s wanderings is  counter to the doctrines of  will and choice 
that or ga nize the  lawyer’s thinking about Bartleby, and to the premium 
on transgression and rupture that con temporary critical theory has put on 
its objects of analy sis. “Melanctha” proffers a way of thinking about the 
chronic, of imagining its protagonist and its own syntax’s protracted and 
repetitive qualities as a mode of self- stylization and other- relationality: a 
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method of knowing and  doing, and of connecting with  others, through a 
sense of dilated and time- ish being.
Importantly, if it is not agential this mode of being is not passive 
 either; indeed, it belies the passive/active dichotomy. It is captured in 
“Melanctha” by a technique that Stein calls “insistence” (Stein [1934] 
1985 171), a word that she uses to describe time in terms of “distribution 
and equilibration” (Stein [1935] 1993, 502). The idea of distribution and 
equilibration emphasizes a certain constancy, marked by changes in ap-
portionment, circulation, and balance, rather than by movement forward 
or backward or by the incremental pro gress of repetition. And indeed, 
Stein claims that “insistence” is actually distinct from repetition—it bears 
on the continuous imperfective aspect rather than the habitual one. As 
Stein declared  later in her lecture “Portraits and Repetition,” “If a  thing 
is  really existing  there can be no repetition. . . .  Then we have insistence 
insistence that in its emphasis can never be repeating” (Stein [1934] 1985, 
171; emphasis mine). This is repetition as intensification, rather than as 
“working through,” in the Freudian model, or as the preamble to the 
event of “difference,” in the Butlerian model that has dominated queer 
theory for the last twenty- five years (see Freud [1914] 1950 and Butler 
[1990] 2006). As the Stein critic Ulla Dydo claims, Stein’s “insistence” is 
not only about duration or per sis tence but also about rethinking energy 
and movement: “ ‘Insistence,’ ” Dydo writes, “refers to forms of repetition 
that create concentrated, mounting intensity rather than extended, di-
luted repetitiousness” (Dydo 2008, 16; emphasis mine). Insistence seems 
to be a mode of what Berlant (2011, 95) calls “lateral agency,” and Kathryn 
Bond Stockton (2009, 27) calls “fattening”— a thickening or extensive 
movement in directions other than forward or backward,  whether cen-
tripetal or centrifugal. It is a kind of being the same, but more so, and not 
for or  toward anything in par tic u lar.
On the face of it, it may seem that Stein’s prolonged pre sent just looks 
like stasis or eternal time. But it is actually not temporally homogeneous 
in the way that eternal time is: it differs from itself. A look at “Melanc-
tha’s” adverbs of time demonstrates how inadequate the term “pre sent” 
is for what Stein is up to  here. For instance,  there are 633 instances of 
the adverb “now” in “Melanctha,” but they most often signal a shift in 
status rather than the immediate pre sent per se; that is, they appear 
 interchangeably with but also replace the word “then” (which appears only 
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275 times), in clauses such as “Now Melanctha would go out” rather than 
“Melanctha wanted the book now.” In other words, oddly enough, in 
“Melanctha” “now” signals a point in past time rather than in the pre sent. 
 There are also 693 instances of the word “always,” most often attached 
to a past- tense verb, as in “Melanctha always went out,” which signals 
the imperfective by blurring pre sent and past. In “Melanctha,” what is 
“continuous” and “prolonged” is as likely to be the past as the pre sent, 
and the two cannot be fully distinguished.  Here is where we can see the 
temporal heterogeneity within the continuities Stein seemed to privilege. 
What ever “insistence” is, it is neither a return of the same nor a ruptural 
difference from the historically or temporally prior.
Moses (2014, 134) traces Stein’s interest in theorizing the continuous, 
the prolonged, and the insistent to her understanding, following William 
James, of habit itself as a temporal mixture: “[Habit] allows one to di-
gest and absorb the overwhelming data of experience by matching the 
images one takes in with memories of images from the past. . . .  To the 
degree that one’s perceptions are overwhelmed by habit, new experiences 
are assimilated into ready- made responses. . . . [But i]f one subtracts from 
the perception of an object the habit that allows the object to be recog-
nized and therefore positioned in a context, one is left only with fugi-
tive sensations and potentialities that overwhelm the body’s capacity to 
act.” In other words, habit is what inclines us  toward a self- preserving 
automaticity, insofar as it calibrates new experiences in relation to a past 
without subsuming them to that past. It is neither absolute sameness nor 
complete difference. “Insistence,” though, is something like the pressure 
or intensification of habit, as if habit lost its periodicity. It is about the re-
fusal of something regular to go away, as with Bartleby, who was “always 
 there” in the law office.
And this, more than anything, is what chronic conditions do. The an-
thropologist Angela Garcia (2010) saw a version of this intensification 
of ongoingness in her mid-1990s fieldwork with heroin addicts along 
the Rio Grande, detailed in her beautiful book The Pastoral Clinic: her 
subjects’ repetitive be hav iors, frequent references to long- gone events, 
and stories that went nowhere worked on a princi ple of what she calls 
“intensification” rather than resolution or letting go. The  people with 
whom she worked told stories to reexperience personal pain and to con-
nect it to larger sociopo liti cal events, but not to achieve closure or release 
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themselves from torment. “Chronics,” then— addicts, wanderers, recalci-
trants, malingerers— are  people whose queerness inheres in their relation 
to time, not as forward- or backward- moving but as ebbing and flowing 
in varying degrees of intensity and insistence, compression and dilation, 
irreducible to the habits that consolidate identity.
What distinguishes insistence from repetition, Stein argues, is that in 
insistence  every linguistic recurrence contains not necessarily diff er ent 
words or even diff er ent syntactical positions, but a diff er ent emphasis. 
 Here we can return to her distinction between repetition and insistence 
in “Portraits and Repetition”: “If a  thing is  really existing  there can be no 
repetition. . . .  Then we have insistence insistence that in its emphasis can 
never be repeating  because insistence is alive and if it is alive it is never 
saying anything in the same way  because emphasis can never be the same 
not even when it is most the same that is when it has been taught” (Stein 
[1934] 1985, 171; emphasis mine).
To Stein, emphasis is the sign of an “aliveness” that makes pure rep-
etition impossible, but then again does not require discontinuity to be 
meaningful. It also indexes a certain commitment to life, even to vitality 
or animacy, but not the sort associated with optimizing or maximizing 
that life. “Bartleby” too actually has a moment of emphasizing emphasis: 
“ ‘I would prefer not to quit you,’ [Bartleby] replied,  gently emphasizing 
the not” (Melville [1853] 1979, 129).  Here, insistence is  doing the work 
that rearrangement, addition, subtraction, or accretion would other wise 
do, binding Bartleby to what prevents his thriving, to his negativity, but 
in a paradoxical assertion of liveliness, to being still  there, still,  there.12
What exactly is emphasis, then, and how does it relate to the kind of 
chronicity, the “timeishness” that I am suggesting may be a product of 
biopower but also offers some leverage in relation to it? At a basic level, 
as Melville’s italicized not expresses, emphasis is stress. When speaking 
we emphasize through gestures (think of pounding the  table), stances 
or facial expressions (think of standing up to make a point or scowl-
ing while speaking a par tic u lar word), or changes in tone, volume, or 
tempo (think of shifting to a stern tone, speaking more loudly, or slowing 
down). Thus emphasis is at base a bodily  matter—it involves lips, tongue, 
teeth, lungs, glottis, larynx, hands, face, bodily stance, and so on. One 
way of understanding emphasis might be to think of it as a broadened 
version of “accent.” In Time Binds (Freeman 2010, 29), I argue that a 
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certain queer corporeal accent, an out- of- kilter bodily tempo and set of 
daily rhythms marked by both socioeconomic and sexual alterity, trou-
bles the chrononormativity of domestic life. This is accent as rhythmic 
bodily hexis, irreducible to “tone,” “attitude,” or even some generic “dif-
ference.” In the passage above from “Portraits and Repetition,” Stein also 
says that emphasis seems most the same when it is taught. This formula-
tion sounds very much like Bourdieu’s (1977, 78) concept of habitus: “the 
durably installed generative princi ple of regulated improvisations” that 
shape legible personhood in a given culture. And it sounds like Lefebvre’s 
(2004, 41–45) understanding of rhythm as the modality in which bodies 
concretely live out social time (his shorthand for this pro cess by which 
bodies are trained into and by time is “dressage”). Emphasis, then, is a 
corporeal way of playing on or with regularity, a mode of literally making 
“do” with what one already is. And as I  shall argue below, it can be a way 
of living aslant to the chrononormativity of clinical life, as well as to the 
larger global discourse of the chronic, and to biopower itself.
With the Emphasis on Race
Emphasis has a relationship to con temporary African American culture 
and to the working- class Baltimore communities in which Stein lived 
and worked while at the Johns Hopkins School of Medicine in the late 
1890s. By the time Stein was writing “Melanctha,” “chronic” had become 
a noun, denoting someone whose suffering was without end, with the 
negative implication of malingering (the Oxford En glish Dictionary cites 
a magazine article from 1886 with the sentence, “We question  whether 
the late donor intended his sanatorium to be filled with chronics”). But 
as I remarked  earlier in this chapter, by the 1860s the term had taken 
on a slangy quality and began to describe the continuation of anything 
objectionable— the Oxford En glish Dictionary’s examples include chronic 
revolution, horror, and doubt— and then the state of simply being objec-
tionable, as in, again from the oed, “The weather is chronic” and “He 
puts a dash of whisky into the paraldehyde to disguise the taste, which is 
a chronic one, I can tell you.”13 By 1992, when the rap artist Dr. Dre issued 
his solo  album The Chronic, this adjectival meaning of severity and the 
noun form of “chronic” had come together to name a particularly potent 
breed of marijuana whose effects are stronger and last longer than ordinary 
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weed.14 In the Urban Dictionary Online, definitions of “the chronic” tie 
high- grade marijuana to intensity, severity, or shock: one writer offers the 
definition “in a very acute or intense state of being”; another describes 
it as “anything sick, excellent, extreme, severe or funny”; still another de-
fines it as “something shocking but in a good way.”15 “The chronic,” then, 
is not only about grim endurance: paradoxically,  here the chronic is also 
the pleas ur ably acute. It resonates with the difference that Stein saw be-
tween “repetition” and “insistence” and that she captured with the term 
“emphasis”: it names a connection to the visceral and the sensory, shifts 
in magnitude or stress rather than in subjectivity or action. And this has 
every thing to do with Melanctha’s ability to seize time beyond biopolitics.
The chronic, in the terms of con temporary African American culture 
and nineteenth- century medical discourse alike, is about a continued 
bodily state— but in the former, not one marked solely by exhaustion 
or desiccation. Rather, the chronic body signaled by Dr. Dre is open 
to the severe, and in slowing down the pre sent, can find physical plea-
sure or new capacity without acceding to the demand for transformative 
agency. The chronic, with a black accent, is what Berlant (2011, 137) calls 
“a countertemporality.” “Inhabiting such dense moments of sensuality” as 
eating, fucking dangerously, or toking up, she writes, “stops time, makes 
time, and saturates the lived,  imagined, and not- yet- imagined world.” 
One might add to this list of activities and their effects Bartleby the 
 scrivener’s “dead- wall reveries” (Melville [1853] 1979, 121), which Branka 
Arsić (2007, 74) suggests may be a result of opiate use. Another way 
of thinking about countertemporality might be this: the form of time 
marked by the chronic deregulates chrononormativity to introduce a gap 
that is not necessarily a life- changing event— but is not entirely meaning-
less  either. As Puar (2017, 19) describes affect in general, the chronic is 
“the body’s hopeful opening, a speculative opening not wedded to the di-
alectic of hope and hopelessness but rather a porous affirmation of what 
could or might be.” Perhaps the chronic  isn’t even as tuned to the  future 
as Berlant and Puar might have it. Perhaps, in its defective chronicity, the 
chronic is as much a “would not” as a “would.”
This sense of the chronic as a commitment to ongoing intensity, to 
the emphasis that keeps one alive if not precisely  going anywhere amid 
constraining conditions, brings us to the crux of “Melanctha.” The story 
offers up a model of chronicity as a time- ish, body- based extension of 
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relations to  others, an “ethics” that is not so much a po liti cal movement 
as a stylized mode of participation with and in the existing world, a 
sense- method of being with it and with  others. Melanctha herself is con-
sistently described as a “feeling” person, and “feeling” is one of the story’s 
recurrent words (“feel” or “feeling” appears 216 times, crescendoing in 
the story’s third quintile and diminishing to almost nothing in the final 
quintile). The good doctor wants Melanctha to “feel right” by acquiesc-
ing to normative schedules for marrying, reproducing, and living daily 
domestic life. Melanctha wants to “feel” even if it’s not right, even if it 
eschews  these  things and keeps her in a constant state of what the novel 
calls “excitement” and I am calling the chronic. If Melanctha is not pre-
cisely a drug user, she is an intensity junkie, but that’s an importantly tem-
poral state. She needs and demands the “excitement” that is emphasis, 
that is, the carnal experiences that refuse to guarantee the  future through 
perfect rhythmic regulation and absolute temporal sameness on the one 
hand, or action- oriented transgression on the other. In her pursuit of sex-
ual and other pleasures, Melanctha might be the sensory antipode of the 
anhedonic Bartleby, but in her refusal  either to accede to the discipline of 
habit or to start a revolution, she is his temporal twin.
If Bartleby refuses to extend the  lawyers’ briefs into the  future by copy-
ing them, Melanctha refuses to extend the pre sent into the past by “re-
membering.” Dr. Campbell constantly accuses her of not “remembering 
right” what he has done for her and how much he loves her, as if her 
waywardness  were subject to a Freudian narrative cure of excavating the 
past. She, in turn, accuses him of “remembering” rather than experienc-
ing  things. In other words, Jeff ’s “feeling right” is a  matter of “remember-
ing right,” of retroactively sequencing events in relation to a preexisting 
narrative, in the way that the  lawyer also wishes he could do for Bartleby. 
Melanctha says to Jeff, “You remember right,  because you  don’t remem-
ber nothing till you get home with your thinking every thing all over, but 
I certainly  don’t think much ever of that kind of way of remembering 
right, Jeff Campbell. I certainly do call it remembering right Jeff Camp-
bell, to remember right just when it happens to you, so you have a right 
kind of feeling” (Stein [1909] 2000, 151).
While Dr.  Campbell strives to remember events “right,” as in 
correctly— insofar as they reflect an ordering scheme that he understands 
as universal— Melanctha emphasizes “right just when it happens to you.” 
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The word “right” turns from adjective to adverb, from moral to tempo-
ral valence, from conformity with proper conduct to a mea sure of im-
mediacy. The phrase “to remember right just when it happens to you” 
suggests something other than forgetting or living in a fictively selfsame 
pre sent. It is a way of not occupying the temporalities of recollection, 
memorial, anticipation, or hope. It is a way of encountering the event in 
time, other wise.
Stein correlated this sense of acuteness and immediacy, interestingly, 
to forgetting, just as a toke of the right weed or a shot of heroin  will 
provide both a change in the pre sent and an escape from the past. Stein 
held out that not remembering, or emptying out the historical, had a 
tonic effect, declaring in “Portraits and Repetition” (Stein [1934] 1985, 
179–80) that “that is the trou ble with a  great many so called intelligent 
 people they mix up remembering with talking and listening, and as a re-
sult they have theories about anything, but as remembering is repetition 
and confusion, and being existing that is listening and talking is action 
and not repetition intelligent  people although they talk as if they knew 
something are  really confusing,  because they are so to speak keeping two 
times  going at once.”
Dr. Campbell’s prob lem is that he  doesn’t  really listen,  because he is 
too busy gauging his own be hav ior in terms of the regulative norms he 
“remembers” or has been taught.  Because he is constantly trying to re-
member an idealized past, to get back to normal, he lives in a damag-
ing double- time, always trying to wrench the pre sent into the beat of the 
past. Melanctha’s temporality, by contrast,  doesn’t erase the past— her ac-
tions occur, remember, in the past imperfective— but  isn’t dictated by it 
 either. Indeed, the talking and (not always) listening, the dialogics that 
structure the story itself, are a way of making and experiencing shifts in 
emphasis that crack open the pre sent.
Melanctha’s emptying out of memory might fruitfully be compared 
to the experiments in automatic writing that Stein undertook with fel-
low student Leon Solomons at the Harvard Psychological Laboratory 
while she was an undergraduate at Radcliffe. In her single- authored piece 
“Cultivated Motor Automatism” (Stein 1898), Stein aimed to correlate 
character types with the propensity for automatic action. She instigated 
this automatic action in her subjects by propping their dominant arm 
onto a board hung from the ceiling, and putting a pencil into their hand, 
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which hung over the edge of the board and could doodle on a piece of 
paper below. The experimenter could surreptitiously control the swing-
ing of the board and thus introduce a par tic u lar motion of the arm and 
a corresponding doodle. Stein’s interest lay in  whether or not the subject 
resisted being guided into new motions by manipulations of the board. 
Though her description of the  human types and their lesser or greater 
re sis tance to automaticity strike con temporary readers as comical, she 
correlated their re sis tance with the fixity of their attention on the situa-
tion of the experiment itself:  those who could not forget that they  were 
in a scientific experiment tended to return to old movements rather than 
adapting new ones, whereas “hysterics,” as she called them, adapted beau-
tifully to new movements  because they could not attend to the experimen-
tal situation at all: “It is [the hysteric’s] anaesthesia which makes automatism 
pos si ble” (305).  Here, resonant with Jeff Campbell’s situation, a lack of 
feeling (anaesthesia) correlates to being automated.
But in the experiments Stein wrote up with Solomons, the two re-
searchers honed in on “consciousness without memory” (Solomons and 
Stein 1896, 501), the phenomenon the authors correlated to “men com-
pletely undressing without knowing it” (492), in which the subjects  were 
aware of having accomplished something like reading or writing but had 
no memory of actually  doing it. The investigators  were particularly in-
vested in this distracted, rhythmic state of being  because it allowed for 
the cultivation of new motor habits. Solomons and Stein actually sug-
gested that a chronic condition could provide just such new possibili-
ties: “Imagine an arm in the condition of ‘chronic rest’ of an hysterical 
paralysis. Is it not altogether likely that it often acquires  great sensitive-
ness from this, so that stimuli reaching it along the automatic path, not 
strong enough to produce a reaction in a normally exercised arm, may yet 
produce a reaction in a hyperaesthetic arm?” (Solomons and Stein 1896, 
503).  Here, hysteria correlates with an excess of feeling, a hyperaesthesia. 
Lacking the muscle memory of the “normally exercised” arm, the chronic 
arm can adapt to new movements  because it feels sensations other wise 
imperceptible, right when they happen to it, just as Melanctha the chronic, 
lacking the proper form of habituated memory that Jeff exemplifies, feels 
 things right when they happen to her.
This remembering right when  things happen also gives us another way 
into the temporal politics of race in the story. The Stein critic Claudia 
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Franken (2000, 122) writes that “[a]s a literary form, insistence aims for 
a certain in de pen dence in the  mental relation to an object of attention. 
Repetends and extensive parallelisms [have] been used in religious language. 
Suggestive of a time that goes on and on forever, religious ‘insistence’ may 
satisfy a desire to forget and provide a rise or standstill of feelings.” This 
simultaneous forgetting and rise of “feeling” also seems to me to be a way 
to conceptualize racial belonging in general. For example, per for mance 
theorist José Esteban Muñoz (2000) describes racial belonging as “feeling 
brown” a phrase that disrupts the legalistic and lexical sense of race as an 
identity and redescribes it as a sensory apparatus, something durable and 
installed but not fully biological, something of the body but not reducible 
to it, something ongoing that one nevertheless feels at varying states of in-
tensity, something that indexes not just the misery of oppression but also 
the joy of connection with  others.
While I  can’t credit Stein with a coherent critical theory of race and 
racialization, I do think that her using black characters to explore the 
relationship between repetition and memory is impor tant. Clearly, her 
sense of what black cultural continuity might mean was not reproduc-
tive: nobody in “Melanctha” has a child that lives, and in this the story 
flirts dangerously with a eugenic mindset. Yet I think it also goes be-
yond the “repetition with a difference” or “beginning again” that James 
Snead (2003), Fred Moten (2003), and other African American critics 
have recognized in cultural forms such as jazz and rap. It has some-
thing to do with the kind of accrual or per sis tence that can counteract 
false memories of a time “before” a supposed social or physiological 
breakdown, or can contest demands that black  people give up par tic-
u lar activities in the name of personal uplift, racial solidarity, or na-
tional vitality. In other words, insistence and emphasis, or what I am 
calling the chronic, are forms of duration in which past and pre sent 
admix, but not in which the past or the  future block access to plea sure: 
rather, the chronic is a mode of continuity without sacrifice. And as with 
Muñoz’s formulation, Melanctha’s insistence on “feeling” is not just 
the presentism that is often described as the fatal flaw of racialized and 
class- marked cultures (as in the idea that black and/or poor  people buy 
 things for immediate gratification, such as cars). Rather, Steinian insis-
tence, and Melanctha’s insistence in particular— what I am calling their 
chronic characteristics— have an impor tant relationship to the politics 
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of memory, as Franken’s words suggest: “forgetting” the past in order to 
allow the “rise of feelings” or new intensities may be key to inhabiting 
the now other wise.
Stein herself correlated automatic writing and its evacuation of the past 
with religious ecstasy, writing in her scientific work that “I have found a 
number of instances of [automatic writing] which reminded me of the 
rapid and incessant movement seen in revival meetings, where  people  under 
the domination of religious frenzy swing their arms and beat their breasts 
in rhythmic time” (Stein 1898, 300–301). And indeed, Franken (2000, 
122) isolates a key moment of insistence in Gertrude Stein’s play Saints and 
Singing, a moment saturated with religious imagery that captures the work 
of insistence, emphasis, and chronicity that I have been tracking:
Saints and singing do not come to this as an ending. Saints and sing-
ing. Read me by repetition. Saints and singing and a mission and 
an addition.
Saints and singing and the petition. The petition for a repetition.
Saints and singing and their singing.
Saints and singing and winning and.
Do not repeat yourself. (Stein [c. 1922] 1993, 399)
First, in this passage we can see Stein enjoining us against the terminal: 
though saints and singing may conjure up images of the pearly gates and 
the end of time, Stein asks us not to stop  there. Then, too,  there is some-
thing more  here than repetition with a difference, even “repetition” “and 
an addition.”  There is song, reminding us that the emphatic part of insis-
tence lies in what the body can do, what it must do, to carry on.  There 
is a mission, but not the kind of missionary work that attends to saving 
souls or curing bodies,  because  there is also the sound of “omission,” or 
what that model cannot see or hear.  There is a petition within repeti-
tion, a kind of recurring demand or the demand that lies in recurrence, 
even recurrence without any transformative difference. This “petition” is 
a way of asking that equivocates between mission and omission, between 
 doing and not  doing, whose most salient characteristic is its constancy. 
As Franken (2000, 122) writes, “Yet another formulation of the concept 
of ‘insistence’ contrasts with ‘repeating’ . . .  insistence now appears as an 
addition, an act of asking or demanding something from life.” Yet in Stein, 
that dem/and is just an “and,” not an end.
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Fi nally, Stein enjoins us, “Do not repeat yourself,” which of course 
points to the deadening possibility that what we  will pass on down is our 
habituated “selves,” our identities. But her call to us not to “repeat” but to 
read her by repetition suggests that she wishes for a constant reader, a way 
of being ongoing with us, of talking and listening without remembering 
but without abandoning continuity for the safe blank slate of rupture. In-
sistence, endurance, keeping on, chronicity as timeishness without obvi-
ous historical or futural directionality, without even recognizable agency, 
are forms of engagement with the times, which is to say, they are ways of 
extracting, protracting, dilating, or other wise intensifying everyday ex-
istence without promising to be any par tic u lar kind of subject in return. 
As the federal government and industry, following the cues of Fisher and 
other conservationists, moved in the early twentieth  century to regulate 
the production, conservation, and expenditure of  human energy, Stein’s 
(and Melanctha’s) mode of chronicity, we might say, chucked all that.
Queerer Chronicities, American Religions
I’d like to call Bartleby’s and Stein’s modes of defective, imperfect, queer 
chronicity chronocatachresis. Catachresis is a literary term, describing the 
misuse of a word— not just in the sense of making a  mistake but also in 
the sense of purposefully stretching the meaning or function of a word 
beyond its denotative or even commonsensically meta phoric ones. In 
“The Woodchuck Song” of my epigraph, the woodchuck “chucking” 
wood is one example of catachresis: the noun “woodchuck” is possibly 
derived from the Cree “wuchak,” but breaking the syllables apart pro-
duces the back- formation “to chuck,” a sonic meta phor for chopping 
wood. “Chuck” originally meant to cluck, to throw, or to tickle  gently 
 under the chin, but not actually to chop; hence the stretching of the 
term  toward wood chopping is catachrestic. In the song, the “chucking” 
then does what it says, refracting backward on the wood to produce the 
cutting or splitting of the modal verb “would” into other modal verbs, 
“could” and “should.”
 There is a vaguely sexual politics to catachresis; the root word kata 
means “down,” with the sense of a perversion. And in fact, Foucault 
(1990b, 53) defines chresis, or use, in terms of sexual plea sure: the way 
a  human being regulated his or her pleasures in terms of conduct, regi-
The Sense of Unending 155
men, proportion, and timing.16 Chronocatachresis, then, would name an 
individual’s “perverse” deregulation of temporality— his or her untimeli-
ness in terms of the dominant regimes of time I have elsewhere called 
chrononormativity and  here fleshed out in historical terms by way of the 
history of  human resource management and the movement for racial 
uplift. Chronocatachresis names a way of misusing, or even misunder-
standing, the princi ples of control over a condition, the management of 
wayward affects, and the discipline of self- production. Bartleby achieves 
this misuse by preferring not to quit, not to leave, not to work or eat or 
do anything at all but be “always  there” (Melville [1853] 1979, 118; empha-
sis in source), a chronic condition blighting the  lawyer’s other wise safe 
and snug existence and interrupting the rhythms of his days. Melanctha 
achieves it by wandering away from both the interminable wait for black 
liberation and the drumbeat of racial uplift, and by feeling her feelings 
right when they happen to her.
Interestingly, though, “Melanctha’s” Jeff Campbell too has his moment 
of chronocatachresis, his queerest moment of chronicity. In a rare mo-
ment of giving Melanctha credit for her own way of being in the world, 
Jeff declares, “I got a new feeling now, you been teaching to me, just like 
I told you once, just like a new religion to me, and I see perhaps what 
 really loving is like, like  really having every thing together, new  things, 
 little pieces all diff er ent, like I always before been thinking was bad to be 
having, all go together like, to make one good big feeling” (Stein [1909] 
2000, 136; emphasis mine).
“Having every thing together” is Jeff ’s version of “feeling right when it 
happens to you,” a scheme that disrupts the orderly arrangement of time 
into the sequence of past, pre sent, and  future. And Jeff connects it to reli-
gion. It’s hard to know what denomination Jeff is indexing  here— prob ably 
none in par tic u lar, though the narrator tells us that he has been “raised 
religious by his  people” (Stein [1909] 2000, 105). Certainly, what Jeff de-
scribes is not the internalization of a catechism, or the completion of a 
ritual that installs him into a religious order. It is some kind of sudden 
indwelling, some moment of what the Baptist tradition, especially in its 
African American iterations, has called “catching the spirit.”17 And Melanc-
tha too has felt this. Early on in “Melanctha,” Stein writes that “Melanctha 
Herbert always loved too hard and much too often. She was always full 
with mystery and subtle movements and denials and vague distrusts and 
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complicated disillusions. Then Melanctha would be sudden and impul-
sive and unbounded in some faith” (91). This last phrase, “unbounded in 
some faith,” seems key to understanding Jeff ’s religious feeling as well: like 
marijuana, faith unbinds the body’s tempo, and that unbinding produces 
a feeling of connection with another.
 Here, then, is a sensory regime that does not accede fully to  either 
discourse, as it is primarily affective, or biopolitics, as its object is un-
bound from compulsory forms of sociability rather than bound to them. 
 Importantly,  there is no or ga nized church involved in Jeff ’s religious feel-
ing or Melanctha’s unbounded faith, not even a black one. The narra-
tor tells us that “[r]eligion ha[s] never interested Jeff very much” (Stein 
[1909] 2000, 105), so he does not get his feeling from even the reverse 
discourse of black Chris tian ity. Nor is “religion” a category of person-
hood that Jeff or Melanctha can occupy, like that of “the colored  people” 
that indexes their racial belonging— neither one claims to be a Christian, 
for example. Thus, in this “good big feeling” that Jeff can get when he 
tunes himself to Melanctha, and in Melanctha’s being “unbound in some 
faith,”  there is something that eludes total capture by biopolitics, by the 
discourse of racial uplift, by theological doctrine, and by even the tempo-
ral regularity of ritual. This “feeling” is neither past- nor future- oriented: 
only when Jeff is with Melanctha in this par tic u lar, “religious” way can 
he let go of his sense of being bound by both tradition (“remembering 
right,” as Melanctha puts it) and the idea of the collective  future of African 
Americans, and only when Melanctha finds her par tic u lar form of faith 
can she loosen herself from the strictures of respectability.18
This religious feeling reflects the influence of William James on Stein. 
James, in Va ri e ties of Religious Feeling, was interested not in the institu-
tionalized church, or the clergy and its hierarchies, or theology, but in 
religion as affect: “Religion . . .  shall mean for us the feelings, acts, and ex-
periences of individual men in their solitude so far as they apprehend them-
selves to stand in relation to what ever they may consider the divine” ( James 
[1901–2] 1987, 36; emphasis in source). In  these lectures, James aimed to 
capture what he called, invoking Kant, the “sense- content” of religion 
(56), which he fleetingly correlated with substance use in the way that the 
con temporary term the “chronic” also does: “Sobriety diminishes, dis-
criminates, and says no; drunkenness expands, unites, and says yes. It is 
in fact the  great exciter of the Yes function in man” (348). In other words, 
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the affective state indexed by and inculcated in religion involves a radical 
loss of self and expansion of relationality. Stein, though, was less concerned 
with the relation between the  human and the divine. Instead, she under-
stood religious feeling as a sense- method through which  humans could 
stand in diff er ent relation to one another. Thus when Jeff has “religion,” 
he has something besides his own regimen and Melanctha’s excitements 
alike, and the feeling makes pos si ble, at least momentarily, a collabora-
tion or being- together of two: “They sat in the bright fields and they  were 
happy, they wandered in the woods and they  were happy. Jeff always loved 
in this way to wander. Jeff always loved to watch every thing as it was grow-
ing, and he loved all the colors in the trees and on the ground, and the 
 little, new, bright colored bugs he found in the moist ground and in the 
grass he loved to lie on and in which he was always so busy searching. 
Jeff loved every thing that moved and that was still, and that had color, 
and beauty, and real being” (Stein [1909] 2000, 130). This passage evokes 
James’s description of saintliness as “the outlines of the confining selfhood 
melt[ing] down” ( James [1901–2] 1987, 250). Melanctha and Jeff ’s reli-
gion,  here channeling some of transcendentalism in its focus on nature, 
fosters and depends on the pleasures of feeling together in rhythmic time 
as well as unbounded space: the repetitions of “they” and “Jeff,” as well as 
the paratactic “ands,” strung like beads on a rosary, unify both the passage 
and the characters. Oddly,  here the hyperregulation of time is chronocata-
crestic, for the repetends take Melanctha and Jeff out of the times that 
seem to predestine them for failure (Melanctha) or conventional success 
( Jeff ), and turn them  toward the plea sure of one another.
“Melanctha,” then, brings us full circle back to the Shakers and to the 
role of Protestant ecstatic religion in American culture: it may not be ac-
cidental  after all that its protagonist’s name echoes that of the reformer 
Philip Melanchthon, colleague of Martin Luther. But the reforms this 
story points to are diff er ent from  those nailed to the church doors of 
Wittenberg. What threatens existing  orders and allows for new solidari-
ties in both “Melanctha” and Shaker worship is not doctrine, faith, or 
belief so much as the way that tuning bodies to one another’s frequen-
cies, especially temporal ones, allows for the expansion of their bound-
aries and their merging into one another. As my following, final chapter 
shows, this is a feature of religion writ large, the feature that allows it to 
function against the very canons that purportedly authorize it.
Ecstatic religion, or the ritualized movement that in-
tends to open bodies up to other bodies and to the 
spirit(s), might be counterposed to another religious ac-
tivity, Catholicism’s verbal confession by the individual 
to a single priest. In the latter, sinful thoughts and acts 
are transformed into spoken words of contrition, and 
then dissolved into priestly statements of absolution. 
Ecstatic religion emanates from active bodies coming to-
gether in public or semipublic spaces; the Catholic con-
fession emanates from the still body in the  silent booth 
in the recesses of the church. Ecstatic religion infuses the 
body with affect and fuses it to multiple other bodies; 
confession intends to empty the body of desire and its 
effects. Yet Foucault (1990a, 58–63) reminds us that the 
Catholic confession actually saturated the body with de-
sire; its interrogative tendency to draw out the subtlest 
indications of prohibited arousal led to an expansion of 
language about sex, and eventually, through sexology 
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Entirely woven through with ele ments that are imaginary, erotic,  
effective, corporal, sensual, and so on, [the church] is superb!
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and psy chol ogy, to the bundling of lust, fantasy, acts, and object- choice 
into a kind of person, the homosexual. It is difficult, then, to imagine the 
regime of modern Western sexuality without the confession.
The work of Americanist scholars such as Peter Coviello (2013), 
John Mac Kilgore (2016), and Molly McGarry (2012) has clarified the 
ways that ecstatically embodied belief practices in the United States— 
nondominant religions from Native American spirituality to Mormon-
ism to the “science” of spiritualism— refuse to accede to the techniques 
whereby physical acts become sexual identities through the medium of 
speech.1 But what if instead of only turning to ecstatic Protestant reli-
gions to think beyond scientia sexualis, we center other Catholic rites, 
and ask  toward what forms of eroticism and relationality they extend? 
Having suggested in my first chapter that Shaker dance led to new modes 
of engroupment, including racialization as what some scholars (see Fine 
et  al. 1997) have called “off white,” and having elaborated, across the 
period between the late eigh teenth  century and the fin de siècle, some 
sense- methods attendant to whiteness, to enslavement and its escape, 
to variously racialized and sexualized historical methods, and to a form 
of chronicity at once black and queer, in the previous chapter I ended 
up back at ecstatic religion with “Melanctha.” This suggests to me that 
the long nineteenth  century’s extralinguistic, sensory modes of belong-
ing and becoming, of which ecstatic religion might be the most extreme 
example, forge relationalities that do not begin or end with race, gender, 
or, in par tic u lar, sexuality. Yet sitting between the dissident Protestant 
sects I have discussed or alluded to and a mainline Protestantism that 
effectively became the secular worldview in post- Puritan Amer i ca is 
 Catholicism, always a stigmatized religion in the United States. Catholi-
cism accrued stigmatized gendered, racialized, and sexualized meanings 
 here  because of its association first with the French, Spanish, and An-
glican North American colonizers and their indigenous converts against 
whom Puritan En glish settlers defined themselves, then with immigrants 
and Mexicans from the 1840s onward, and then with antidemo cratic, 
even subversive, “foreign” entanglements abroad during the Progressive 
era that preceded Nightwood, the subject of this chapter.2 Central to anti- 
Catholic discourse in the United States has been a vision of Catholicism 
as suspiciously carnal, with implications that include, in Jenny Franchot’s 
(1994, xxi) description of antebellum objections to it, “novel structures 
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of interiority and public conduct” and “an alternative psychological 
landscape that offered to an industrializing, individualist society a popu-
lated sacramental tradition, a vastly enlarged sense of temporality, and 
a reconfigured spatiality of confessional, monastery, and cathedral.” In 
Franchot’s view, Catholicism’s deeply embodied rituals and iconography 
indexed modes of subjectivity, be hav ior, collectivity, time, and space that 
 were antithetical to Protestant visions of modernity.
Pace Foucault, then, Catholicism cannot be reduced to the confession, 
which is only one of the sacraments. Resituating confession into its origi-
nal sacramental context, we can see that Catholic liturgical practice (not 
always equivalent to Roman Catholic theology) is in many ways much 
more “catholic” about bodies, desires, fantasies, and affinities than the 
dominant Protestant worldview of the New  England colonies and even-
tually the United States as a whole—in ways that contest the regime of 
modern sexuality and make sacramentality a sense- method of the sort 
I have been tracking throughout this book. Foucault himself seems to 
recognize this in the epigraph above, in which he lauds the “imaginary, 
erotic, effective, corporal, sensual” aspects of the church. William James, 
in The Va ri e ties of Religious Experience, seems to have done so as well, 
writing that Catholicism “has so many cells with so many diff er ent kinds 
of honey, is so indulgent in its multiform appeals to  human nature, that 
Protestantism  will always show to Catholic eyes the alms house physi-
ognomy” ( James [1901–2] 1987, 413). Invoking the science of physiog-
nomy, James anticipates Foucault’s understanding of Chris tian ity as 
the precursor to scientia sexualis— correctly keying that early science of 
the body to a Protestant worldview. But James’s gentle pun on monas-
tic cells, which he depicts as bursting with liquid honey, suggests an ars 
erotica inherent in Catholicism, particularly as it centers on immersion 
in fluids and on drinking and eating, or the two sacraments of baptism 
and the Eucharist.
This chapter, then, offers up  these two, most sensate sacraments— 
with a detour through the sacramental imposition of hands—as a way 
out of what I consider a counter- Reformational regime of sexuality, using 
Djuna Barnes’s modernist classic Nightwood ([1936] 2006) as a touch-
stone text, one at the very outer edge of a very long nineteenth  century 
that I have limned in terms of the movement from an eigh teenth- century 
specification of the sensual body as a domain of knowledge and control 
 toward a final consolidation of the homosexual/heterosexual binary in 
the Anglo- American world by the mid- twentieth  century. For no novel 
knows the history of confession, or understands and repudiates its stakes 
for the production of modern homo sexuality, better than Nightwood, 
which has not generally been read as a meditation on Chris tian ity.3 
Nightwood, though, turns over and over again to the motif of genuflec-
tion. Its original title was Bow Down, which became the title of the first 
chapter; several of its characters spend their time “ going down before the 
impending and inaccessible” (5); the main female character, Nora Flood, 
goes down on her knees in horror when she first sees her lover, Robin 
Vote, with another  woman; and Robin eventually “go[es] down” (179) 
herself, falling to the floor and crawling around in a grotesque chase 
scene with a dog.  These episodes echo Nightwood ’s central scene, which is 
explic itly figured as a confession: in a chapter titled “Watchman, What of 
the Night?,” the pathetic and jilted Nora comes to the apartment of her 
friend Matthew Dante O’Connor, a cross- dressing, defrocked priest and 
abortionist, to tell the story of her doomed love with Robin. As watch-
man, Matthew emblematizes what Foucault (1990a) calls the Christian 
pastoral, the beneficent, all- seeing shepherd who  will sacrifice himself, 
if necessary, for his sheep. His tiny one- room apartment, strewn with 
 women’s garments and rusty gynecological tools, also visually condenses 
Foucault’s notion of the confessional as, at once, closet and precursor for 
the “science” of sexuality (see Veltman 2003). But despite  these gestures 
to the confessional, Nightwood ultimately uses religion to reject the re-
gime of sexuality: it does so unsurprisingly by renouncing the confes-
sion and its hypervigilance over the body, but also counterintuitively by 
turning to other sacraments. Barnes illuminates a sacramental point of 
view— a sacra/mentality— that is the final sense- method I  will discuss in 
this book.
Briefly, sacramentality is an affective experience of the sort that James 
claimed as religious, though he did not treat the sacraments in his com-
pendium of religious experiences. Considered a vis i ble sign of inward 
grace, a Christian sacrament is nevertheless not altogether visual. Rather, 
as a rite, it enacts an embodied relation to the divine and a relation to the 
body of the divine, one that also inaugurates or affirms relations among 
 those who take part in or witness it. In rethinking the term “sacramental-
ity,” I put a slash before “mentality” to indicate that it is not solely the 
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property of Catholics, Christians, or even  people of faith but an incorpo-
rative stance  toward objects and  others, a way of encountering the world 
and its  people as well as or even instead of the divine. In Nightwood, I 
 will demonstrate below, sacra/mentality puts pressure not only on the 
virulent anti- Catholicism seen in the United States from the late eigh-
teenth  century up to Barnes’s own moment but also on the solidification, 
by the 1930s, of the homosexual as a species in medical discourse, if not 
as completely so in the vernacular.4 Fi nally, on a more con temporary ho-
rizon, sacra/mentality contests present- day theoretical configurations of 
queerness as radical negativity— theorizations that are profoundly linked 
to the secular.
Protestants, Penance, and Prattle
As I’ve indicated above, Foucault’s straight track from the confessional 
to the closet may be a result of his focusing so much on the confession 
as a ritual of speech rather than of physical and sensory engagement: 
his version of the confession is actually somewhat Protestant, or at least 
Counter- Reformation Catholic. He treats the Protestant confession as a 
continuation of the Catholic one, arguing for “a certain parallelism in the 
Catholic and Protestant methods of examination of conscience and pasto-
ral direction,” and claiming that “procedures for analyzing concupiscence 
and transforming it into discourse  were established in both instances” 
(Foucault 1990a, 116). But he may have been too fast to conflate the two. 
In fact, the medieval reor ga ni za tion of confession, and eventually the 
Protestantization of this religious ritual during the Counter- Reformation, 
made modern sexuality pos si ble and foreclosed other possibilities.  These 
included what Foucault elsewhere calls the uses of pleasure—or at least, 
in this case, the use of the body as a sanctioned instrument with which 
to achieve transformations both individual and social, to do what queer 
theory has called world making.
Early Christian penance was deeply corporeal; the rite emphasized 
the public display of repentance in embodied suffering. Foucault himself 
has described changes in the rite of penance that precede the Protestant 
revolution, arguing that the monastic tradition of exagoreusis, or the ver-
bal expression of sin, eventually overtook exomologesis, the somatic ex-
pression of penitence in early Chris tian ity. And Stephen Haliczer (1996, 8) 
identifies the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215 as a turning point in the 
relation between acts and words. When the council put priestly absolu-
tion at the center of the rite of penance, its leaders also began to extend 
the interrogatory phase: as Haliczer’s history of the confession in Spain 
reveals,  after this council  there appeared numerous manuals instructing 
priests and penitents in the elaborately structured pro cess of examining 
the sinner’s conscience and replying appropriately to this examination.5
In some ways, early modern Protestants simply made this already- 
revised Catholic rite of penance into an explic itly secular  matter; Martin 
Luther’s Babylonian Captivity of the Church (1520) demoted the confes-
sion from the sacraments. But more generally, Protestantism refocused 
Christian attention onto the Word as manifest in Scripture (clearest 
in the doctrine of sola scriptura), and Puritanism especially focused on 
Scripture oral and aural, interpreted aloud by believers and/or received 
by witnesses, in ways that had deep ramifications for the rite of penance.6 
The Counter- Reformation Catholic Church, in turn, responded to Prot-
estantism in a particularly Protestant way: the bishops at the Council 
of Trent (1545–63) made the confession the centerpiece of a renewed 
emphasis on the sacraments, demanding more frequent and much more 
detailed verbal interrogations and responses, and the rite became more 
extravagantly linguistic (Foucault 1993, 212–15).7 When the Protes-
tants stripped the confession of its sacramental status, and then forced 
the Catholic Church to reconfirm that very status as a specifically oral 
and aural exchange between priest and penitent, they paved the way for 
the transformation of acts into the utterances— a pro cess begun in the 
thirteenth  century and culminating in the Counter- Reformation— that 
would eventually, in the transfer of this pro cess to a medical environ-
ment, signal par tic u lar identities.
But more importantly for my purposes  here, by desacramentalizing 
confession, Protestants also reined in the sacraments’ power to contest 
both the regime of alliance (marriage and descent) and the regime of 
sexuality (bodies as objects of knowledge and desire as the key to self-
hood). As Franchot’s (1994, xxi) invocation of Catholicism’s “populated 
sacramental tradition” suggests, the sacraments conjoin  people into and 
as the body of Christ on a social model that explic itly competes with 
earthly marriage and  family. By contrast, the eventual transformation 
of sex into discourse isolated and specified individuals as if their erotic 
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life had nothing to do with their extended social relations, though the 
newly specified  were, of course, able to forge new social relations on the 
very basis of their named identities. The sacraments also foreground 
nongenealogical models for descent, such as discipleship and apostolic 
succession. The regime of sexuality, on the other hand, propped up the 
ideology of reproductive kinship as, by the early twentieth  century, it fo-
cused more and more on the Oedipal scenario. Fi nally, while the sacra-
ments have a complex relation to the past, or what Franchot (1994, xxii) 
calls “a vastly enlarged sense of temporality” insofar as they reanimate 
historically specific events such as the Last Supper, “sexuality” separated 
erotic life from the historical pro cess by implanting desire into (and as) a 
timeless psyche. A close examination of the sacraments themselves, par-
ticularly  those among which the confessional was originally embedded 
before its secularization, reveals loops of flight not only beyond mar-
riage and reproduction but also beyond the regime of sexuality, which 
are as power ful and promising as  those of the Protestant evangelical and 
spiritualist traditions discussed by other Americanists.
A sacrament is a palpable manifestation of God’s grace, experienced 
as an interaction between priest and recipient and sometimes extending 
itself between or among  these recipients. In Catholic doctrine,  there are 
seven of them: baptism, confirmation, Eucharist, penance, holy  orders, 
marriage, and extreme unction. Since Thomas Aquinas, who followed 
Aristotle’s theories of the material, each sacrament has been understood 
as bipartite, consisting of what the Catholic catechism calls “essential 
 matter” and “form.”8 The essential  matter is a substance— water for the 
baptism; oil for confirmation and extreme unction; bread and wine for 
the Eucharist; the priest’s spoken absolution for penance; the laying on of 
hands for receiving the holy  orders; and the  couple’s spoken consent for 
marriage. The form is verbal and in general connected to church author-
ity; indeed, for most sacraments that form is a linguistic performative: “I 
baptize thee . . .” enacts a baptism; “I confirm thee . . . ,” a confirmation; “I 
do,” a marriage. “I absolve thee” transforms penance into absolution; “Ac-
cipe spiritum sanctum” (“Receive the Holy Ghost”) enacts an ordination; 
and “I anoint thee” enacts extreme unction.9 Put differently, the words, 
when accompanied by the properly sanctified material, are the action; 
the exception is the Eucharist’s command, “Eat/drink this and remember 
me,” in which the communion consists of that eating and drinking.
But strikingly, only two sacraments have words as both their essen-
tial  matter and their form: marriage and penance. Historians of marriage 
have described the way the Catholic Church seized marriage from the 
purview of families by demoting tangible, customary signs of agreement 
between  couples’ families and the  couple itself, such as the dowry, the 
ring, the handclasp, the  father’s “handing over” of the bride, and the kiss, 
and by making the words of consent the validating act.10 Despite the 
Council of Trent establishing the necessity of marrying before priest and 
witnesses, the essential  matter of the marriage sacrament is still that of 
the twelfth  century as formulated by Pope Alexander III and theologian 
Peter Lombard: consent, evidenced by the verbal “I do” of the bride and 
groom rather than by the priest’s “I now pronounce you man and wife” 
or by consummation (Martos 2001, 374). Penance is equally verbal but, 
conversely, rests on the priest’s words. Since the Fourth Lateran Council 
of 1215, and as reaffirmed by the Council of Trent, the essential  matter 
of penance has been the priest’s statement of absolution rather than the 
penitent’s dramatization or statement of his or her sins.11 Fi nally, Cath-
olic marriage and penance are the least tactile of the sacraments: while 
 these two are centered on speaking and hearing, the other five center on 
touch (of  water in baptism, oil in confirmation and extreme unction, and 
hands in ordination) or taste (of the bread and wine in the Eucharist).
The removal of the somatic and theatrical aspects of marriage and 
penance in  favor of verbalization, their eventual desacralization by the 
Protestants, and the Counter- Reformation’s reclaiming marriage and 
penance as sacraments in the Protestant terms of aurality and verbos-
ity, are precisely what made  these two rituals so transferrable to the civil 
realm, so useful for a scientia sexualis centered on the confession, and 
eventually for a regime of normalization centered on marriage. Thus a 
Western scientia sexualis stemming from confession and grounded in law 
and psychiatry has been effulgently linguistic. More recently, a biopoli-
tics of normalization, which exceeds both law and the health professions 
to encompass statistics and population management, has depended on 
diminishing the language required from  those against whom aberrant 
species of  people are demarcated. Thus heteronormativity has been la-
conic. In other words, the more that sexual minorities have been spoken 
about, pressed to speak and through speaking to establish the truth of 
themselves, the less the “marriageable” have been spoken about and had 
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to speak: culturally, both sexual “deviance” and marriage are or ga nized 
around a dichotomy between the hyperarticulated and the presumed. 
This is made particularly stark by the comparative loquaciousness of the 
confession and terseness of the marital declaration “I do.” While the 
becoming- verbal of confession (and the becoming- tacit of marriage) cer-
tainly precede the Protestant Reformation by many centuries, their shift 
away from embodied acts can be seen as a precursor to Protestantism’s 
diminution of the incarnational, visceral, and visual aspects of Catholi-
cism in  favor of a focus on the Word of God as manifest in Scripture. 
This shift is central to the Counter- Reformation’s re orienting of Catholi-
cism itself  toward a garrulous penitential scene and, to a lesser extent, a 
reticent marital one. And as it turns out, Nightwood is saturated with this 
history.
Nightwood ’s Sacramentalities
Nightwood ’s only straight marriage is abridged and disastrous: Robin 
Vote marries the Baron Felix von Volkbein, bears a son, and abandons 
them both. She does not so much as speak an “I do”; in fact she ac-
cepts Baron Felix’s proposal of marriage “as if [her] life held no volition 
for refusal” (Barnes [1936] 2006, 46). But the novel both stylistically 
mirrors the prolix aspect of the confession (the first thirty pages are a 
nearly unreadable series of long paragraphs) and comments on it. As 
the controlling voice of the novel, Matthew O’Connor aligns Protes-
tantism with the word and Catholicism with the sensory, figuring Prot-
estantism in terms of talking. He asks, “What do you listen to in the 
Protestant church? To the words of a man who has been chosen for his 
eloquence” (23), and finishes by stating that the Protestant outlook “is 
as hard, as hard as the gift of gab” (24). By contrast, he figures Catholi-
cism as somatic: it’s “already in your blood” (24). He gives Catholicism 
the fleshy qualities missing from Protestantism, describing the Catho-
lic sinning boldly (“pecca fortiter”) with his goats, and finishing with a 
statement that in contrast with Protestantism’s “hard gab,” Catholicism 
is “as soft as a goat’s hip” (24). But then, just as  these distinctions seem 
firm, they merge in the figure of the Catholic confessional— which I 
read as a post- Reformation one— where “in sonorous prose, lacking 
contrition (if you must) you can speak of the condition of the knotty, 
tangled soul and be answered in Gothic echoes, mutual and instanta-
neous ” (24).
In other words, Nightwood understands that if Catholicism origi-
nally seemed promisingly carnal, the Counter- Reformation confession 
reduced it to a hollow verbal exchange. We see this recapitulated in the 
chapter titled “Watchman, What of the Night?,” in which Matthew’s 
long- winded apologia overtakes Nora’s abject declarations of her love 
for Robin: she has come to confess to him, but he ends up the penitent. 
 There is even a second confessional moment in the text: Matthew goes to 
an empty church to confess in the form of a masturbation session, pulling 
out his penis and making it “face the mystery so it [the mystery] could see 
him [the penis] as clear as it saw me” (Barnes [1936] 2006, 140).  Here, 
Matthew lays bare not so much his sins as his state of morphological ab-
jection, in an act reminiscent of exomologesis. Both penitent and priest, he 
offers his penis as si mul ta neously sign and solution: it identifies his sinful 
state, and serves as gender- normalizing punishment for his transgender 
subjectivity and cross- dressing, the “me” that God “sees” but apparently 
cannot see through to Matthew’s female soul. Yet for the modern regime 
of sexuality within which the novel takes place, this form of confession 
fails too; neither oral confession nor penitent acts in a post- Reformation 
world can save Matthew. He thus finishes his own chapter- long mono-
logue, “Go Down, Matthew,” by renouncing the linguistic, declaring, 
“I’ve not only lived my life for nothing, but I’ve told it for nothing” (175).
Despite its own torrents of prose, then, Nightwood resists the triumph 
of verbalization, of sacramental “form.” We might think of Nightwood 
in terms of Barnes’s stubborn (and perhaps apocryphal?) statement, “I am 
not a lesbian. I just loved Thelma.”12 If being a legible lesbian at that his-
torical moment meant a certain mannishness à la Radclyffe Hall, or an 
investment in  women’s community along the lines of Renée Vivien’s and 
Natalie Barney’s salons, or a couple- centered domestic arrangement like 
that of Gertrude Stein and Alice B. Toklas, Djuna Barnes could only ever 
fail. Her sexual worldview— the capaciousness of “loving Thelma”— may 
have drawn less from the sexological model of the lesbian, the Sapphic 
Left Bank’s protofeminist revaluation of  women’s culture, or the ideal 
of the Boston marriage, than from her spiritualist grand mother’s influ-
ence, her own  father’s bigamy, and her nonconsensual, quasiincestuous 
first marriage to her  uncle (her  father’s second wife’s  brother). Certainly 
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it encompassed her agonized relationship to Thelma’s committed non-
monogamy, her own bisexuality, and her exclusion from the upper- class 
leisure that many of the Left Bank lesbians enjoyed. To what of this com-
plexity could the identity statement “I am a lesbian” compare? And what 
intricacies of attachment are contained in her seemingly defensive, self- 
diminishing, pre- lesbian- feminist “just”?
One of  those intricacies, I contend, is spiritual. Instead of the verbal 
form, the novel revalues sacramental  matter and proffers the latter as a 
counterhistory of sexuality: Nightwood is the story of Barnes’s love for 
Thelma, written in a sacramental language. Then, too, Barnes’s commit-
ment to the sacraments other than confession also has something to do 
with what T. J. Jackson Lears (1994), Heather Love (2009), and Kevin 
Floyd (2009) have in diff er ent ways made it pos si ble to think of as an af-
finity for the premodern in protest of modernity’s reifications.13 Follow-
ing  these scholars, we might also call Barnes’s counterhistory of sexuality 
an erotics of counterhistory, insofar as the novel is also deeply invested 
in questions of the relation between past and pre sent and yet funda-
mentally lacks the nostalgia of some modernist texts. The novel makes 
its move  toward the historical less through the motif of return to, say, 
early Chris tian ity, than by renewing the promise of the two sacraments 
central to Catholicism, and the only two recognized as sacraments by 
Protestantism: baptism and the Eucharist. In  doing so, Nightwood makes 
Protestantism more carnal, more Catholic, less secular. On a more con-
temporary note, it also intervenes on a (perhaps by now rather predictable) 
debate in queer theory as to  whether eschewing sociability, understood as 
so totally overwritten by marriage and reproduction as to be unredeem-
able, actually contests the regime of sexuality. As I’ll demonstrate below, 
the novel makes pos si ble a reading of queer theory’s antisocial thesis as 
itself part and parcel of a secular regime of sexuality—as, indeed, com-
pletely wrapped up in the dynamic of confession that girds “sexuality”— 
and not as the latter’s antidote.
Nightwood proffers instead what might be called a hypersocial thesis 
grounded in baptism and the Eucharist as figures for a radically corpore-
alized relationality, an inhabitation by and of the other rather than a self- 
shattering. The basis of this hypersocial thesis is twofold: the plethora of 
figuration (a diff er ent form of “form” than Catholicism’s words) opened 
up by  these sacraments, and the vision of bodies and spirits as capable of 
inhabiting one another in traversals of corporeal bound aries. Moreover, 
this hypersocial thesis involves something the antisocial thesis cannot ac-
count for, the question of history: to inhabit or be inhabited by  others in-
cludes a visceral reckoning with their pasts. Again, this is an aspect of the 
most lushly sensate sacraments: whereas marriage orients the betrothed 
 toward a  future  until death do them part, and penance orients confessors 
 toward the sins of their past, baptism and the Eucharist have a promis-
ingly complex relationship to time and to history.
Baptism, or, the  Water of Enjoinment
In Nightwood, baptism is initially a reminder of our oceanic origins, 
our commonality with other species in deep time. Foucault (1980, 30) 
writes, somewhat opaquely, “It is not through sexuality that we commu-
nicate with the orderly and pleasingly profane world of animals.” I take 
this to mean that the animal world has its own extralinguistic system 
of ordering— one thinks, for instance, of the diff er ent roles of bees in a 
hive— independent of the naming function supposedly granted to Adam 
by God (and thus “profane”). One way to read sexuality, then, is as the 
demarcation between the inhuman and the  human, the “ human” denot-
ing the kinds of entities that aestheticize, nominalize, and categorize not 
just bodies but the pleasures of the body. A turn  toward the animal would 
thus seem to figure a way out of the prison  house of both language and 
sexuality, which is to say, of the social. And Nightwood is often read as a 
novel of degeneration.14 Nora’s lover, Robin Vote, is the avatar for a devo-
lutionary animality that begins with the phytological and moves through 
the zoological. Robin first appears in a faint in her apartment, figured as 
a plant: her body smells like fungi, her flesh has the “texture of plant life,” 
and  there is “an effulgence as of phosphorous glowing” around her head 
(Barnes [1936] 2006, 38). The narrator eventually analogizes Robin to 
a “beast turning  human” (41), yet this pro cess is incomplete, as “she yet 
carried the quality of the ‘way back’ as animals do” (44).
But Robin is not just a figure of degeneration, for her temporal quali-
ties do not refer exclusively to the past. Her prehistoric qualities, that is, 
are matched by her antifutural ones, such that she embodies Lee Edelman’s 
(2004) most trenchant formulations of queerness: she rejects  children, 
 going so far as to threaten to smash the doll that her lover Nora Flood 
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gives her as a symbol of the  children they cannot have, and she even lets 
her pets die. In her refusal to be intelligibly  human, which is to say, intel-
ligible at all, Robin is fundamentally antisocial, even asocial; the novel 
refers to her “unpeopled thoughts” (Barnes [1936] 2006, 50), and Nora 
realizes that Robin “ can’t ‘put herself in another’s place,’ she herself is the 
only ‘position’; . . . [Robin] knows she is innocent  because she  can’t do 
anything in relation to anyone but herself ” (155). Indeed, Robin is the 
living emblem of Lacan’s (1999, 126) injunction that “ there is no such 
 thing as a sexual relation.” Fi nally, Robin escapes figuration altogether. 
Matthew describes Nora’s fatal error regarding Robin as “dress[ing] the 
unknowable in the garments of the known” (Barnes [1936] 2006, 145). If 
a figure is something like  matter pressed into the ser vice of an idea (and 
thus very diff er ent from the catechism’s use of the term “form”), Robin 
simply refuses to let that pro cess come to fruition. Baron Felix remarks, 
“I never did have a  really clear idea of her at any time. I had an image of 
her, but that is not the same  thing” (119). In sum, Robin links the antihu-
man, the asocial, and the antifigural, and in  doing so she clarifies the way 
that the antisocial thesis in queer theory has disdained the figure itself.
Robin’s becoming animal, that is, is less about degeneration or a de-
parture from history or even humanity, than it is about the fantasy of 
being unrepresentable, about an iconoclasm that is, I think, the basis of 
the queer antisocial thesis. We can see that iconoclasm in Leo Bersani’s 
(1987) formulation of jouissance as a mode of askesis, in which anal sex 
serves as a rite of penance for the sin of selfhood, shattering the imago. 
We can see it in Edelman’s (2004) sinthomosexual, which denotes a fun-
damental re sis tance to meaning and intelligibility. But as alluring and 
intellectually rigorous as  these formulations are, I find them somewhat 
unsatisfying in that they are merely the flip side of the same coin: they 
are part of the complex of renunciation, asceticism, sadomasochism, and 
transgression of the limits of selfhood that Foucault sometimes suggests 
as modes of re sis tance to the regime of sexuality. Ultimately, this complex 
too depends on the rite of confession— which is to say on the linchpin of 
the regime of sexuality— for its meaning. It is not that one must confess 
before having, say, anal sex. Rather, confession has worked, historically, 
to produce the very ideal of personhood necessary for the queerly imper-
sonal, self- unmaking, death- seeking drive to do its work. It is not pos si ble 
to have the second without the first.
This is especially clear in Foucault’s essay “Friendship as a Way of 
Life”: “[Ascesis is] the work that one performs on oneself in order to 
transform oneself or make the self appear which, happily, one never at-
tains. Can that be our prob lem  today? We’ve rid ourselves of asceticism. 
Yet it’s up to us to advance into a homosexual ascesis that would make 
us work on ourselves and invent— I do not say discover— a manner of 
being that is still improbable” (Foucault [1981] 1984, 137). The language 
of “oneself,” “the self,” and “being” still suggests a monadic horizon for 
queer activities: the product of all this effort is a new and diff er ent self, 
however unattainable, seen as the precursor to and product of new so-
cial relations. Bersani, it is fair to say, does return penance to the exomo-
logical in his suggestion that anal sex does precisely this work, and he 
thereby recorporealizes penance in ways that reanimate its sacramental 
qualities. But the model of self- shattering that the antisocial thesis privi-
leges, as I’m not the first feminist critic to note, is actually very much 
bound up in the self it seeks to jettison. Fi nally, Bersani’s and Edelman’s 
emphasis on destroying the figure (the ego, the self, the child, the po liti-
cal horizon) makes the antisocial thesis a somewhat reactionary queer 
theoretical drive  toward a high modernist politics of the nonrepre sen-
ta tional. I say “reactionary”  because the ideal of nonrepre sen ta tion is 
not, in the end, very far from the politics of self- abstraction that ani-
mates liberal, representative democracy;  those with the heaviest burden 
of embodiment are least able to reach even a queer apotheosis of self- 
negation.15 On this model, Robin Vote is, if not male, at the very least 
consummately white.
If the regime of sexuality originates in the confessional and finds its 
pseudooppositional corollary in asceticism, s/m, defiguration, and other 
ele ments of the antisocial thesis, we can of course follow Derrida’s (2000) 
work on hospitality and won der if another version of friendship, that 
hypersocial mode that Foucault posited as homo sexuality’s real, mate-
rial work on the world and against the regime of sexuality, resonates in 
the other sacraments. For Foucault ([1981] 1984, 135) writes, in the same 
essay on friendship, “Perhaps it would be better to ask oneself, ‘What re-
lations, through homo sexuality, can be established, in ven ted, multiplied, 
and modulated?’ The prob lem is not to discover in oneself the truth of 
one’s sex, but, rather, to use one’s sexuality henceforth to arrive at a mul-
tiplicity of relationships.”16
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 Here, Foucault must mean something like “homoerotic life” rather 
than “homo sexuality,” as the idea of using one’s specification as a kind of 
person in order to arrive at relationships that dismantle selfhood seems 
oxymoronic; indeed, the identity- concept that is “homo sexuality” has 
sometimes led us to multiply one kind of relationship only to shut down 
many  others. In comparison to Foucault’s words on asceticism, though, 
 here the horizon is promisingly plural: for he focuses on social relations 
rather than on individual models of selfhood. What Foucault does not 
consider  here is that relations can be established, in ven ted, multiplied, 
and modulated through uses of the body that do not necessarily con-
form to what dominant culture recognizes as sex, yet are not personal 
and intimate in the way that friendship feels  either.17  These uses, or sense- 
methods, have been the subject of this book thus far, and the sacraments 
are one of them.
Even friendship, we might note, is never merely personal: while Fou-
cault would insist that radical forms of friendship must operate “outside 
of institutional relations,” by which he means marriage and identity poli-
tics as well as school, the military, and the church, no friendship com-
pletely escapes the framings of social relations such as race, class, gender, 
et cetera: as cliques make clear, friendship is always mediated by public 
forms of intelligibility.  There  were also times when Foucault suggested 
that such promising social modes could occur within institutional rela-
tions. In 1978, for instance, he got into an argument with a hitchhiker 
about the Catholic Church. The hitchhiker was against it. Foucault 
([1978] 1999, 107) responded with the words I have used as my epigraph 
above: “Entirely woven through with ele ments that are imaginary, erotic, 
effective, corporal, sensual, and so on, [the church] is superb!”  Here he 
seems to recognize that the church, like many institutions, contains the 
contradictions Marx attributed to the cap i tal ist workplace and Foucault 
himself understood in terms of reverse discourse: the church generates 
both recognized forms of being and new forms of relationality that are ir-
reducible to what it sanctions (marriage) or condemns (homo sexuality). 
Canon law and the church’s interrelations with the state may produce 
legible and  legal subjects, but what Catholics call “the mysteries” go be-
yond  these earthly bound aries, beyond the bound aries between mind 
and body, and beyond the bound aries between individuals. Yet they are 
not, for that, intimate in the secular sense of the word. Nor do they con-
stitute friendships per se.
To wrest Nightwood out of its frame of degenerate lit er a ture and high 
modernism and resituate it in terms of a sacramental queer hypersocia-
bility akin to but not reducible to friendship, let us turn away from the 
universally admired, unrepresentable androgyne Robin Vote, and  toward 
the much more difficult, weepy, overwrought femme, Nora Flood. A 
minor character remarks, in the novel’s opening chapter, “Wir setzen an 
dieser Stelle über den Fluss”— something like “We set out in this place, 
 here, over the river” (Barnes [1936] 2006, 17; translation mine). While 
the allusion is to the river Styx, the wave of passion on which the novel 
rides is Nora’s. Her full name, “Nora Flood,” echoes the Old Testament’s 
story of Noah. In Christian theology, the flood that besets Noah prefig-
ures the baptism; one might also say of course that the baptism rewrites 
aspects of the Hebrew text. Nora is the novel’s figure for a sacrament 
more radical than penitence.
Early in the novel, Nora seems aligned with the verbal and textual: 
the narrator tells us that as “an early Christian . . . [Nora] believed in the 
word” (Barnes [1936] 2006, 56). But this association of Nora with words 
morphs into an association with  water; Matthew declares that Nora is 
“of a clean race, of a too eagerly washing  people” (91). It’s notable that 
Matthew describes Protestants as “a race,” as if washing confers enough 
bodily likeness on the washers that they may be thought of as a  people, 
with  water replacing blood. But Matthew  later declares, “We wash away 
our sense of sin, and what does that bath secure us? Sin, shining bright 
and hard. In what does a Latin bathe? True dust. We have made the lit-
eral error. We have used  water, we are thus too sharply reminded. . . .  The 
Anglo- Saxon has made the literal error; using  water, he has washed away 
his page” (96). Though this passage nicely skewers the Anglo rage for spir-
itual and physical hygiene, oddly,  here, baptism washes away the “page,” 
the word  earlier associated with Protestantism: in short, the “literal error” 
of using  water and not the word is a promising one. To wash away the page 
and immerse oneself in the ele ment is, in a sense, to return to the material, 
the dust in which “the Latin” bathes.  Here, “Latin” also invokes both anti- 
Catholic discourse associating Catholicism with Italy and Spain, and, in 
its association with dust, a slight distance from Nora’s whiteness.
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Matthew eventually redeems this dusty (dirty?) version of baptism for 
something the novel insistently tropes as queer— the night: “I’m an angel 
on all fours, with a child’s feet  behind me, seeking my  people that have 
never been made,  going down face foremost, drinking the  waters of night 
at the  water hole of the damned, and I go into the  waters, up to my heart, 
the terrible  waters!” (Barnes [1936] 2006, 102). “ Going down” differently 
than in the confession now, Matthew sees the sacrament of baptism as an 
act of “seeking my  people that have never been made,” or  those outside of 
both polity and discourse. Gathering at the font with other outcasts, he 
enters  these unclean  waters not to be forgiven but to be conjoined with 
something, someone, somewhere, beyond the secular and racial imagina-
tions not only of “peoplehood” but also of humanism’s humanity. This is, 
remarkably, what a sacrament does: it uses a material substance to invite 
recipients into both an experience of otherness and a community. Just 
as the sacrament’s proffered otherness is not  limited to the earthly but 
includes the divine, its community is not  limited to existing  people but 
encompasses beings who  were “never made” as solely  human, let alone as 
a nation— the Apostles, the saints, the angels. Or, in Matthew’s case, the 
damned.
We can see this dual, communitarian and other- extensive aspect of the 
sacrament, especially baptism, enacted in Nightwood ’s consistent link-
age of  humans and nonhumans through  water. Robin appears to us first 
figuratively immersed and transfigured into an animal, “as if sleep  were a 
decay fishing her beneath the vis i ble surface” (Barnes [1936] 2006, 38), 
the verb “fishing” curiously oscillating between “hunting her like a fish” 
and “turning her into a fish.” In another example of  water connecting the 
 human and the inhuman, when Nora first meets Robin in the circus, a 
lioness comes to the edge of its cage, turns her head  toward Robin, goes 
down on all fours, and, “as if a river  were falling  behind impassable heat, 
[the lioness’s] eyes flowed in tears that never reached the surface” (60). 
This scene, in turn, prefigures the novel’s famous ending in the ruined 
chapel on Nora’s property, in which Robin goes down on all fours before 
Nora’s dog, and then begins to fight with it as if she herself  were a dog. 
The dog begins to cry, and Robin for the first time cries too, cries with 
him, “crying in shorter and shorter spaces, moving head to head,  until 
[Robin] gave up, lying out, her hands beside her, her face turned and 
weeping; and the dog too gave up then, and lay down, his eyes bloodshot, 
his head flat along her knees” (180).
Why does this final liquidation of the boundary between  human and 
animal, a typical trope in the lit er a ture of degeneration, take place in a 
chapel— and not only in a chapel but in front of “a contrived altar, before 
a Madonna” (Barnes [1936] 2006, 178), with flowers and toys heaped at 
her feet and two candles burning? It is  because this scene, like the one in 
Matthew’s apartment, figures a sacrament, one as power ful as the confes-
sional but extremely diff er ent in its per for mance and meaning. Baptism 
is practiced by vari ous Christian sects in at least four diff er ent ways— 
aspersion or sprinkling, affusion or pouring, immersion of part of the 
body, or total submersion— but its fundamental sign is  water flowing to 
the head. Nightwood ’s final scene is not one of washing body and soul 
clean, though, as Matthew has  earlier described baptism. Instead, the 
novel’s final scene separates ablution from absolution, and merges with 
Matthew’s figure of the “ waters of night.”
Crucially, this last baptism through tears fi nally joins Robin’s body 
with something. Whereas the confession is a technique that, Foucault 
(1990a) tells us, specified individuals— isolated, intensified, and consoli-
dated acts into monadic identities— baptism is fundamentally a rite of 
engroupment, of admission to a social field irreducible to the  human. Its 
fundamental work is not on the self,  whether to shore it up or to disman-
tle it; baptism not only asperses but disperses the self. Then, too, the iden-
tity it confers, that of “Christian,” has  little to do with the specification 
of individuals;  there is no postbaptismal apparatus that characterizes the 
baptized person as a kind of Christian (except, redundantly, a baptized 
one). Robin, then, is baptized at the end of Nightwood in boys’ clothes, 
by and with a dog, not into the divine, and not merely into Matthew’s 
community of  human inverts, but into an unnameable interspecies form 
of belonging— very diff er ent from the unrepresentability and implicit 
whiteness with which she  earlier seemed so aligned.
Furthermore, the sacraments do not only figure the “ matter” of bind-
ing  humans laterally, “populating” them, in Franchot’s words across spa-
tial imaginaries, but also offer a “vastly enlarged sense of temporality” 
(Franchot 1994, xxi). As the theologian Mark Jordan (2006, 331) re-
minds us, “A spiritual child through baptism exchanges biological  family 
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for the genealogy traced in ritual supersession.” “Genealogy” is perhaps 
the wrong word  here, as baptism enfolds the participant into a collec-
tive movement through time, whose simultaneous forward propulsion 
and backward extension have to do with predestination and fulfillment, 
prophesy and recapitulation, rather than with biological reproduction 
or even  simple descent. Jordan writes, “Baptism inaugurates a series of 
inhabitations or vicarious per for mances that reach backwards, sideways, 
and forwards through an ingathered history” (328). This question of how 
history can be “ingathered,” which is to say crystallized into formations 
that can illuminate the past, can catalyze the  future other wise, and can 
create diagonal lies across the temporal field, is crucial to queer theory. 
It  counters not only the (admittedly promising) nonrelationality of the 
antisocial thesis but also the (much less promising) ahistoricality of that 
way of construing queer. A queer hypersocial thesis, then, necessarily en-
tails the question of the social as it binds us with what and who have 
come before us, and  will survive  after us: Nightwood clarifies, again, the 
role of the sacraments in making this possibility felt— especially in 1936, 
when “I am a lesbian” might seem to mean, at least on the face of  things, 
restriction to horizontal community.18
Imposition, or, the Hands of Historicity
Franchot (1994) reminds us that in anti- Catholic discourse, the Catholic 
Church was figured as static and resistant to historical change. This was 
part of how Protestants constructed history itself, a seemingly secular 
and secularizing concept: as a “text- oriented” (Franchot 1994, 6) progres-
sion from the Reformation to the pre sent, dependent on and taking place 
within the pages of “biblically allusive historical and fictional narratives” 
(7) that both mimicked and supplanted Scriptural historiography. This 
seemingly secular but deeply Protestant mode of history is contested by 
Jordan’s notion of “ingathering” the past, a term I take to mean appre-
hending the past as more than a sequence of events in which one super-
sedes the next— rather, it means something akin to Walter Benjamin’s 
concept of the convolute, literally a sheaf (Eiland and McLaughlin 1999, 
xiv). The term “convolute” invokes the leaf in the bud, the event in lon-
gitudinal history rolled back over and over on itself in lateral relations 
such that events of diff er ent times can be thought or felt in conjunction. 
Following Jordan and Benjamin, then, we might ask what a sacra/mental 
historicist method would look like.
We might expect that it would look like New Historicism, which 
also privileges a kind of sideways ingathering of fragments from a single 
moment in time, reading them as symptoms of a larger cultural logic, in 
a method with which academics are still reckoning. But as David Aers 
(2003) has discussed in  great depth, New Historicism was elaborated by 
Catherine Gallagher and Stephen Greenblatt (2001) in direct opposition 
to the sacraments and to sacramental ways of thinking. Gallagher and 
Greenblatt equate the sacraments with sterile and ahistorical doctrinal 
formalism, as opposed to living and vital history. Analogizing the art 
object to the Eucharist, they write, “When the literary text ceases to be 
[like the Sacrament] a sacred, self- enclosed, and self- justifying miracle, 
when in the skeptical mood we foster it begins to lose at least some of the 
special power ascribed to it, its bound aries begin to seem less secure and 
it loses exclusive rights to the experience of won der. . . . [The new his-
toricist proj ect] is concerned with finding the creative power that shapes 
literary works outside the narrow bound aries in which it had hitherto 
been located, as well as within  those bound aries” (12). I am sympathetic 
to the New Historicist proj ect, and remain deeply invested in questions 
of how texts contain the historicizing seeds of their own undoing.19 But 
given Gallagher and Greenblatt’s rhetorical divide between a dead for-
malism and a creative, shaping historicism— a divide that, we might note, 
always risks inflection by the homo/hetero binary— I think it may not 
be a coincidence that an antisacramental New Historicism and the New 
Americanist writing that followed it in the 1990s  were not particularly 
hospitable to queer theory, that it has taken a generation of queer theo-
rists trained  under this method some time to formulate other ways of 
 doing and thinking history.20 At the same time, what queer culture and 
by extension queer theory may have in common with New Historicism 
is, paradoxically, something sacramental: a relation to the fragmentary 
object as the invocation of and invitation to a world (see Muñoz 2009), 
of which relation queer camp is paradigmatic.
Just as the anecdote is the New Historicist key to what Greenblatt 
calls speaking with the dead, a camp per for mance is the reanimation of 
a historically specific, culturally “dead,” ideologically oversaturated ob-
ject (a Cole Porter song, a Dolly Parton wig, a Wildean gesture, Joan 
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Crawford as Mommie Dearest).21 The Oxford En glish Dictionary dates 
the first usage of “camp” to 1909 as “[o]stentatious, exaggerated, affected, 
theatrical; effeminate or homosexual,” and both this meaning and the 
practice seem to have emerged in tandem with the gender inversion 
model of homo sexuality.22 It is impossible to pinpoint just when out-
moded or archaic objects became part of that exaggerated per for mance 
and affect, but Djuna Barnes’s roman à clef The Ladies Almanack (1928), 
which spoofs the Left Bank Pa ri sian lesbian subculture of Natalie Bar-
ney and her salons in seventeenth- century Baroque style, suggests that 
by the first third of the twentieth  century, the historicist aspect of camp 
sensibility— which I have elsewhere called “temporal drag” (Freeman 
2010) and David Román (2005, 137) calls “archival drag”— had been 
consolidated.23 I suggested in chapter 3 that pseudohistoricist time travel 
novels and highly stylized historical novels such as Salammbô created set-
tings within which alternate possibilities for gender and sexuality could 
be made into  imagined worlds: accordingly, Barnes and the performers 
she creates in her novels scavenge around more fragmented pasts, picking 
up individual ele ments or stylistic gestures to express sexual dissidence.
Camp parts ways with New Historicism, though, by treating its his-
torical fragment as a doorway not just into a “true” past of vio lence and 
oppression but also into a series of complex temporal relations: acknowl-
edgments of con temporary paradoxes and strug gles, invocations of a 
 future to come, surrogate relations to the dead, nonlinear models of de-
scent (and dissent). In other words, camp has an irreverent sacramental 
sensibility. In The Premodern Condition, Bruce Holsinger (2005, 5–6) has 
described the sacramental sensibility as one “which finds in discrete past 
events and surviving relics the wondrous promise of an invisible totality it 
can only occasionally glimpse in the lived pre sent.” In other words, the sac-
rament takes up something acknowledged to have happened in the past, 
such as the Last Supper, and uses that fragment as a prismatic lens for two 
 things: for the fleeting presence of utopia in the now (the body of Christ 
reassembled in the communion), and for a peek at the kingdom of heaven 
that awaits believers in the  future. In fact, recent queer theologians 
have connected this sacramental sensibility with José Esteban  Muñoz’s 
(2009) work on how glimpses of utopian  futures appear in ephemeral 
present- tense per for mances (see Brintnall, Marchal, and Moore 2017). 
By resurrecting the term “sacramental,” Holsinger points  toward ways 
of knowing that include desires, bodies, and fantasies, and which the 
stridently secularized historicisms of New Historicism, and even the 
astringently atheistic philosophies of some continental theory, tend to 
disavow or displace. Aers points out, correctly, that religious ritual and its 
treatment of objects are not by any means an avoidance of conflict, con-
temporaneity, or narrative, three ele ments crucial to what Gallagher and 
Greenblatt call “history” and counterpose to religion. Nor do the sacra-
ments avoid diachrony, local contingency, pro cess, or accidental likeness, 
other aspects of practicing historicisms new and other wise.
In fact, Nightwood is as suffused with the desire to speak with the dead 
as New Historicism ever was, but understands sacramentality as a way of 
 doing so rather than as a mode of avoidant self- enclosure. Importantly, 
the novel figures the “ doing” of history as an imposition or laying-on of 
hands. This gesture, the essential  matter of the rite of holy  orders that 
admits properly trained men into the formal priesthood, also appears 
in confirmation, baptism, and extreme unction, and forms a part of the 
blessing administered by priests to penitents, the married  couple, com-
munion takers, and so on. The laying on of hands is another vis i ble sign 
of the Holy Spirit, understood as a means of conveying that spirit to the 
newly ordained. It is also sometimes interpreted as a way of imparting 
ministerial gifts, or charism; some theologians describe it as an ongo-
ing conduit between recipient and divine source.24 Its role as a means of 
power transferred from one priest to the next also gives it a kind of super-
cessionary character  going back to the original Apostles: in this sense the 
laying on of hands conveys something both eternal (divinity) and historical 
(succession).
In Nightwood, hands are the relay for a less purely monumental or se-
quential movement between past and pre sent. About Robin, Felix ob-
serves, “When she touched a  thing, her hands seemed to take the place 
of the eye. He thought: ‘she has the touch of the blind who,  because 
they see more with their fin gers, forget more in their minds.’ Her fin gers 
would go forward, hesitate,  tremble, as if they had found a face in the 
dark. When her hand fi nally came to rest, the palm closed; it was as if she 
had  stopped a crying mouth” (Barnes [1936] 2006, 45–46). Robin’s hand, 
her touch, overtakes the vis i ble, supplanting both eye and “crying mouth” 
or speaking instrument. In a Nietz schean ([1873–76] 1997) mode of am-
nesia as a catalyst for experiencing the pre sent, Robin’s touch also stays 
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the movement of memory. Importantly, Nightwood ’s regime of palpabil-
ity contains within it a kind of forgetting of the cognitive, or remem-
bering of the visceral, that founds the novel’s alternatives to genealogy, 
lineal descent, and history proper.  Here is one example, one of the most 
beautiful passages in the novel, and a complex reimagining of the imposi-
tion of hands: “As an amputated hand cannot be disowned  because it is 
experiencing a futurity, of which the victim is its forebear, so Robin was 
an amputation that Nora could not renounce. As the wrist longs, so her 
heart longed” (Barnes [1936] 2006, 64).
In this elaborate synecdoche, hand and wrist are cleaved in both senses 
of the word. They cannot be severed, yet their separation is necessary to 
assert the difference between their  futures: the hand is experiencing a fu-
turity of which the wrist can only be an ancestor. But rather than touch-
ing in a forward movement,  here the hand longs physically backward 
through the wrist, wishing itself extensive enough to meet the wrist not 
in the past but in a  future that precludes it ( else the hand would not be 
“amputated,” and Nora cannot renounce Robin precisely  because Robin 
is an amputation and Nora feels her as a phantom limb). The hand, that 
touch that enables forgetting “with the mind,” though not apparently 
with the body, opens up a past of suffering, and a  future of rejoining. 
Both memory and futurity  here are metacarpal.
In Nightwood, then, the laying on of hands gets transmuted from a 
means of signifying a relation to the divine or bestowing the gifts of min-
istry to a way of palpably (and erotically, given the significance of hands 
for lesbian sex) reor ga niz ing relations between past and pre sent. The ges-
ture, appearing only fleetingly, nevertheless links the affiliative aspect of 
the baptism to the complexly filiative work of the Eucharist.
Blood, or Food
Matthew O’Connor’s distinction between Protestantism and Catholi-
cism turns on the figure of blood (“in the blood”), explic itly counter-
posed to words (“the gift of gab”). But what does it mean to say that 
Catholicism— perhaps even Chris tian ity—is “in the blood?” How can 
Chris tian ity be sanguinary, when it has been so consistently theorized 
and theologized as a form of sodality beyond biological kinship? In fact, 
the new covenant is supposed to be a counterimaginary to  family. In its 
substitution of the bonds of faith for  those of genealogy, Chris tian ity 
also  counters what we now know as the eugenic concept of “race,” or 
the idea that something corporeal connects earthly families across the 
bound aries of both domicile and historical moment. In some ways, then, 
the bread and wine of Christian theology are simply another version of 
the baptismal  waters, insofar as they posit belonging as a relationship of 
shared fluids superseding both the fictions of sperm and blood that or ga-
nize the meanings of kinship, and the imposition of hands, insofar as this 
represents descent as a  matter of surrogation.  
 Here are the words the priest speaks at the Eucharist, quoting Christ 
at the last supper:
On the day before he was to suffer,
he took bread in his holy and venerable hands,
and with eyes raised to heaven
to you, O God, his almighty  Father,
giving you thanks, he said the blessing,
broke the bread
and gave it to his disciples, saying:
take this, all of you, and eat of it,
for this is my body,
which  will be given up for you.
In a similar way, when supper was ended,
he took this precious chalice
in his holy and venerable hands,
and once more giving you thanks, he said the blessing
and gave the chalice to his disciples, saying:
take this, all of you, and drink from it,
for this is the chalice of my blood,
the blood of the new and eternal covenant,
which  will be poured out for you and for many
for the forgiveness of sins.
do this in memory of me. (Catholic Church 2011, 639)
It’s easy, and tempting, to see this eaten body and poured- out blood as 
a radical reor ga ni za tion of corporeal connectivity beyond both  family 
and race, and indeed this is what I’ve been suggesting. But Nightwood 
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complicates this sacrament by reminding us of the role of the Jew in 
blood theology. The novel’s figure for blood as lineage, kinship, and de-
scent is Robin’s husband Felix von Volkbein, the fake Baron born on a 
bed stitched with the emblems of a made-up aristocracy. Far from being 
a nobleman, Felix’s  father Guido is “a Jew of Italian descent” (Barnes 
[1936] 2006, 4), whose lineage is entirely fictional: his borrowed name, 
Volkbein, contains the figure of a biologized  people, a “volk”; he has sto-
len a coat of arms and in ven ted a “list of progenitors . . .  who had never 
existed” (5–6); and the portraits of his  father and  mother that eventually 
hang in his dining room are “reproductions of two intrepid and ancient 
actors” (9–10) that he found in a dusty attic. Guido also carries a hand-
kerchief whose color scheme indexes the  running of the Jews at Corso in 
1466, making him what the narrator calls, in racialized terms, “the sum 
total of what is the Jew . . .  black with the pain of a participation that, 
four centuries  later, made him a victim, as he felt . . .  the degradation by 
which his  people had survived” (4–5).  Here we see the ste reo type of the 
Jew as Sander Gilman (1991) has described it: figuratively black, mired 
in history, incurably bound to racial ties (or as the novel puts it, “heavy 
with impermissible blood” [5]), greedy, duplicitous, supplicating, and 
eternally victimized.
So what, then, do Christians consume when they figuratively drink 
the blood of a Jew? In one of the novel’s most complex statements about 
the Eucharist, Nightwood ’s narrator remarks, “The Christian traffic in 
retribution has made the Jew’s history a commodity; it is the medium 
through which he receives, at the necessary moment, the serum of his 
own past that he may offer it again as his blood” (Barnes [1936] 2006, 13). 
 Here, retribution, or penance, turns out to be a means of recirculating 
the past when it is rethought as a means of injecting the penitent ( here, 
the Jew) with the “serum,” the blood, of history. The past, marked as 
 Jewish, becomes the sacramental blood of Christ. In other words, Barnes 
rethinks penance in precisely Eucharistic terms, as a sacrificial offering of 
blood that reanimates a community, as sacraments do. But Barnes also 
rethinks the Eucharist as an offering of history, of pastness itself, in ways 
that the New Historicist description of the sacrament as merely formal 
belies. Barnes’s problematic formulation that Jewish sacrifice is the bed-
rock of a “commodified” Christian redemption seems to damn Jews and 
Christians in the same breath, but it does suggest that the sacraments are 
deeply, complexly historicist.
Nightwood also recognizes this pro cess as in keeping with capitalism. 
According to Matthew O’Connor, the function of Christians is to “bring 
up from that depth charming and fantastic superstitions through which 
the slowly and tirelessly milling Jew once more becomes the ‘collector’ 
of his own past” (Barnes [1936] 2006, 13). Disturbingly,  here Christians 
recycle histories of suffering and exclusion into objects of consumption 
resold to their original  owners— retelling the Old Testament as the New, 
we can presume. And they do so in ways that exactly follow the move-
ment of the commodity- fetish: A Jew’s “undoing,” Matthew declares, “is 
never profitable  until some goy has put it back into such shape that it can 
again be offered as a ‘sign’ ” (13). He continues, “A Jew’s undoing is never 
his own, it is God’s; his rehabilitation is never his own, it is a Christian’s” 
(13). And, of course, the commodity- fetish is precisely the  thing that ob-
scures histories of suffering— the relation between owner and laborer—
in a fantasy that the subject can be renewed, eternally, by the product: it 
is the form of formalism itself. This is certainly one way to read the sacra-
mental, perhaps one in keeping with Gallagher and Greenblatt’s (2001) 
way, and the novel understands that the sacrament can be, simply, an 
uncomplicated reincorporation and sanctification of the Jew. Indeed, as 
Gil Anidjar (2009, 48) persuasively argues, the drinking of sacramental 
blood is not actually separable from  later, racializing figurations of blood 
purity: Eucharist and eugenics— etymologically eu- (good) charism 
(grace) and eu- (good) gens ( people) respectively— are not that far apart. 
Early Christians  imagined themselves as  those who, by drinking the pure 
blood of Christ, became themselves a pure  people. In this sense, Barnes’s 
choice of the term “serum” is not incidental: a serum is actually plasma 
purged of clotting agents, used as an antitoxin, and Barnes seems to imag-
ine the Eucharist as, precisely and paradoxically, a Jewish offering made 
to purge a  people of Jewishness. Here we can see again the off- whiteness 
of Catholicism in its entanglement, despite its invocations of blood pu-
rity, with a racialized Judaism.
Yet Nightwood ’s other images of the Eucharist emphasize the quality 
of the host as food rather than as purified serum, and thus turn it other 
ways. It is notable that nobody in the novel seems to consume any meals, 
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though Matthew mentions eating a salad and every one drinks like a fish. 
Instead,  people are troped as edible: for instance, the circus performer 
Frau Mann has “a skin that was the pattern of her costume, a bodice of 
lozenges, red and yellow . . .  one somehow felt they ran through her as 
the design runs through hard holiday candies” (Barnes [1936] 2006, 16). 
A more directly sacramental image of receiving the past through the in-
corporative gestures of the Eucharist by eating  people is reiterated in the 
first account of Robin Vote: “Such a  woman is the infected carrier of the 
past . . .  we feel that we could eat her, she who is eaten death returning, 
for only then do we put our face close to the blood on the lips of our 
forefathers” (41).  Here, the image of “eaten death returning” is a way 
to come into contact with the savagery of our ancestors, with the vio-
lence and impurity indexed by the blood on their lips that could indicate 
 either their cannibalism or their own version of a brutal Eucharist, or 
both. This passage proposes eating the other not only as a movement be-
yond language—as Foucault ([1981] 1984, 136) describes friendship, two 
 people meeting “without terms or con ve nient words, with nothing to as-
sure them about the meaning of the movement that carries them  toward 
each other”— but also as time travel, a means of quite literally tasting the 
blood of the past. In other words, in Nightwood ’s economy of sacra/mental 
friendship, the encounter with the other must include an encounter with 
his or her past, and without the Christian recycling of this into a com-
modity. Foucault’s (136) description of friendship as “the formation of 
new alliances and the tying together of unforeseen lines of force,” then, is 
perhaps not temporally thick enough, not as rich as the blood on the lips 
of Robin’s pre de ces sors.
What we have  here is the image of a sacrament as something more 
than a palpable means of infusing a  people with otherness such that they 
feel a visceral sense of belonging to one another and to God, impor tant 
as that might be for countermanding marital and genealogical notions 
of togetherness. Instead, what I am describing as the sense- method of a 
Barnesian sacra/mentality includes the rupturing bodily encounters both 
excised from the rite of penance by the or ga nized church, and indicative 
of what it means to  really host the other, which includes opening oneself 
to the pain of their past. Nightwood ’s counterpoint to the regime of sexu-
ality, with the latter’s verbalization of every thing, is something like can-
nibalism, a completely diff er ent use of the mouth— though I’d argue that 
it is a mutual and reciprocal eating in which neither party is completely 
dead. Thus for Nightwood, cannibalism is less a shattering of the self than 
a remixing of it. This is what I would like to stress as crucial to a queer 
hypersociability that countermands both the sexological, taxonomic im-
perative of the fin de siècle and modernism, and the current queer anti-
social thesis: Nightwood ’s method of affinity risks wounding encounters 
between bodies, and encounters between previously wounded bodies. 
Yet its queer hypersociability is not afraid of risking images of  wholeness 
in the figure, or of taking the figure too literally (or, indeed, of taking the 
figure into the body). It understands that history hurts, but the gustatory 
trope allows for other experiences of history, including that of satisfaction. 
And it does not disavow connections between  humans, and between 
 humans and  others, that some might call merely religious.
We can see a glimpse of this queer sociability that I am linking to a sac-
ramental outlook in Matthew’s statement that “Nora  will leave [Robin] 
some day, but though  those two are buried at opposite ends of the earth, 
one dog  will find them both” (Barnes [1936] 2006, 113). What links 
Robin and Nora is not a rosy vision of a shared subjectivity achieved 
by eating the same substance, nor an exalted spiritual state of living to-
gether  after death, but a shared susceptibility to being eaten by the same 
creature.  Here again, animals lead us to the extralinguistic aspect of the 
sacramental, and its ability, as a sense- method, to provide connective tis-
sue between the dead and the living, the past and the pre sent. And it is 
Nora, again, who figures the passion of giving her body and blood to be 
eaten for this purpose: “Nora robbed herself for every one; incapable of 
giving herself warning, she was continually turning about to find her-
self diminished. . . .  She was by fate one of  those  people who are born 
unprovided for, except in the provision of herself ” (57–58). This figure 
of eating impurity, of offering the body as necessarily impure  because 
 human food, throws a wrench into any fantasy of confession as commu-
nication, as language purified of power relations—if indeed one could 
have such a fantasy  after Foucault. The narrator insists that Nora’s “good 
is incommunicable” (57), that her passions “ma[k]e the seventh day im-
mediate” (58) in a way that obviates questions of belief and makes faith 
a material  matter. The narrator continues, “To ‘confess’ to her was an act 
even more secret than the communication provided by a priest . . .  she 
recorded without reproach or accusation, being shorn of self- reproach 
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or self- accusation” (58). In the figure of a confession that is “more secret” 
than the “communication provided by a priest,” the pun on “communica-
tion” (which means both to converse and to administer the sacraments) 
suggests that Nora offers up and receives a Eucharist of a visceral, non-
verbal kind.
In all, then, Nightwood moves from the confessional whereby acts, 
fantasies, and desires turn into discourse; through the baptism whereby 
immersion in, drinking of, and exchanging  water enables a reconfigura-
tion of the social; through the laying on of hands whereby the past is a 
visceral encounter; to the Eucharist, where consumption remixes both 
selfhood and the pre sent. Tracking this, I have asked: if sexuality and its 
other in the proj ect of ascesis both emerge from the rite of confession, 
what would the other that Foucault calls friendship, and I am calling 
queer hypersociability, look like if  imagined in terms of the rite of the 
Eucharist, a sense- method that seems opposed to ecstatic religion but 
shares the latter’s fantasies about how bodies can be conjoined through 
material means? It would, I have suggested, look more engaged with past-
ness, vio lence, and memory, and involve collisions of bodies with one an-
other and with spirit and animal, rather than just like sex as we know it. 
If New Historicism also emerged from a rejection of that Eucharist, what 
would a Eucharistic imagining of the historical look like, and what is its 
purchase for queer theory? It would not counterpose the figural and the 
historical but exploit the trace of the visceral in the sign for new forms 
of connectivity, insisting that the queer and the social are inseparable. 
I think Nightwood helps im mensely in thinking about  these questions. 
The sacra/mentality of Djuna Barnes lies in her commitment to the tan-
gible, the perceptible: in her version of history, we leave our body and our 
blood to be eaten by the dogs.
In Amiri Baraka’s short- short story “Rhythm Travel” 
([1995] 2009), an African American man uses timing 
to time travel— specifically, he seizes musical meter as 
a way to si mul ta neously move from historical scene to 
historical scene and to join with groups of  people who 
preceded him and  will succeed him.  After manifesting 
himself before the story’s narrator as Theolonius Monk’s 
“Misterioso” (1958), the unnamed traveler declares, 
“Dis visibility, be unseen. But now I can be around any-
way, perceived, felt, heard. I can be the  music” (Baraka 
[1995] 2009, 148). Through this technology— which 
he names, in its vari ous developmental stages in rapid 
succession, “Molecular Anyscape. The Resoulocator . . . 
T- Disappear” (148)— the man has solved the prob lem 
of visibility that plagues the spectacularized African 
American male, creating an “unseen” visibility, a sense- 
method for evincing himself into historically specific 
scenes of sociability. His latest improvements, he tells 
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the narrator, have “pushed the Anyscape into Rhythm Spectroscopic 
Transformation” (149). While the science  here is shaky, the idea encoded 
in this name is that sound can be parsed into discrete units on a spectrum, 
rhythmic items which become exchangeable for one another across time. 
This allows the traveler to enter other historical moments by becoming 
a piece of period  music and then reappearing “anywhere and anytime” 
(149) that par tic u lar  music plays— much as Of One Blood ’s Dianthe Lusk 
seems to have traveled across time from ancient Ethiopia by way of sing-
ing, except that  here the emphasis is not on lyr ics or melody but on the 
beat. As Baraka (1994 [2009], 123) puts it elsewhere, “Rhythm is the most 
basic, the shortest of all stories, the Be & At.” In other words, rhythm, 
“beat,” is both manifestation (be) and location (at), which makes some 
sense of why it allows Baraka’s rhythm traveler to go places.
While “Rhythm Travel” is a late twentieth- century work of Afrofu-
turist science fiction, it is worth pausing to note the way it gathers to-
gether the themes I have been pursuing in this book. First, it develops the 
idea that being together with  others is a  matter of keeping in time with 
them. Baraka recognizes that timing is crucial not only to how respon-
sive flesh becomes constituted into bodiliness and subjectivity but also 
to engroupment—to how bodies come together, and how subjectivities 
are constituted and modified in that coming together. As he writes in an 
essay, rhythm is sociability in a nutshell, for it is “the splitting of the one 
into two” (Baraka [1994] 2009, 122). In other words,  there is no rhythm 
without more than one sonic or kinesthetic event, and rhythm is what 
conjoins them; similarly, the body becomes ex- tensive, stretching out-
ward in rhythmic response, becoming more than itself. Timing, then, is 
a constitutive aspect of how bodies become oriented  toward one another 
both synchronically and diachronically, how they come to feel tempo-
rally coincident or connected across historical eras.
“Rhythm Travel” links this pro cess to the two outer historical edges 
of this book, an admittedly somewhat underspecified period of enslave-
ment and an early twentieth  century specified by the date 1920. As to the 
first, Baraka’s unnamed traveler describes becoming the slave song “Take 
This Hammer” and being “sung” into the scene, as he echoes slaves dig-
ging a well to the musical accompaniment of their own voices: “They 
 were singing this and I begin to echo. A big hollow echo, a sorta blue 
shattering echo” (Baraka [1995] 2009, 150). “Shattered” out of their mis-
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ery by this transhistorical call- and- response, the slaves “got to smilin 
 because it made them feel good,” while the  owners and overseers take 
on a rhythm of their own, “turn[ing] their heads sharply back and forth, 
looking  behind them and at the slaves” (150).  Here, timing has momentarily 
united the slaves to one another and to their freeborn descendants, while 
deindividualizing their white captors into a head- bobbing, paranoid 
mass. In a second historical allusion, Baraka’s traveler finances the im-
provements on his technology by robbing banks, a nod to W. E. B. Du 
Bois’s science fiction short story “The Comet” ([1920] 1999), whose pro-
tagonist is a messenger serving a bank. Yet another moment of homage 
to Du Bois appears when the traveler remarks, “You prob ably heard of 
the Scatting Comet” (Baraka [1995] 2009, 150), turning the comet away 
from the doom it portends in Du Bois’s story and  toward another rhyth-
mic act in which the body, including the  human voice, is an instrument 
for sociability rather than a signifier of it. Whereas Du Bois’s comet emits 
toxic gases that kill off almost the entirety of New York City, Baraka’s 
Scatting Comet invites the traveler and the narrator into a scene of pos-
sibility. As the traveler assures the narrator in the story’s last lines, “ Ain’t 
no danger. Just  don’t pick a corny tune” (150).
“Rhythm Travel” also nicely condenses the themes of this book  because 
it implicitly endorses the idea of biopolitics as a merger of two devel-
opments in the organ ization of time: discipline, which oriented living 
bodies  toward one another through inculcating synchrony between their 
movements, and historical time, which oriented living bodies  toward the 
dead and the unborn through inculcating a sense of temporal sequence, 
consequence, and succession. Thought in terms of time, biopolitics con-
sists of managing populations first via individual disciplinary techniques, 
then through large- scale coordination of their activities, and fi nally by 
their ideological situation on a timeline of  those consigned  either to 
ahistoricity/obsolescence or modernity/futurity— the timeline of race. 
In his trip to the plantation, Baraka’s time traveler uses the foundation of 
discipline, the rhythmic activity of keeping together in time, to enter the 
era of slavery in which he, his compatriots, and his pre de ces sors count 
as ahistorical waste, and to bring them some momentary plea sure. In his 
trip to the Scatting Comet, he also enters the scientific  future, claiming, 
“I turned into some Sun Ra and hung out inside gravity” (Baraka [1995] 
2009, 150). Becoming the  music of Sun Ra, the traveler can unmake a law 
that is both physiological and po liti cal: the downward pull of gravity has 
special purchase for a population terrorized by the mob hangings that 
emerged  after the Civil War, and hanging “out” rather than “down,” being 
“inside” of a force rather than the object of it, suggests an ability to bend 
it other ways.
 These kinds of acts are exactly what I have been tracking in this book: 
I have been interested in small- scale temporal coincidences between 
bodies, achieved through corporeal praxes opening out from face- to- 
face community  toward the larger population and  toward other mo-
ments on the historical timeline. Through repre sen ta tions of the Shakers, 
I have demonstrated how dance was used for face- to- face recruitment 
away from the norms of Protestant- secular, heterogendered whiteness. 
Through nineteenth- century African American lit er a ture, I have shown 
how miming death was used as a wedge against social death. Through 
Twain’s and Hopkins’s early science fiction novels, I have tracked how 
amateur historiography, for which time travel is a figure, worked against 
dominant historicisms and their racial implications. Through Melville’s 
and Stein’s tales of debility, I have suggested a queer and crip chronicity 
that countered the rhythms of racial uplift and  human resource manage-
ment. And through Djuna Barnes’s modernist novel shot through with 
Catholic sensibilities, I have laid out how the sacramental contested the 
Protestant secularity of the regime of sexuality itself.
Taken together,  these chapters remind us that the nineteenth  century 
was not just a drama of national space and scale, inflected by imperialism, 
capitalism, and Manifest Destiny (even as  these too are temporal con-
structs). It was also a drama of temporality, in which bodies  were timed 
into official and minor forms of belonging, and arranged in historical 
relation to one another— a drama whose opening and closing curtains 
do not neatly correspond with the turn of centuries but tangle with one 
another as regimes of secularity, race, and health, among other forms of 
power, rise and consolidate. My hope is that this book also  matters for the 
pre sent, insofar as it allows us to conceptualize social formation beyond 
and beside the linguistic, as an embodied and affective pro cess. Sense- 
methods are not just for the past. They are for now, for being around 
other wise: perceived, felt, heard.
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Introduction
 1 See, e.g., the Rule of St. Benedict (6th  century ad), which prescribes the eight ca-
nonical hours for prayers and hours for meals. Foucault’s second and third vol-
umes of The History of Sexuality also describe the regimes of self- care and bodily 
exercise that, while not precisely equivalent to the timetable, greatly precede the 
prison timetable he uses as a figure for modern discipline. See Foucault 1990b and 
1990c.
 2 Thompson 1967 dates the uneven emergence of time- discipline somewhat  earlier, at 
the turn of the eigh teenth  century.
 3 I thank my second anonymous reader for Duke University Press for this formulation.
 4 Foucault (1979, 155) is rather breezy about what preceded this new body, the 
 “mechanical body.”
 5 “The time of each must be adjusted to the time of the  others in such a way that the 
maximum quality of forces may be extracted from each and combined with the 
optimum result” (Foucault 1979, 164).
 6 The majority of essays in Gregg and Seigworth’s The Affect Studies Reader (2010) 
engage with the concept of habitus.
 7 In the first volume of The History of Sexuality (1990a), Foucault describes cultures 
with an ars erotica as non- Western. In the second two volumes (Foucault 1990b and 
1990c), he considers the ars erotica of ancient Greece and their reformulations  under 
Roman rule, respectively, but with an emphasis on practices of selfhood and self- 
knowledge rather than on collective action, making them less useful for this proj ect 
than they might other wise be.
 8  Here, I am reversing Hardt and Negri’s (2004, 94–95) distinction between biopower 
as sovereign order, separate from society, and biopolitics as immanent, relational, and 
potentially oppositional, precisely  because in much recent queer- theoretical work, 
“biopolitics” has been centered on the state.
 9 I owe this formulation to my first anonymous reader at Duke University Press.
 10 A working bibliography on American sentimental culture would include E. Barnes 
1997; Berlant 2008; Burgett 1998; Carby 1987; Coviello 2005; Douglas 1977; Ellison 
1999; Hendler 2001; Howard 1999; Luciano 2007; Noble 2000; Romero 1997; S. 
Samuels 1992; Schuller 2017; S. M. Smith 1999; and Tate 1992. Schuller 2017 has 
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made a compelling case that sentimentalism was first and foremost a racializing dis-
course, with gender dimorphism following as an effect of whiteness.
 11 I have learned the most about the racialization of sentiment from Schuller 2017 and 
S. M. Smith 1999.
 12 Anderson 1982; Luciano 2007; and Kete 2000 are astute about the role of mourn-
ing ritual in organ izing collectively- felt time. On collecting and tourism as part of 
the inculcation of historical feeling, see Lockwood 2015. Brief histories of the prac-
tice of historical reenactment can be found in McCalman and Pickering 2010. For a 
beautiful theorization of historical reenactment, see Schneider 2011. The history of 
tableaux vivants is detailed in Holmström 1967, 209–63.
 13 On femme receptivity, see Cvetkovich 2003, 49–82.
 14 Thanks to Dana Luciano for bringing this connection to my attention.
 15 For an assertion that the gay white male archive and the antisocial thesis are linked, 
see Halberstam in Caserio, Edelman, Halberstam, and Muñoz 2006.
Chapter 1. Shake It Off
 1 For example, “An Indian Tune” (undated) ran “Quo we lorezum qwini /qui qwini 
qwe qwini qwe / Hock a nick a hick nick / qwini qwi qwo cum” (Andrews [1963] 
2011, 74), while “Arkumshaw’s Farewell” (also undated) featured the lyr ics “Me 
tanke de white man for who me did fess / Me tank de good Elder who he did address 
/ Me feel poor and needy me want me soul save / An now lest me weary de white 
man me leave” (Andrews [1963] 2011, 75).
 2 On the Mormons, see Coviello 2013; Bentley 2002; and Hickman 2014. On the 
heteroreproductive timing of the period, see Luciano 2007.
 3 Jagose 2012 offers another example outside the historical scope of this chapter, fo-
cusing on the promotion of simultaneous orgasms in marriage and sex manuals of 
the early twentieth  century.
 4 On celibacy as a form of sociability in reform cultures, see Kahan 2013.
Chapter 2. The Gift of Constant Escape
 1 See, for example, Holland 2000; Luciano 2003; Parham 2008.
 2 On surrogation, see Roach 1996.
 3 See Harris 1881a. This American tale dates from at least the nineteenth  century but 
has its roots in West African storytelling as well as other traditions; the folklorist D. L 
Ashliman characterizes it as Aarne- Thompson- Uther type 1 and traces it to nineteenth- 
century Eu rope, Scotland, Scandinavia, and Palestine, as well as India’s Panchatantra, 
compiled between the third and fifth centuries ad (see Ashliman 2000–2018). For 
the African version, see Courlander and Prempeh 1957. The Bahamas version starring 
Boukee is from Parsons 1918. Variants are also cata logued in Green 2006.
 4 I thank my second anonymous reader for Duke University Press for this formulation.
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 5 I thank my second anonymous reader for Duke University Press for helping me 
think through a more precise version of this paragraph.
 6 Genovese ([1974] 1976) cites Nietz sche 1927, 432; Troeltsch 1950; and Kautsky 1953. 
See Genovese (1974) 1976, 707–8, notes 5, 7, and 8.
 7 Several theorists of black domesticity have explored how black  women, including 
Jacobs, both exploited and subverted domestic ideology. See, for example, Carby 
1987; DuCille 1993; and Reid- Pharr 1999.
 8 For an analy sis of how Douglass’s and Jacobs’s narratives understand marriage as a 
complicated and not always salutary relation to the state, see Coviello 2013.
 9 This is somewhat diff er ent than Hartman’s beautiful “The Time of Slavery” (2002). 
Hartman means to situate the temporality of slavery in the pre sent, for black 
 Eu ro pe ans and Americans. Jacobs, writing contemporaneously with slavery, means 
to repudiate the deathly form of domesticity.
 10  Here, of course, I am thinking about Michael Brown, who on August 9, 2014, in 
Ferguson, Missouri, was shot twelve times by police officer Darren Dean Wilson 
despite being unarmed. Brown’s body was left in the road for four hours. See Hunn 
and Bell 2014.
 11 In Fanon’s ([1952] 1994) Black Skin, White Masks, the narrator describes being 
hailed as a “Negro” by a taunting white child, an experience that, far from confirm-
ing and consolidating his bodily imago, ruptures it. The scene famously reverses 
Lacan’s mirror stage, in which the child experiences its separateness and bodily 
bound aries through an alienated mirror image. Thus the affirmation of blackness is, 
in Fanon’s terms, a negation of psychic and bodily  wholeness.
 12 The most comprehensive explanation of Afropessimism, which attributes the term 
to Saidiya Hartman and explains the original meaning, is Wilderson 2010; see 
especially 346–47n9.
 13 See also Hartman (2002, 759), which argues in a slightly diff er ent vein vis- à- vis 
 African ancestors that “we are coeval with the dead.”
 14 The most forceful articulations of the relationship between blackness and non- or 
antihumanity, besides Fanon, are Wynter 1984 and (1992) 1994; and Wilderson 
2010. Vari ous other ways of formulating this include Chandler 2008; Gordon 
2010; Hartman 2003; Sexton 2008; and Spillers 1987. I mean  here not to reduce 
 these works of scholarship to one another but to mark them as being in a larger 
conversation.
 15 See, for example, Richard Wright’s Native Son ([1940] 2005).
 16 I owe this formulation to my second reader for Duke University Press.
 17 See Mbembe (2003, 23): “The slave nevertheless is able to draw almost any object, 
instrument, language, or gesture into a per for mance and then stylize it.” See also 
much of Fred Moten’s work; for example, Moten 2003, 2008a, 2008b.
 18 I name Moten an Afro- optimist in the playful spirit of queer studies, where “queer 
optimism” (see Snediker 2009 for the phrase) has been described as a response to 
the antisocial thesis, and following Sexton 2011.
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 19 Cohen (1997) makes much the same point in “Punks, Bulldaggers, and Welfare 
Queens,” where she argues that a queer politics based on radical outsiderness to 
heterosexuality cannot recognize the ways that even the marital- reproductive black 
 family is never accorded full heteronormativity.
 20 In the bibliography, I list this first edition  under Charles Stearns’s names, following 
critical assessment that this edition contains a  great deal of Stearns’s writing, and to 
distinguish it from the 1851 version, in which Brown apparently had a greater hand. 
Quotations are from the 2008 edition of the 1851 version.
 21 See, for example, Brooks 2006, 71.
 22 The credit for locating the figures of Brown and his box— figures 2.1–2.5— belongs 
to Ruggles 2003. I thank him for this work, and hope to build on it by closely inter-
preting the images.
 23 I am reading Brown’s per for mances with his box, which preceded his stage work as 
a mesmerist and practitioner of electro- biology, as a deliberately incomplete enact-
ment of the “fugitive,” much in the way Britt Rusert (2017) reads Brown’s  later stage 
work as “fugitive science.”
 24 On polyrhythm, see Arom 1991. On the slave songs, see, famously, Du Bois (1903) 
1997.
 25 The racial ele ment of the zombie myth is that voudon, or “voodoo,” makes zombifi-
cation pos si ble.
Chapter 3. Feeling Historicisms
 1 Collins (1986) distinguishes between narratives where time travel is explic itly ren-
dered as a hallucination, thought experiment, or dream, and fictions of explic itly 
physical time travel.
 2 The works Twain read before writing Connecticut Yankee include William Edward 
Hartpole Lecky’s History of Eu ro pean Morals, Hippolyte Taine’s The Ancient 
 Regime, Carlyle’s The French Revolution, George Standring’s  People’s History of En-
glish Aristocracy, and Charles Ball’s Slavery in the United States. For a comprehensive 
bibliography of Twain’s historical readings that is prob ably in need of updating, see 
J. D. Williams 1965.
 3 For a good account of this pro cess, see Kahan 2017.
 4 The name Amyas is derived from the Latin amare, “to love.”
 5 “Yankee” (n.), etymology, Oxford En glish Dictionary, last accessed November  13, 
2018, http:// www . oed . com / viewdictionaryentry / Entry / 231174.
 6 “Hank” (n.), definitions 7 and 4a respectively (rare or dialect), Oxford En glish Dic-
tionary, last accessed November 13, 2018, http:// www . oed . com / viewdictionaryentry 
/ Entry / 83999.
 7 On pre ce dent, casuistry, and romantic historiography, see Goode 2009; on amateur 
historiography, see B. G. Smith 1998; on the dangers of plea sure, see, for example 
Horkheimer and Adorno 1969. On queer theory’s dangerous ahistoricism, see espe-
cially Morton 1993.
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 8 I owe the phrase “the sexuality of history” to Goode 2009.
 9 On antitheatricality in the Eigh teenth Brumaire, see Parker 1991.
 10 On the Reconstruction- era domestic romance, see Carby 1987 and Tate 1992. On 
science fiction as emerging in the nineteenth  century  after Mary Shelley’s Franken-
stein (1818), see, e.g., Spree 1973 and Scholes and Rabkin 1977. Works by African 
American authors that imagine alternative  futures rather than pasts include Martin 
Delany’s Blake, or the Huts of Amer i ca (1859), Frances Ellen Watkins Harper’s Iola 
Leroy (1892), and Sutton E. Griggs’s Imperium in Imperio (1899).
 11 Alternate history is history that would have followed if a par tic u lar event had tran-
spired, a kind of temporal twist on future- set speculative fiction.
 12 On mesmerism as a trope for rape and other sexual violations, see S. M. Smith 1999; 
as Smith demonstrates, this is especially evident in Hawthorne’s The House of the 
Seven Gables (1851).
 13 I’m alluding  here to Walter Benn Michaels’s (1987) classic reading of late nineteenth- 
century lit er a ture in terms of crises over the gold standard, The Gold Standard and 
the Logic of Naturalism, and Philip K. Fisher’s (1985) historicist reading of popu lar 
American lit er a ture in terms of the realities it made palatable, Hard Facts: Setting 
and Form in the American Novel.
 14 On turns to the archaic, obsolete, and negative in the lit er a ture of same- sex love, see 
Love 2009. For an elegant theory of queer anachronism, see Rohy 2009.
Chapter 4. The Sense of Unending
 1 “Chronic” (adj), definition 1, Oxford En glish Dictionary, last accessed December 17, 
2018, http:// www . oed . com / view / Entry / 32570.
 2 For a beautiful meditation on the way chronic illness transforms time, see Samuels 
2017.
 3 As it turns out, I am not the first critic to consider “Bartleby, the Scrivener” and 
Stein together in terms of chronicity, which I discovered midway through drafting 
this chapter. Michael Snediker, in a brilliantly quirky essay on Melville (including 
“Bartleby”), Stein (though not “Melanctha”), and chronic pain, focuses on “pre-
fer” as in “like,” and “like” in terms of “the inexorable everydayness of chronic pain” 
(Snediker 2015, 2). For Snediker, the opacity and re sis tance of the word “like”— 
the modern- day “prefer”— a seemingly transparent and inconsequential word that 
actually “pulses in and out of legibility” (3), makes it good for thinking about the 
body whose utility and functions cannot be taken for granted. He reads Melville 
as an author who “treats the word like, even when it behaves grammatically as it 
should, as a word resistant to disappearing into its function” (13), which is precisely 
Stein’s linguistic proj ect as well. Where I would differ from Snediker is in pivoting 
a bit from bodily pain and  toward other chronic conditions often named as psycho-
logical that we might attribute to Bartleby and Melanctha— laziness? recalcitrance? 
anhedonia?— and through  these,  toward the chronic as a malady of tense and time. 
In other words, if for Snediker, Melville and Stein both pursue a re sis tance to ableist 
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notions of bodily function through their use of repetition, for me, this proj ect is 
fundamentally a sensory and temporal one, which can produce bodies whose tense-
lessness is precisely their way of apprehending and transforming their contexts.
 4 My interest in linguistic defectiveness is inspired, in part, by Chen 2012. For a de-
tailed and rigorous consideration of tense in American lit er a ture, see Weinstein 
2015.
 5 For an extended meditation on this question, see Arsić 2007.
 6 Con temporary disability activists refer to this as the “spoon theory” of energy: 
 people with disabilities wake up with a limited amount of energy, meta phorized as 
a handful of spoons.  Every task costs a spoon, and when the spoons run out, the 
person has no choice but to rest and replenish. See Miserandino 2003.
 7 Irving Fisher does not use this phrase, but does refer to “vital resources” and consis-
tently analogizes the population to the country’s “lands,  waters, minerals, and for-
ests” (I. Fisher 1908, 1). The Oxford En glish Dictionary cites the first use of “ human 
resources” as 1915. (“ Human resources” (n.), definition 1, Oxford En glish Dictionary, 
last accessed December 17, 2018, http:// www . oed . com / view / Entry / 274632).
 8 The Greek compound is my speculation; name dictionaries give no documented 
etymology for “Melanctha.” Philipp Schwarzerdt (whose last name, meaning “black 
earth” in German, was changed to Melanchthon, or “black earth” in Greek, in 
honor of his proficiency in the latter language) was a con temporary and friend of 
Martin Luther.
 9 On Stein and cubism, see Steiner 1978 and Dubnick 1984.
 10 Ironically, Wiedman (2010, 52) advocates the promotion of “cardiovascular fitness, 
nutritional balance, and reasonable stress levels” at the individual and vari ous collec-
tive levels.
 11 For an excellent reading of “Melanctha” along  these lines, see Fleissner 2004.
 12 In fact, Bartleby’s lumpen endurance resonates quite a bit with Lauren Berlant’s (2011) 
“cruel optimism,” the condition of attachment to that which prevents one’s thriving.
 13 “Chronic” (adj.), definition no. 3 (transf.), Oxford En glish Dictionary, last accessed 
December 17, 2018, http:// www . oed . com / view / Entry / 32570.
 14 “Chronic” (adj.), draft addition, June 2007, Oxford En glish Dictionary, last accessed 
December 17, 2018, http:// www . oed . com / view / Entry / 32570.
 15 Urbandictionary . com gives the following definitions: “sinthetek,” entry 4 (March 16, 
2005); “Diego,” entry 8 #3 ( July 18, 2003), “Oki3,” entry 57 ( July 22, 2006), at http:// 
www . urbandictionary . com / define . php ? term = chronic.
 16 The phrase “chresis aphrodesion” translates as “the use of plea sure,” the title of the 
second volume of The History of Sexuality (Foucault 1990b).
 17 For an expansive sense of how breath, spirit, and religious ritual create new forms of 
sociability, see Crawley 2016.
 18 This version of faith interestingly connects to Harney and Moten’s (2013, 97–98) 
concept of “the feel,” a sensation of visceral interconnection among black bodies 
whose ancestral history includes being crushed together in the ship’s hold during the 
 Middle Passage.
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Chapter 5. Sacra/mentality in Djuna Barnes’s Nightwood
 1 On Native Americans’ speech as “enthusiastic,” I have learned from Kilgore 2017; 
on the Mormons, see Coviello (2013, 104–28) and Freeman (2002); on spiritualism, 
see McGarry 2012. I’ve also written about the Oneida Perfectionists in some of the 
same terms; see Freeman 2004.
 2 See Franchot 1994; Nordstrom 2006.
 3 The exception is Veltman 2003. The extant bibliography on Nightwood ’s exploration 
of Judaism, by contrast, is large. It includes Trubowitz 2012; Hanrahan 2001; and 
Altman 1993. In terms of Catholicism, Nightwood has also been read as a neode-
cadent text (see Blyn 2008), and de cadence is complexly entwined with Catholi-
cism (see Hanson 1997). But nobody has taken Nightwood seriously as, in some 
ways, a Catholic theology, or perhaps a countertheology of Catholicism.
 4 Chauncey (1995) contends that  until World War II, sexuality was not fully consoli-
dated  under the homo/hetero divide but was understood in gay male communities 
and by the dominant culture on a model of gender inversion, with “queer” signi-
fying sexual interest in other men but normative gender pre sen ta tion, and “fairy” 
signifying a more stigmatized gender inversion accompanied by an interest in other 
men.
 5 Foucault (1990a, 58) also cites the Fourth Lateran Council as a turning point.
 6 Kibbey (1986, 7) writes that for Puritans in the En glish colonies, salvation was “es-
sentially a linguistic event,” in which listeners’ relation to their own language was 
transformed in a “conversion from one system of meaning to another.” But of course 
any scholar of early modern lit er a ture and culture  will recognize that my schematic 
division of Catholics into “the material” and Protestants into “the textual” is an 
oversimplification. As Kearney (2009, 22) has argued, Protestants strug gled with 
the prob lem that the text itself is material, and also believed that responses to the 
Word would and should be somatic (34). I think it is fair, though, to say that non-
verbal transactions are less impor tant to Protestants than to even post- Reformation 
Catholics.
 7 For detailed renditions of the same story, see both Haliczer 1996 and Martos 2001.
 8 For a concise history of each sacrament, see Martos 2001; on Aquinas in par tic u lar, 
see Martos 2001, 60–64.
 9 For an enumeration of the  matter and form of each sacrament, see Catholic Church 
2011.
 10 In addition to Martos 2001, 351–80, see Coontz 2006, 106–7; Goody 1983 makes a 
compelling argument that the Catholic Church became involved in marriage regu-
lation and rites  because they wanted to wrestle large tracts of land away from aristo-
cratic landholders, with uninheritable lands defaulting automatically to the Church.
 11 On penance and the two Councils, see Martos 2001, 295 and 308–12.
 12 Thelma Wood, her lover. See Field 1983, 137.
 13 On antimodern premodernism, see Lears 1994; on identifications with the sexual 
formations made obsolete by the hetero/homo divide, see Love 2009; on the 
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reification of “sexuality” as part of a larger aspect of the system of production, see 
Floyd 2009.
 14 Persuasive readings along  these lines include Seitler (2008, 94–128) and Stockton 
(2009).
 15 I take my understanding of disembodiment as a relay to citizenship from Warner 
1990b and Berlant 2008.
 16 Note that by “sexuality”  here Foucault means not the regime of knowledge/power 
but something more like “erotic acts.”
 17 Interestingly, Bersani and Phillips (2008) offer up the analytic scene as just this 
promising kind of impersonal relational mode. But again, it’s all talk— and thereby 
conforms to a Protestant split between an apprehending and cognizing mind and a 
body that cannot take on this function. In this sense it repudiates Freud’s compelling 
claims about the symptom as a means of bodily knowledge and communication. 
More promising is their discussion of the original scene for the impersonal, the dis-
interested love of God theorized by Catholic mystics in the late seventeenth  century 
as le pur amor, in which love of God does not depend on  whether God is merciful 
or vengeful to  humans: love is,  here, indifferent to reward or punishment for that 
love. But though they analogize that kind of love to “bareback” (condom- free) sex 
between men, Bersani and Phillips do not elaborate upon the role of bodily acts. It 
does seem crucial that they cite Saint Catherine of Genoa’s inability, as a follower of 
pure love, to confess her sins (51–53).
 18 This would, of course, be wrong. For a moving account of how pre- Stonewall lesbi-
ans and gay men understood themselves as connected to historical periods, popula-
tions, and figures not their own, see Nealon 2001.
 19 For example, a masterful, though not precisely New Historicist, account of how 
historical ele ments deconstruct the morality of Hawthorne’s tales and sketches is 
Colacurcio 1984.
 20 While the New Americanists by no means excluded sexuality or queer theory from 
consideration, I think it is fair to say that their suspicion of the aesthetic made it dif-
ficult to claim certain queer strategies as directly po liti cal or, indeed, historicizing. 
I consider Dinshaw 1999 and Nealon 2001 to be the inaugural books in the shift 
 toward considering queer modes of historiography. McGarry 2012 is a splendid ex-
ample of queer theory, religious studies, and historiographical questions reinflecting 
one another.
 21 I have argued elsewhere, following the lead of R. Dyer 1986 and Ross 1989, that 
camp is best understood as a queer archival practice, albeit without the reverence 
for preservation that accompanies archival work. See Freeman 2010.
 22 “Camp” (adj.), Oxford En glish Dictionary, last accessed December 19, 2018, http:// 
www . oed . com / view / Entry / 26746.
 23 When I was writing Time Binds, I somehow failed to come across David Román’s 
formulation of archival drag, for which I apologize to him.
 24 On the history and theological disputes over the laying on of hands, see Tipei 2009.
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